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Abstract 
The aim of this thesis is to amalgamate philosophy and history of science with literature 
to achieve an overview of changing ideas of the animal/human divide during the 
nineteenth century. Drawing on the ideas of Jacques Derrida, Friedrich Nietzsche, Julia 
Kristeva and Giorgio Agamben. I consider this divide and its contents, often regarded as 
an abyss. The study is written like a time line, starting at the beginning of the nineteenth 
century and finishing at the end. I split the nineteenth century into four time periods 
centred around the emergence of Darwinian theory, considered by this study to be the 
single most prolific scientific event to have occurred during the nineteenth century. 
These time frames are the pre-Darwinian, the early Darwinian, the late Darwinian and 
the post-Darwinian. The study is split into four chapters which coincide with these time 
frames, covering four different novels which exemplify contextually relevant ideas of the 
abyss. These are Frankenstein by Mary Shelley, Moby-Dick by Herman Melville, Crime 
and Punishment by Fyodor Dostoevsky and The Island of Doctor Moreau by H.G.  Wells. 
During the course of this study I consider various ideas applied by the authors about the 
abyssal limits and what they consist of. These include considerations on reason, society, 
morality and spirituality, all ideas used in various different manners to attempt to 
explain the abyss. From these various deliberations I formulate a conclusion which takes 
into account the various nuances which would have effected each of the writer’s 
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Introduction 
The implications of Charles Darwin’s theory of natural selection are humbling 
considering how religion and Cartesian philosophy had previously elevated the 
human species. With his revolutionary On the Origin of Species (1859) Darwin 
produced viable evidence for a theory that had been in scientific discussion for 
years but never published as a single study1. Humans, according to Darwinian 
theory, could no longer be considered the favoured species of a supreme being. 
Sigmund Freud summarizes this concept in An Infantile Neurosis: 
In the course of the development of civilization man acquired a 
dominating position over his fellow-creatures in the animal kingdom. 
Not content with this supremacy, he began to place a gulf between his 
nature and theirs. He denied the possession of reason to them, and to 
himself he attributed an immortal soul, and made claims to a divine 
descent which permitted him to break the bonds between him and 
the animal kingdom . . . We all know that little more than half a 
century ago the researches of Charles Darwin and his contributors 
and forerunners put an end to this presumption on the part of man. 
Man is not a being different from animals or superior to them; he 
himself is of animal descent, being more closely related to some 
species and more distantly to others.2                                          
                                                          
1 Charles Darwin, The Origin of Species, By Means of Natural Selection, London: HarperCollins 
Publishers, 2012 Subsequent page references in text. 
2 Sigmund Freud, An Infantile Neurosis, London: Random House, 2001 (140) Subsequent page 
references in text. 
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Freud’s argument posits that what separates humanity from the animal is 
evolutionary success alone, yet arrogance had allowed humans to imagine a gulf 
between themselves and other creatures. What Freud alludes to when he 
mentions a “gulf”, is a conceptual enigma in philosophy that is described as an 
“abyss”. It is a concept approached by various philosophers in an attempt to 
explain the distinction between the animal and the human. During the 
nineteenth century, with the introduction of Darwinism, more philosophical 
considerations of the difference between animal and humankind were produced, 
as humanity’s place in the world was considered increasingly more dubious. 
According to Gillian Beer whose seminal Darwin’s Plots inspired this study: 
“Instead, in Darwinian myth, the history of man is of a difficult extensive family 
network which takes in barnacles as well as bees, an extended family which will 
never permit the aspiring climber-man-quite to forget his lowly origins.”3 What 
had been a clear, yawning division between human and animal, was now in a 
state of flux, depending upon whether you were a conservative creationist, a 
radical evolutionist, or somewhere in between. Darwinism effectively 
problematized the abyss, opening it up to a discussion that still seems unlikely 
to ever be resolved. That discussion can be found embedded in much of the 
literature of the nineteenth century. The purpose of my study is to examine how 
approaches to the abyss changed and developed throughout the nineteenth 
century, so I can effectively demonstrate how Darwinism changed the literary 
perception of humanity’s relationship with the animal.  
                                                          
3 Gillian Beer, Darwin’s Plots, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009. Subsequent page 
references in text. 
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Few philosophers would argue that there is absolutely no abyss separating 
humanity and animality. For example, in The Animal That Therefore I Am Jacques 
Derrida explicitly states: “I have never believed in some homogenous continuity 
between what calls itself man and what he calls animal”4. Furthermore scientists 
still actively research and discuss what constitutes the difference between 
human and animal, for example, neuroscientist V.S. Ramachandran, in his 
bestselling The Tell-Tale Brain (2012) neuroscientist V.S. Ramachandran argues 
that: 
There is no region or structure that appears to have been grafted into 
the brain de novo by an intelligent designer; at the anatomical level, 
every part of our brain has direct analogue in the brains of the great 
apes. However, recent research has identified a handful of brain 
regions that have been so radically elaborated that at a functional (or 
cognitive) level they actually can be considered novel and unique.5  
Ramachandran demonstrates that although the brain is more developed in 
humans, each part of its structure can be traced back to our simian origins. 
Although Darwinian theory is generally accepted today in the scientific 
community, the philosophical implications are still under scrutiny. During the 
nineteenth century, Darwin’s scientific revolution inspired re-examination of 
many of these questions. Once the theory of the separate creation of humanity 
could be considered void, there was a necessity for a new explanation of our 
                                                          
4 Jacques Derrida, The Animal that Therefore I Am, Trans. David Wills, New York: Fordham 
University Press, 2008 (30). Subsequent page references in text 
5 V.S. Ramachandran, The Tell-Tale Brain, London: Windmill Books, 2012 (22) Subsequent page 
references in text. 
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individuality as a species. Even “Darwin’s bulldog” Thomas Henry Huxley found 
difficulty explaining the difference that was evidently there. He demonstrated 
this whilst lecturing at the Royal Institution by saying of humans, gorillas and 
baboons: 
Now I am quite sure that if we have these three creatures fossilized 
or preserved in spirits for comparison and were quite unprejudiced 
judges, we should at once admit that there is very little greater 
interval as animals between the gorilla and the man than exists 
between the gorilla and the baboon. (3) 
Huxley’s position demonstrates how, even as a devout Darwinian convert, he still 
struggled with the concept that man is inherently closer to animals that he may 
have originally seemed. His attitude was shared by a variety of intellectuals, and 
not just those working in the field of science. On a wider, cultural level, Darwinian 
theory took some time to be accepted. Beer suggests that:  
This revolution must take place not only in the minds of scientists but 
in the beliefs of other inhabitants of the same culture if the theory is 
to reach its full authority-an authority which rests upon an accepted 
congruity between theory and nature. (3) 
Beer highlights how for a theory to be widely accepted, it should not only appeal 
to scientists, but must also be acknowledged culturally. Literature is an excellent 
gauge for this cultural acceptance. My study aims to analyse how throughout the 
nineteenth century the contents of the novel were affected by Darwinian theory, 
that is, how can long prose fiction be interpreted in ways that demonstrate a 
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change in public perception of the animal human divide. Focus is placed on the 
philosophical “abyss”, or the space that separates man from animal. I analyse 
four novels showing how scientific progress at the time in which they were 
written inspired their authors to consider the theme of the human condition and 
how we differ from animals.  
My introduction aims effectively to commence this study by outlining some of 
the key principles concerning the difference between human and animal. My 
discussion will further introduce the abyss, investigating how it functions in 
philosophy to intellectually engage with the difference between animals and 
people. I include a discussion on the philosophically constructed abyss and the 
contents within, involving an outline of the ideas of Derrida, Nietzsche, Agamben 
and Kristeva. It must be noted that not all of the philosophers under discussion 
were actively informed by Darwinism. Instead, I use these philosophers’ theories 
on animal phenomenology to reconsider the effects of Darwinism. The aim of this 
section is to provide a clear view of the different philosophical attitudes towards 
the abyss, so that I can regularly refer to it during the course of my thesis. 
Furthermore within this introduction I provide an example of how stories can be 
used to explored the difference between animal and man. The ancient Greek 
myth of “Theseus and the Minotaur” exemplifies a way of reading of the liminal 
space within literature and how it can be conceived. The next section considers 
writers who have already explored this area of study; what they have discovered, 
and how my study will contribute to the debate. This section will serve as an 
introduction to Literary Darwinism and other works of literary criticism that has 
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focused on similar subject matter. Finally, I provide an outline of the study, 
detailing the literature considered in each chapter. 
Yawning Chasms  
In recent years, neuroscientists have pinpointed specific developments in the 
human brain that have catalysed accelerated development. Ramachandran 
argues that research has demonstrated a development of the cortex, “the tabula 
(far from) rasa where all our highest mental functions are carried out” (5). 
Ramachandran argues, that the cortex is the reason for the development of 
mirror neurons, and thus culture:  
By hyperdeveloping the mirror-neuron system, evolution in effect 
turned culture into the new genome. Armed with culture, humans 
could adapt to hostile new environments and figure out how to 
exploit formerly inaccessible or poisonous food sources in just one or 
two generations-instead of the hundreds or thousands of generations 
such adaptations would have taken to accomplish through genetic 
evolution. (23) 
Ramachandran pinpoints the area of the brain that scientists believe to be 
responsible for the void between animals and humans, and summarizes what we 
now believe to be the reason for our advanced development. Scientists including 
Ramachandran argue that this hyperdevelopement is a product of evolution, 
thus it exemplifies the constant reiterated veracity of the theory of natural 
selection.  Ramachandran is only one of many authors in recent years who have 
published works for public readership on the subject of humanity’s uniqueness. 
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Yuval Noah Harari’s Sapiens: A Brief History of Humankind6 has proven a best 
seller, and Brian Cox helped promote the subject in his Human Universe7. Both 
books, as well as many more approach the question of what defines us as a 
species, demonstrating the current enduring popularity of the subject.  
However, in the nineteenth century evolutionary theory was only recently 
considered a serious usurper of the original explanation that attributed man’s 
difference to superior creation by a deity. Before Darwinism, religious 
explanation of the dramatic contrast between man and animal was the most 
respected theory of man’s origins. Religious thinkers considered man greater 
than animal because God created him as an intrinsically higher being. In both 
Genesis 1:1-2:3 and Genesis 2:4-2:24, humanity is created superior to animals. 
In the first chapter, humanity was created in God’s image after the animals so as 
to rule over them: “And God said, Let us make man in our image, after our 
likeness: and let him have dominion over the fish and cattle, and over all the 
earth, and over every creeping thing that creepeth on the earth.”8 In the second 
chapter, humanity is made prior to animal, but his status as a superior being is 
reiterated: “And the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and 
breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living soul.”9 The 
belief in the “living soul” supports the explanation of individual creation; an idea 
supported for centuries by philosophers like Rene Descartes, whose arguments 
                                                          
6 Yuval Noah Harari, Sapiens: A Brief History of Humankind, London: Vintage, 2015 
7 Brian Cox, Human Universe, London: HarperCollins, 2015 
8 Genesis I: 26 
9 Genesis II:7-8 
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Gilbert Ryle referred to as “the dogma of the Ghost in the Machine”.10 Descartes 
argues that: 
For, examining the functions which might in accordance with this 
supposition exist in this body, I found precisely all those which might 
exist in us without our having the power of thought, and consequently 
without our soul-that is to say, this part of us, distinct from the body, 
of which it has just been said that its nature is to think-contributing 
to it, functions which are identically the same as those in which 
animals lacking reason man be said to resemble us.11 
Descartes writes that humans differ from animals because we have the faculty of 
reason, available because we alone have souls, a view that is still held today by 
many religious groups. Many of those groups are influenced by religious 
speakers and “scientists” such as John. C. Morris and Henry M. Whitcomb, who 
published Genesis Flood in an attempt to use science to reaffirm literal reading of 
the Bible.12 As Darwinism is widely accepted within the scientific community, the 
opinion of the vast majority of scientists differs from the fundamental religious 
view, creating a sudden, and dramatic divide between empiricists and 
spiritualists. 
Religious principle is a primary reason that evolutionary theory was held back 
for so long. As Edward J. Larson has shown it took Darwin twenty years to 
                                                          
10 Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of the Mind, (London: Penguin Books, 2000) 
11 René Descartes, A Discourse on the Methods and the Meditations, Trans. F.E. Sutcliffe, (London: 
Penguin Classics, 1968) p.100-101 Subsequent page references in text. 
12 Morris and Whitcomb, The Genesis Flood, The Biblical Record and its Scientific Implications, 
(New Jersey: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company,1961) 
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publish On the Origin of Species. 13 Aware of the adverse reaction that his ideas 
would most likely receive, Darwin strove to perfect his theory over those two 
decades, whilst keeping in constant communication with Charles Lyell who 
eventually persuaded him to publish his findings (70-71). To summarize, Larson 
argues that “Indeed, God became more than superfluous under Darwin’s 
emerging view of origins-He became problematic. At the very least, the theory of 
evolution dispenses with the immediate need for a Creator to shape individual 
species, including humans” (69). Therefore, considering this dramatic step in 
science, the nineteenth century became a period when the question of humanity 
and our origins was revolutionized. The established theory that comprised of the 
“dogma of the ghost in the machine” was more than just threatened; it was 
usurped by a particularly brutal new concept. Such was the anxiety that makes 
Tennyson’s In Memoriam particularly interesting as a poem that responds to 
scientific ideas; Tennyson grieving for the untimely death of his friend Henry 
Hallam, poetically emphasized the doubt that evolutionary ideas inspired within 
the Victorian mind: 
Are God and Nature then at strife, 
That Nature lends such evil dreams? 
So careful of the type she seems, 
So careless of the single life14 
The question of humanity’s individuality troubled even atheist scientists of the 
era, who lacked an explanation for this seemingly great void, so much so that 
                                                          
13 Edward J. Larson, Evolution: The Remarkable History of a Scientific Theory, (New York: 
Random House, 2004) Subsequent page references in text. 
14 Lord Alfred Tennyson,  , In Memoriam, London: W. W. Norton & Company, 2003 
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even Darwin’s greatest supporters believed that there must be an additional 
factor that accelerated human evolution. According to Larson “Even Darwin’s 
bulldog, Huxley, envisioned evolution proceeding in jumps (rather than 
incremental steps) and believed that civilized humans could overcome nature in 
shaping their own destiny” (100-101). Consequently, although On the Origin of 
Species became the primary theory to explain our origins, even the most fervent 
supporter could not fully attest to how it changed the relationship between 
human and animal. The conceptual space that divides animal from human 
seemingly narrowed, what was generally considered a yawning space now 
seemed to fluctuate in shape; the uncertainty of this space caused a lot of anxiety 
for many people, who struggled with self-definition.  
It is the abyssal space that separates animal and man that I focus on in my study, 
I have selected literary works from across the nineteenth century that respond 
to the development of evolutionary science, centring of Darwin’s theory of 
natural selection. The study of literature has always been a particularly vital way 
of understanding philosophies and trends of thought that define an era. Through 
critical readings I aim to show how the introduction of Darwinian theory 
changed perceptions of the abyss.  
Minding The Gap 
So far, I have discussed the issues concerning the difference between animal and 
man in a general sense, whilst briefly alluding to the abyss. I now further 
demonstrate how the abyss has been used to discuss humanity’s relationship 
with animality within philosophy. The primary philosophers which I discuss in 
this context are Jacques Derrida, Friedrich Nietzsche, Julia Kristeva and Giorgio 
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Agamben whose concepts can allow us a glimpse of what this abyss may 
represent. I also briefly mention John Gray, whose approach helps form my 
conclusion. In a longer study I could perhaps discuss further philosophers, as 
there are varied approaches to the abyss that could be considered. For example, 
Martin Heidegger argues that the abyss separating animal and man is extensive. 
Heidegger considers the animal to be “poor in the world” whilst “man is world 
forming”.15 He further describes how: “The leap from living animals to humans 
that speak is as large if not larger than that from the lifeless stone to the living 
being.”16 Heidegger imagines a clearly defined abyss, which separates humanity 
from animality with a yawning expanse. On the opposite side of the argument, 
Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari discuss the metamorphosis of human into 
animal, a process called “becomings animal”. They argue that “Society and the 
State need animal characteristics to use for classifying people; natural history 
and science need characteristics in order to classify the animals themselves.”17 
There is a transformation that occurs, which decimates the separation between 
man and animal: “There is no longer man or animal, since each deterritorializes 
the other, in a conjunction of flux, in a continuum of reversible intensity.”(99) 
Man and animal become interchangeable; the abyss, can therefore be crossed by 
both parties. 
Despite the relevance of these approaches, the authors I have chosen to focus on 
have been selected specifically to demonstrate the complexity and scope of the 
                                                          
15 Martin Heidegger, The fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude, 
trans. William McNeill and Nicholas Walker, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995 (177) 
16 Martin Heidegger, Hölderlins ‘Germanien’ und ‘Der Rhein’ ed S. Ziegler (Frankfurt am Main: 
Klostermann, 1980), p.75, quoted in Matthew Calarco, ‘Heidegger’s Zoontology’, Animal 
Philosophy, London:Continuum, 2004 
17 G. Deleuze and F. Guattari, ‘Becoming Animal’, Animal Philosophy, London: Continuum, 2004 
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abyss. They also exemplify different concepts of the abyss from differing 
perspective; I have included a modern philosopher (Derrida), a nineteenth 
century philosophy (Nietzsche), a psychoanalytic perspective (Kristeva) and a 
Human Rights angle (Agamben).  
Derrida’s ideas are based on the animal’s gaze. He writes that we can find the 
abyss within the eyes of the animal:  
As with every bottomless gaze, as with the eyes of the other, the gaze 
called ‘animal’ offers to my sight the abyssal limit of the human: the 
inhuman or the ahuman, the ends of man, that is to say, the 
bordercrossing from which vantage man dares to announce himself 
to himself, thereby calling himself by the name that he believes he 
gives himself. (12) 
Derrida argues that humanity cannot understand itself unless it seeks definition 
from an outside source; that is, through the eyes of an animal. It is only when we 
cross over from animal to human that we can understand ourselves as a species. 
When discussing the difference between man and animal he declares that there 
is no “single indivisible line”(31). Instead, he states; 
The discussion is worth undertaking once it is a matter of 
determining the number, form, sense, or structure, the foliated 
consistency of the abyssal limit, these edges, this plural and 
repeatedly folded frontier... one attempts to think what a limit 
becomes once it is abyssal, once the frontier no longer forms a single 
indivisible line... (30) 
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Here Derrida describes an abyss separating man from animal, which has no 
definite limits; it is ambiguous and indefinable. Derrida therefore argues that 
there is no particular element of humanity that divides us from animal, but 
instead we have a multi-faceted and complex relationship with non-human 
species. He critiques his predecessors; Descartes, Heidegger, Lacan and Levinas, 
as only observing the animal themselves and not acknowledging that they 
themselves are also being looked at. Nevertheless, he is adamant that there is a 
separation between animals and humans, although its not one that can be 
understood easily: “For that very reason, it can never be limited to a single trait 
(properties of man) and it is never closed….” (5) H.G. Wells, explores this concept 
in some depth in his fiction; as an outspoken Darwinist, he believed in the 
mutability of humanity, using ideas that can be linked to an ever changing, 
indefinite abyss. Derrida’s philosophies can be considered as the general 
framework for my complete study, as it demonstrates the fluid, changeable 
nature of our division from animals.  
Nietzsche’s concepts of the abyss predate all other philosophies that I am 
discussing. In Thus Spoke Zarathustra he conceives man as an intermediary stage 
between animal and the “Übermensch” or the “Superman”.18 As a philosopher 
writing in the wake of Darwinian theory he demonstrates the more immediate 
effect of Darwinism on philosophical perspectives of the abyss. He discusses how 
humanity is just a stage in the process of evolution and will be overcome by 
something greater and nobler: “Man is a rope stretched between the animal and 
                                                          
18 Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Ware: Wordsworth Editions, 1997 
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the Superman-a rope over the abyss” (8). Interestingly, Nietzsche considers 
humanity as a bridge above this conceptual chasm; which divides animality from 
an improved human being. When Nietzsche discusses the Superman he 
considers an ideal version of what man should be, and what our species has not 
reached yet: “Man is something to be surpassed” (6). Here, Nietzsche is not 
agreeing with Darwin’s theories, which suggest a more randomized change in 
species caused by evolution; Nietzsche’s ideas used more Spenserian ideas of a 
graduated improvement of the species.  
Perhaps however, the idea of homogenous continuity which Derrida contests can 
be found along Nietzsche’s metaphorical rope. However, this complicates the 
definition of the abyss. When discussing man’s relation to animal Zarathustra 
makes this damning statement; “Ye have made your way from worm to man, and 
much within you is still worm. Once were ye apes, and even yet man is more of 
an ape than any of the apes.” (6) The contents of the abyss are perhaps part of 
humanity, rather than separate from it. The choice of the rope as the 
metaphorical device to cross the abyss rather than a bridge demonstrates a 
journey across the abyss fraught with danger. Nietzsche conceives of the path 
towards the Übermensch as being precariously balanced over animality. He 
suggests that we need to be able to see into the abyss, to also overcome it.  
The abyss therefore is the gulf we must cross the reach super humanity. It 
contains within it the remnant of humanity’s past, and prior links to the animal. 
Nevertheless, Nietzsche writes “What is great in man is that he is a bridge and 
not a goal: what is loveable in man is that he is an over-going and a down-going.” 
(8) Nietzsche therefore complicates the matter by defining a difference between 
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crossing the abyss and descending into the abyss. We might conclude that the 
person who descends into the abyss is the Promethean character, who attempts 
to further humanity by excavating our animalistic history, like Mary Shelley’s 
Victor Frankenstein. It could also, however, be the criminal character, who seeks 
to defy their own natural course to attempt to reach the other side, like 
Dostoevsky’s Raskolnikov. 
From a psychoanalytic perspective, Julie Kristeva’s concepts of the abyss further 
inform an approach to Darwinism and the literature in question.19 Kristeva’s 
theory of “abjection” can also help formulate a picture of the abyss. The abject 
describes the part of ourselves that which so disgusts and horrifies us that we 
must displace or expel it; we move it elsewhere: 
There looms, within abjection, one of those violent, dark revolts of 
being, directed against a threat that seems to emanate from an 
exorbitant outside or inside, ejected beyond the scope of the possible, 
the tolerable, the thinkable. It lies there, quite close, but it cannot be 
assimilated. (1) 
Kristeva refers to the abject as “…something rejected from which one does not 
part, from which one does not protect oneself as from an object. Imaginary 
uncanniness and real threat, it beckons to us and ends up engulfing us.” (4) 
Therefore, it is possible to consider the abject as a way of postulating the 
distinction between animal and man: “The abject would thus be the ‘object’ of 
primal repression.” (12).  
                                                          
19 Julia Kristeva, The Powers of Horror, Trans. Leon S. Roudiez, (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1982) Subsequent page references in text. 
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Kristeva considers the abject as abiding in a liminal space. That is where how I 
can link the abject to the contents of the abyss: 
If, on account of that Other, a space becomes demarcated, separating 
the abject from what will be its subject and its objects, it is because a 
repression that one might call ‘primal’ has been effected prior to the 
springing forth of the ego, of its objects and representation. (10-11) 
The abject can be used to explore the contents of this liminal space with 
reference to the difference between man and animal as a part of ourselves that 
we reject from ourselves. The products of this separation are therefore “The in-
between, the ambiguous, the composite.”(4) Helpfully, Kelly Oliver identifies and 
explores the link between abjection and the human/animal dichotomy: “As 
Derrida does, Kristeva finds another animal lurking behind the origins of 
humanity, a darker, more frightening beast, our dependence on we disavow and 
abject.”20As Oliver explains, abjection is “the result of the return of repressed 
ambiguity or ambivalence inherent in these ‘fragile’ boundaries, which are 
precarious as they are necessary.”(281) According to Oliver, “Abjection, then, is 
a disavowel of the animal pedagogy at the heart of humanity, or at least at the 
center of the human sciences, including psychoanalysis”(282) In reference to the 
abyss, then, abjection is the process in which we reject reminders of our animal 
origins into a conceptual space. The abject represents the contents of this abyss, 
which itself contains the abjected aspects of humanity. If these elements ever 
return, it has the effect of causing horror and revulsion. The classic example of 
                                                          
20 Kelly Oliver, Animal Lessons: How They Teach Us to Be Human, New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2009(282) Subsequent page references in text. 
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this process is embodied in Frankenstein’s creature, the animated corporeal 
being that represents the physicality(but, not for Victor Frankenstein, the soul) 
of humanity. Herman Melville also uses concepts of abjection in particularly 
poignant ways to develop the link between Ahab and Moby Dick.  
Giorgio Agamben’s employs the concept of the animal and the human to inform 
his approach to biopolitics and human rights. He discusses a fundamental 
difference between the Greek terms “zoē” and “bios”; the two words for “life”: 
The Greeks had no single term to express what we mean by the word 
‘life’. They used two terms that, although traceable to a common 
etymological root, are semantically and morphologically distinct: zoē, 
which expressed the simple fact of living common to all living beings 
(animal, man or gods), and bios, which indicated the form or way of 
living proper to an individual group. (1)  
By considering these two terms, Agamben demonstrates a distinction between 
what he calls “bare life” and politics. He relies heavily on groundwork of Michel 
Foucault: “Michel Foucault, who discusses the way that man was conceived in the 
classical era; as ‘a living animal with the capacity for political existence” (2). 
Agamben’s view of the abyss seems clearly defined; zoē represents the animal 
side, and bios defines the human side. Humans are therefore defined by their 
capacity for political life.  
However, Agamben recognises that the distinction of this separation is 
impossible, because although the two may be conceived of as separate entities, 
bare life has always been part of politics: 
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Instead the decisive fact is that, together with the process by which 
the exception everywhere becomes the rule, the realm of bare life-
which is originally situated at the margins of political order-gradually 
begins to coincide with the political realm, and the exclusion and 
inclusion, outside and inside, bios and zoē, right an fact, enter into a 
zone of irreducible indistinction. (9) 
Therefore, there is an intersection between the two concepts of humanity and 
animality which results in a blurring of the boundaries. He then discusses the 
“homo sacer”; a figure from Roman law who was allowed to be killed, but not 
sacrificed. That figure was therefore both excluded and included from the law: 
The sacred man is the one whom the people have judged on account 
of a crime. It is not permitted to sacrifice this man, yet he who kills 
him will not be condemned for homicide…this is why it is customary 
for a bad or impure man to be called sacred. (71) 
The Homo Sacer is representative of this divide, and how it is inherently flawed. 
He is rejected from the law, yet also included, a paradox that represents the 
fundamental problem with the abyss. As Agamben himself notices, the division 
between human life and animal life includes an overlap in which the boundaries 
that are meant to be kept separate are inherently blurred. Therefore, the division 
between animal and man is necessarily problematic, as it is created specifically 
to maintain superiority. Oliver notes how Agamben’s philosophy can be linked 
with Kristeva’s: “The so-called abyss between man and animal is produced by 
abjecting animality from the concept of humanity.” (233) She further explains 
how:  
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To Agamben, Heidegger’s comparative analysis of man and animal is 
another example of the anthropological machine in action: humanity 
is produced by excluding animality, against which it defines the 
human as precisely not-animal. In this way, the human becomes the 
exception, the exceptional animal who is not really an animal at all. 
(233) 
Agamben therefore suggests that humanity finds meaning primarily in its 
exclusion of animality. Humanity transforms itself by ignoring and rejecting its 
animal origins. The abyss, therefore, is entirely conceptual, based on rejection. 
Agamben’s concept is demonstrated in Dostoevsky’s Crime and Punishment, 
which deals with the concept of Homo Sacer, in the form of the criminal.  
A fifth philosopher who is very relevant is John Gray, whose Straw Dogs (2003) 
reflects on the difference between animal and man. To Gray, there is no abyss. 
Or, if there is, it is merely a social construct created by humanity through its 
belief in its own individuality. As he rejects concepts of the abyss, his 
philosophies are not particularly conducive to my central argument. However, 
his ideas are helpful in drawing a conclusion. Therefore, I explore his work in 
greater depth in the final stage of my study. 
Fundamentally, what I have established from my focus on these philosophers is 
an abyss that represents the conceptual space that divides humanity from 
animal. The abyss has no understandable shape that we may visualize, as its 
boundaries are unknown, Derrida considers them multi-faceted. Yet we can use 
the idea of an abyss to consider the so-called “missing link” that which falls 
between man and animal. What my study is interested in is how various authors 
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perceived the contents of the abyss and what the bridge over the abyss is formed 
of; in other words what makes us human, and what perverts the boundary 
between people and animals. 
Theseus and the Minotaur 
To introduce the approach of this study, I have used an ancient Greek myth to 
demonstrate the topic. “Theseus and the Minotaur” is mythic exemplification 
that demonstrates how a narrative can explore the nature of humanity in relation 
to animals.  There are various versions of the myth, for example Robert Graves 
includes the story in his narration of myths in The Greek Myths (1955). However, 
I have used Joseph Campbell’s clear and well narrated version taken from Ovid’s 
Metamorphoses for the purpose of my thesis.21 As Campbell writes “Religions, 
philosophies, arts, the social forms of primitive and historic man, prime 
discoveries in science and technology, the very dreams that blister sleep, boil up 
from the basic, magic ring of myth” (3). Campbell’s proposition is not 
controversial; many philosophers look for answers to the most elusive questions 
within mythology.: 
The story is told, for example, of the great Minos, king of the island-
empire of Crete in the period of its commercial supremacy: how he 
hired the celebrated artistic-craftsman Daedalus to invent and 
construct for him a labyrinth, in which to hide something of which the 
palace was at once ashamed and afraid. For there was a monster on 
the premises- that which had been born to Pasiphaë, the queen. 
                                                          
21 Joseph Campbell, The Hero with a Thousand Faces, (London: Fontana Press, 1993). 
Subsequent page references in text. 
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Minos, the king, had been busy, it is said, with important wars to 
protect the trade routes; and meanwhile Pasiphaë had been seduced 
by a magnificent, snow white, sea born bull. It had been nothing 
worse, really, than what Minos’ own mother had allowed to happen: 
Minos’ mother was Europa, and it was well known that she was 
carried by a bull to Crete. The bull had been the god Zeus, and the 
honoured son of that sacred union was Minos himself-now 
everywhere respected and gladly served. How then could Pasiphaë 
have known that the fruit of her own indiscretion would be a 
monster: this little son with human body but the head and tail of a 
bull? (13) 
Whilst Campbell is most interested in Theseus as the archetypal hero, I am 
particularly interested in the minotaur; a monstrous creature that represents the 
space between man and animal. The narrative demonstrates classic anxiety 
towards the human/animal divide being crossed. The minotaur only acts as an 
example; other monsters of Greek myth such as Gorgons, Harpies, Centaurs and 
Satyrs are all examples of hybridization representing a perversion of the liminal 
space separating man from animal. 
Minos’s labyrinth is built for one particular purpose: 
So deceptive was the invention, that Daedalus himself, when he had 
finished it, was scarcely able to find his way back to the entrance. 
Therein the Minotaur was settled: and he was fed, thereafter, on 
groups of living youths and maidens, carried as tribute from the 
conquered nations within the Cretan domain. (14) 
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The labyrinth is synonymous with the abyss; it is a complex structure, as Derrida 
suggested which is mainly in place to keep something horrific and rejected 
inside, like Kristeva’s abject. To explain this relationship with the abject further 
we must consider how the Minotaur relates to this idea. The abject is the 
monstrous-it embodies what is rejected, like the Minotaur. The labyrinth is the 
liminal space into which the abject is discarded. Those who enter this space are 
sent to certain death; unless, of course, they appear in the shape of a demi-god, 
who resembles Nietzsche’s Übermensch, as does Poseidon’s son, Theseus.  
Daedalus, the creator of the labyrinth, is also a particularly poignant character 
within the story;  
For centuries Daedalus has represented the type of the artist-
scientist: that curiously disinterested, almost diabolical human 
phenomenon, beyond the normal boundaries of social judgement, 
dedicated to the morals not of his time but of his art. He is the hero of 
the way of thought-single-hearted, courageous, and full of faith that 
the truth, as he finds it, shall set us free. (24) 
Daedalus is a vital character whilst considering the abyss. As the scientist who 
believes himself above morality for the sake of what is empirically evident, 
Daedalus builds the abyss, but also provides the rope that allows Theseus to 
traverse it. Therefore, Daedalus represents philosophers who conceived the 
abyss and scientists who have created the tools to explore it. It is possible that 
Darwin could be seen as the Daedalus of the nineteenth century. His theories 
transgress the moral boundaries that were a vital component of society of the 
time. Additionally to this, in the way of scientific discoveries, and relationships 
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with monsters, Victor Frankenstein could also be considered an updated version 
of Daedelus; I explore this further in the first chapter. He creates his monster, 
then rejects it. 
Within this story of Theseus and the Minotaur there are four elements in 
particular than are directly relevant to my study. There is the abyssal labyrinth, 
the monstrous abject contents, the heroic superhuman who conquers the abyss, 
and the ambiguous character of the scientist. Campbell does not need to 
elaborate on what happens next; the heroic Theseus saves the population of 
Crete by slaying the creature. The myth provides a clean, simple solution to 
humanity’s relationship with animality. However, as I demonstrate within my 
thesis, the relationship between man and animal is more complex, and the novels 
studied show how Darwinian theory complicated that relationship. 
Previous Work in This Field 
To place this study in context I now identify some publications that have 
examined similar topics. Literary Darwinism is a school of literary criticism that 
reads Darwinian theory in relation to literature. Joseph Carroll’s work is 
important as he is the founder of that approach. His Reading Human Nature: 
Literary Darwinism in Theory and Practice effectively demonstrates application 
of evolutionary theory to literary studies as I shall show.22 Carroll argues that 
“The central concept in both evolutionary social science and evolutionary 
literary study is ‘human nature’; genetically mediated characteristics typical of 
the human species” (4). As my study is focused on elemental human nature, it 
                                                          
22 Joseph Carroll, Reading Human Nature: Literary Darwinism in Theory and Practice, London: 
SUNY Press, 2011 
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shares some common ground within the school of Literary Darwinism. However, 
this branch of theory, as Carroll claims, is interested in the “adaptive functions of 
the arts” (4). Literary Darwinism primarily demonstrates how literature 
functions as an evolutionary element of human nature that aids our progress as 
a species, so that in his text Literature, Science, and a New Humanities, Gottschall 
argues that research methods should be applied to the study of literature to 
investigate this phenomenon23. This study will differ to this as it is focused on 
how the Theory of Evolution affected the literary representation of the link 
between animal and human. 
Another aspect that moves my study away from Literary Darwinism is its 
interest in poststructuralist theorists. Carroll claims that by coining the term 
Literary Darwinism he endeavoured to move away from poststructuralist 
theory; “Since I could not accommodate myself to poststructuralism, my only 
alternative was to formulate a completely different basis for literary study and 
to set that new basis into active opposition with the prevailing paradigm” (x). 
This study in particular is inspired by the ideas of many poststructuralist 
theorists including Derrida and Kristeva. Post-structuralism, therefore, is 
inherently central to this study. Nevertheless as Gotschall’s argument 
emphasizes, Literary Darwinism is an interdisciplinary approach to literary 
exploration of human nature and Darwinian theory. My study is also aimed to be 
effectively interdisciplinary, so it may cohere well with this school of literary 
criticism.  
                                                          
23 Jonathan Gottschall,  Literature, Science, and a New Humanities New York: Macmillan, 2008 
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Additionally to this there have been various journal articles published on the 
subject of Darwinism and its influence over literature during the nineteenth 
century. Charles S. Blinderman argues in “Vampurella; Darwin and Count 
Dracula” that the character Dracula represents an evolutionary “Übermensch”: 
“Thus, Dracula presents a contest between two evolutionary options; the 
ameliorative progressive, Christian congregation, or the Social Darwinian 
superman in the form of Count Dracula”24. Similarly, Allen A. Debus’s article “Re-
Framing the Science in Jules Verne’s ‘Journey to the Centre of the Earth’” 
demonstrates how Verne, whilst embracing scientific theory of the day rejects 
Darwinism in his portrayal of prehistoric man25. In “Scarcity and Compensation 
in Moby-Dick”, James Hetch observes how Melville attempts to grapple with ideas 
of extinction.26 These articles are representative examples that investigate how 
nineteenth century writers use fiction to address attitudes towards evolution. 
Beer’s Darwin’s Plots; Evolutionary Narrative in Darwin, George Eliot and 
Nineteenth Century Fiction observes how the theory of evolution and Darwinism 
affected the literary imagination of nineteenth century writers27. Beer’s book is 
closest to the topic my thesis, and demonstrates an excellent example of how 
literature can be interpreted using Darwinian theory. My study, however adds to 
Beer’s book and the articles discussed in the focus on the abyss; by moving 
forward to synthesize the literary-scientific treatment of Darwinian theory with 
                                                          
24 Charles S. Blinderman, ‘Vampurella: Darwin and Count Dracula’, The Massachusettes Review, 
21:2 (1980) p.428 
25 Allen A. Debus, ‘Reframing the Science in Jules Verne’s ‘Journey to the Centre of the Earth’’, 
Science Fiction Studies, 33:3 (2006) pp.405-420 
26 James Hecht, ‘Scarcity and Compensation in Moby-Dick’, The Massachusetts Review,40:1 (1999) 
pp.111-130 
27 Gillian Beer, Darwin’s Plots: Evolutionary Narrative in Darwin, George Eliot and Nineteenth-
Century Fiction, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983) 
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philosophical interpretations of the space that separates man from animal. Like 
Beer’s study, and building on her seminal work on Darwin studies, my research 
aims to achieve a contextual map of literary approaches to Darwinism; unlike 
Beer’s text, the focus is on the distinction between man and animal, and the 
conceptual gulf or abyss that remains.  
Kelly Oliver’s Animal Lessons (2009) takes into account the philosophical abyss, 
she discusses the different philosophical approaches, and systematically 
evaluates various philosophers’ viewpoints. Oliver uses a variety of sources to 
discuss how animality, rather that dividing us from our humanity, contributes to 
it.  Similarly, in Surface Encounters: Thinking with Animals and Art (2011), Ron 
Broglio approaches the relationship between humans and animals through an 
artistic lens28.  He argues that it is because we are only able to achieve surface 
encounters with animals, that we are separated from them, and demonstrates 
how this division is represented through art. I share this philosophical focus with 
Oliver and Broglio. Therefore, my thesis approaches a prevalent topic, combining 
a number of angles. 
Structure of the Thesis 
In the last section I discussed previously published work, and clarified how my 
thesis aims to contribute to the current discussion. I will now discuss how I 
intend to achieve this objective. Throughout my thesis, four canonical novels will 
be studied, one from each of the following subcategories; the pre-Darwinian 
period, the early Darwinian period, the late Darwinian period, and the post-
                                                          
28 Ron Broglio, Surface Encounters: Thinking with Animals and Art, University of Minnesota 
Press: 2011 
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Darwinian period. Therefore, the novels studied will be both from the Romantic 
and the Victorian. This provides a conceptual map within which to plot how 
attitudes towards the abyss transformed over such a prolific period of change 
considering the progress of industrialization, science, politics and philosophy. 
The pre-Darwinian period I am defining as pre-dating any publication by Charles 
Darwin, but following Georges Cuvier’s 1796 announcement of “the existence of 
a world previous to ours, destroyed by some kind of catastrophe” (7). The early 
Darwinian period consists of literature published before the publication of On 
the Origin of Species but after the publication of The Voyage of the Beagle (1838). 
The late Darwinian period I define as following the publication of On the Origin 
of Species but pre dating the publication of The Descent of Man. The post 
Darwinian period is defined as after the death of Darwin. The novel I have chosen 
to represent the post-Darwinian period, though written after Darwin’s death, 
was still written Victorian era therefore maintaining contextual relevance. The 
four novels chosen span the century in which the theory of evolution was finally 
championed by scientists. My study creates a varied but also focused view on the 
literary response to the question of human nature. 
The novel that will be studied from the pre-Darwinian period is Mary Shelley’s 
Frankenstein(1818)29. It is a novel that actively engages with science to produce 
a vision of man’s insecurity regarding animality. The author that I studied from 
the early Darwinian period is Herman Melville, focusing on his novel Moby Dick 
(1851)30. Within the novel Melville, explores the interaction between human and 
                                                          
29 Shelley, Mary W.,  Frankenstein: Or `The Modern Prometheus': The 1818 Text. 2008: OUP 
Oxford.  
30 Herman Melville, and T. Tanner, Moby Dick. 1998: Oxford University Press. 
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animal, and shows how by warring against the natural world, humanity also 
attacks itself. For my late Darwinian novel, Dostoevsky’s Crime and Punishment 
(1866)31 demonstrates a dark introspection into the nature of the human soul. 
The post Darwinian novel that I discussed is H.G. Wells’s The Island of Doctor 
Moreau (1895)32, which demonstrates assimilation with Darwinian concepts at 
the end of the nineteenth century.  
My study is divided into four chapters which include subchapters. I begin every 
chapter with a detailed analysis of the contextual background in which the 
novelist was writing. Following the focus on context, I turn my attention to close 
reading of the novel assigned to the chapter in question. and how it integrates 









                                                          
31 Fyodor Dostoevsky, Crime and Punishment, Trans David McDuff, London: Penguin, 2003  
32 H. G. Wells, The Island of Doctor Moreau, London: Penguin, 2005 Subsequent page references 
in text. 
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‘… an animal as complex and wonderful as man’ How Shelley uses Frankenstein’s 
creature to explore humanity, animality, and the in between 
Since Hesiod's Theogeny, the Promethean myth has functioned to warn humanity 
against overreaching33. Part trickster, part scapegoat he represents the dangers 
of furthering human knowledge. In rebellion against the Gods he brings 
humanity knowledge that it was never meant to acquire. Prometheus parallels 
Satan, who also brings forbidden knowledge to humanity as an act of rebellion 
against God. John Milton, who used his seminal work to "justify the ways of God 
to men" seems to also justify the ways of Satan to men34. Paradise Lost (1667) 
was an important inspiration, not only for the literary figures under discussion, 
but for scientists as well, exemplifying the influence that literature had over 
scientific discussion. Interestingly, as Beer notes, Milton acted as one of Darwin’s 
most important inspirations when conceiving the theory of evolution: “What has 
gone unremarked is that it (evolutionary understanding) derived also from his 
reading of the one book he never left behind during his expeditions from the 
Beagle: The Poetical Works of John Milton.” (5) It is curious to note that Darwin’s 
discovery of evolutionary theory may in some manner mirror the fall of man. 
Furthermore, as potentially a Promethean figure, he may have even seen himself 
within the character Satan, as he imparted knowledge conceived as corrupting 
the innocence of humanity. Often acting as the protagonist, Satan's ambition led 
him to challenge God, and is banished from heaven as a result: 
He trusted to have equalled the Most High, 
                                                          
33 Hesiod, Theogeny and Works and Days, London: Oxford University Press, 2008 
34 John Milton, 'Paradise Lost', London: Penguin, 2002, (line 26, 3) Subsequent page references 
in text. 
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If he opposed; and with ambitious aim 
Against the throne and monarchy of God 
Raised impious war in Heav'n and battle proud 
With vain attempt. Him the Almighty Power 
Hurled headlong flaming from th'ethereal sky 
With hideous ruin and combustion down 
                         To bottomless perdition, there to dwell (line 40-48, 4) 
 
Mary Shelley used Paradise Lost as one of her primary literary influences whilst 
writing Frankenstein, or The Modern Prometheus35. Within the novel she directly 
links the creature to Satan. Yet considering how Victor Frankenstein's character 
resembles the Promethean, he could also be considered a Satanic figure also; in 
this manner, he is inherently linked to his creature. The relationship between 
Frankenstein and his creature resemble both the pinnacle of humanity and the 
nadir. No matter how Frankenstein tries, he cannot detach himself from his 
doppelgänger; a symbiosis that resembles the relationship between Dr Jekyll and 
Mr Hyde. Frankenstein's genius is always matched with his primitivism, 
demonstrating how humanity can never challenge the laws of God and nature. 
Furthermore, as Satan is sent to the physical abyss of hell, Frankenstein's 
experiments lead to an exploration of the philosophical abyss that my study 
focuses on. The first novel explored within this thesis is Mary Shelley’s 1818 
novella Frankenstein; as this is the only novel under consideration written by a 
female author it will provide a unique insight into the romantic perspective of 
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evolution. Being so young yet surrounded by the radical personalities of Percy 
Shelley and Byron, Mary Shelley demonstrates a well-informed unique approach 
to the question of life and the human form.  
Mary Shelley observes the scientific problems with the principles of human life 
and the soul in the same way that her primary narrator Walton digests 
Frankenstein’s narrative, as an outsider to whom the more primary figures 
dictate. Walton’s statement on the commencement of his journey is auspicious 
considering what he finds in ‘the land of mist and snow’: “am going to unexplored 
regions, to “the land of mist and snow”; but I shall kill no albatross, therefore do 
not be alarmed for my safety” (10). Here Shelley directly refers to Samuel Taylor 
Coleridge’s poem, “The Rime of the Ancient Mariner” (1798), which depicts the 
disastrous consequences of humanity upsetting the natural order36. Both novel 
and poem warn against detachment from nature and God; by killing the albatross 
the Mariner demonstrated a lack of respect for both, and consequently causes 
the death of his crew. The novel demonstrates a clear general feeling of 
apprehension with regards to science becoming a force that separates man from 
nature and God. Within the following discussion I demonstrate how Shelley uses 
these apprehensions to consider the consequences of this potential divide. By 
considering possible scientific advancements, Shelley uses the creature to 
conceive a being that resides in the abyss between animal and man, linking us to 
animality and dividing us from God. 
                                                          
36 Samuel T. Coleridge, The Rime of the Ancient Mariner and Other Poems. 1992: Dover 
Publications. 
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There is considerable focus on the role of science in Shelley’s novel within 
contemporary criticism, and much of that work provides contextual readings of 
science in the early nineteenth century. Melinda Cooper, in her explanation of the 
significance of deformation, birth defects and monstrosity in the Romantic 
period, discusses how: “It is no doubt more than a historical coincidence that 
Mary Shelley composed and revised her classic novel, Frankenstein, over the 
very same period that the modern life sciences were developing a formal theory 
of the monstrous”37. Also, published in the same book, Allan K. Hunter’s focuses 
on Frankenstein’s creature as a depiction of the potential evolutionary heir of 
humanity, a concept which will be developed in greater detail later in this 
analysis.38 Alan Rauch in his discussion of the novel takes a metaphysical 
perspective, considering instead the nature of knowledge itself.39 Rauch 
contends that it is the misuse of knowledge, rather than the knowledge itself 
which made Frankenstein’s actions problematic: “Frankenstein’s lack concern 
for pragmatism in science parallels his lack of sensitivity to the pragmatic 
product of his sublime conception.” (227) Rauch argues that Frankenstein’s 
private, product-driven science is the evil of the novel, not the science itself. 
There are many more instances where the scientific influences of the novel are 
discussed; as the novel is so scientifically focused, it is an important aspect of the 
novel to consider.  
                                                          
37  Melinda Cooper, 'Monstrous Progeny: The Teratological Tradition in Science and Literature’ in 
Frankenstein's Science: Experimentation and Discovery in Romantic Culture; 1780-1830, ed. C.K. 
King, C. Knellwolf, and J.R. Goodall. 2008: Ashgate Publishing. (87) 
38 A.K. Hunter, ‘Evolution, Revolution and Frankenstein’s Creatures’ in Frankenstein's Science: 
Experimentation and Discovery in Romantic Culture; 1780-1830, ed. C.K. King, C. Knellwolf, and 
J.R. Goodall. 2008: Ashgate Publishing. 
39 Alan Rauch,, The Monstrous Body of Knowledge in Mary Shelley's "Frankenstein". Studies in 
Romanticism, 1995. 34(2). Subsequent page refernces in text. 
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This chapter is focused on the effects that the science of the era had on Shelley 
which led to the production of her novel, and how she uses these ideas to 
question the nature of humanity and its complex relationship with animality. 
However, although the first section will focus on scientific background and 
context, the following sections will be more philosophical, concentrating on 
various interpretations of the novel attaining to the human/animal division. I 
focus specifically on the creature, whose particular liminal attributes make him 
an important element of my study. Following this discussion, I outline the 
creature’s literary liminality. This section leads to a further discussion of three 
differing ways of viewing him and how these affect our determination of 
humanity. The primary argument considers Cartesian dualism, and how it 
pertains to Frankenstein’s creature as a being that has the body and reason of a 
man, but lacks the divine essence. The second argument establishes the creature 
as a social monster, or as humanity without society in view of Rousseau’s “Origin 
of Inequality”40. Finally, I consider a psychoanalytic reading of the novel, 
specifically focusing on Kristeva’s theories that discuss the process of abjection. 
My third argument considers the creature as humanity’s disregarded self, or the 
part of ourselves that we have attempted to discount. I argue that the monster 
could be read not only as Frankenstein’s abject self, but also as that of Shelley 
herself. 
 The second part of the chapter considers the creature as a symbolic resident of 
the abyss. When Derrida discusses this space as an “abyss”, he demonstrates that 
                                                          
40 Jean Jaques Rousseau, and J.T. Scott, The Major Political Writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau: 
The Two Discourses and the Social Contract. 2012: University of Chicago Press. Subsequent page 
references in text. 
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the difference between animal and man in not clear cut and in many ways 
multifaceted: “The discussion is worth undertaking once it is a matter of 
determining the number, form, sense, or structure, the foliated consistence, of 
this abyssal limit, these edges, this plural and repeatedly foliated frontier”(30). 
Shelley’s creature's ambiguous liminality allows us insight in potential contents 
of the abyss that Shelley evokes, and hence the variety of ways she uses the 
creature to demonstrate the uncertain separation of man from animal. The first 
part of the argument begins by observing an easily definable split between 
animal and man where the monster resides considering the attribution of souls 
to humanity. In the next section, when I discuss the social needs of humanity and 
the creature, the difference between man and animal is not quite so definite. The 
final argument narrows the abyss to a greater degree; the creation of the 
creature from dead flesh reminds us of our corporeal mortality, the part of 
ourselves that demands animal requirements and inherently disgusts us.  
Prior to a close examination of the novel, it is necessary to reflect on the 
contextual influences that triggered Shelley’s conceptions. A temporal map will 
be created throughout this thesis of the differing responses of literature to the 
question of humanity, how and if we are different from animals from the 
beginning of the Nineteenth Century until the end. It is therefore necessary in 
every chapter to consider the contextual background in which the novelist was 
writing. 
It is important to mention current debates pertaining to Percy Shelley’s 
involvement with Frankenstein. There has been extensive discussion recently as 
to Percy Shelley’s involvement with the writing process of Frankenstein. Charles 
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Robinson claims that Percy Shelley made over five thousand changes to her 
original draft. Robinson asserts that Percy Shelley’s influence in the writing of 
Frankenstein is vast and he would have therefore had extensive input into the 
ideas that were proffered during the writing process about the principles of 
humanity.41 Robinson’s analysis uses original manuscripts and drafts of 
Frankenstein to demonstrate how Percy Shelley participated in the writing 
process by editing and rewording Mary Shelley’s original work. He argues that 
there are two versions of Frankenstein; the one which had been written by Mary 
Shelley alone, and the one that was edited by Percy Shelley. Robinson therefore 
suggests that Percy Shelley should be credited for the novel. The debate is not 
new; it has been approached by a variety of thinkers like David Ketterer and 
Germaine Greer. John Lauritsen even claims that the novel was written by Percy 
Shelley42. For the purpose of this study Percy Shelley’s influence must be 
acknowledged, therefore Sharon Ruston's Shelley and Vitality informs my 
discussion greatly.43 However, the novel is still considered a creation from the 
mind of Mary Shelley. It is reasonable to suppose that Mary Shelley was 
influenced to some extent by her husband, even if only through the level of 
discussion that would take place within a marriage of intellectuals, which is why 
Percy Shelley’s avid interest in natural science and the origins of life is important. 
However, the novel is and will be still considered an original work by Mary 
                                                          
41 Shelley, M., The Original Frankenstein. 2011: Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group. 
42 John Lauritsen, The Man Who Wrote Frankenstein. 2007: Pagan Press. Subsequent page 
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Shelley to focus effectively on the novella itself as a product of uncertainty in 
view of the origins of humanity.  
Evolution, Galvanism and Vitalism; Mary Shelley and the Principles of Life  
Frankenstein need not be defined as either gothic horror or science fiction, as the 
novel represents an integral part of both genres. With the classic scenes of terror 
in the charnel houses and the Alps, and the demonic apparitions of the monster 
it is exemplary of the gothic literary tradition. Yet science was evoking 
uncertainty during the romantic era, especially for prominent figures like Samuel 
Taylor Coleridge whose faith was contradicted by Erasmus Darwin's concepts of 
evolution. His refusal to accept Darwin's ideas inspired him to write his own 
“Theory of Life” at the same time that Mary Shelley was writing Frankenstein44. 
Science fiction is a genre that considers the effect of potential future scientific 
developments; the uncertainty felt towards future scientific advances can be 
easily perceived in Shelley’s work. It is a novel that exemplifies distrust and 
concern over the most recent advancements. Percy Shelley discusses the 
potential of the science he was familiar with in his “Preface” to Frankenstein: “The 
event on which this fiction is founded has been supposed, by Dr. Darwin, and 
some of the physiological writers of Germany, as not of impossible occurrence”. 
The insecurities divulged in Frankenstein towards perceived potential 
consequences of science can also be found in more recent science fiction novels, 
for example, more modern fears of the process of cloning, envisioned in Kasuo 
Ishiguro’s Never Let Me Go (2005)45, or anxiety towards artificial intelligence, 
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demonstrated in Isaac Asimov’s I, Robot (1950)46. Frankenstein, Never Let Me Go 
and I, Robot are each written to philosophically engage with questions of 
humanity and the rights of man. Asimov does this by attributing Cartesian ideals 
of humanity to a robot, which further invites debate considering what it is to be 
alive, and what it is to be human. Ishiguro instead uses the process of cloning to 
question the potential moral problems of a humanity that is not born, but grown. 
Both novels use scientific issues that were current at the time of publication to 
discuss and explore the nature of humanity. Like Frankenstein no definite 
answers are given, and the novels are used as open questions to engage the 
reader philosophically. Frankenstein could therefore be considered as the 
progenitor of these novels. They query what the outcome would be if there were 
another being with our faculties of reason, and why we are so troubled by the 
idea. The fear of “playing God” remains an inherent query of the arts- as science 
has developed, so has the literature. From Shelley to Ishiguro, these novels 
demonstrate the failings of scientific progress when left in the hands of 
humanity, and how, when given the tools to create life, we destroy it instead. In 
this way, Frankenstein deals with an ever present and reoccurring theme, and 
though the science has changed, the philosophical question has not. 
Shelley was inspired to pursue the novel after considering potential future 
scientific advancements imagined at the tail end of the Enlightenment. According 
to Ruston, “From the 1790s onwards the body had come to be seen among 
scientists as a mass of diseases heading steadily towards death, while the 
‘unnatural connexion’ which held the body together in life was acknowledged to 
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be the greatest mystery.” (2) With further discoveries of electricity and the effect 
it had on the human body, the findings of scientists including Humphrey Davy’s, 
Benjamin Franklin and Luigi Galvani were both en vogue and abhorrent. 
Galvani’s experiments, which consisted of the stimulation of corporeal matter 
with electricity, coupled with Erasmus Darwin’s ideas that pre-empted those of 
his Grandson, and Jean-Baptiste Lamarck’s primary theories of evolution were 
inspirations for Frankenstein. James Rieger considers these influences in his 
discussion of Dr Polidori as an influence for Frankenstein47: 
On the respectable side of this enquiry into the nature of a subtle, 
universal fluid became the researches into galvanism and electricity 
of Sir Humphrey Davy, whose Elements of Chemical Philosophy 
(1812) Mary Shelley got around to reading in October, while 
composing what is probably now Chapter 2 of Frankenstein. It is also 
closely related to Erasmus Darwin’s experiments in medicine, botany, 
and electro-chemical tropism. Finally, of course, animal magnetism is 
linked with the name of Benjamin Franklin, who headed the French 
royal commission which in 1784 exploded Mesmer’s theories.  
Studies into the effects of electricity on the body, animal magnetism, and 
evolution simultaneously are suggestive of the natural as opposed to divine 
origins of life and man, and man’s potential God-like power. These two aspects 
of the sciences had divergent effects; primarily, ideas of human evolution 
diminished man so he becomes uncomfortably close to the animal. Ruston 
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continues to describe how: “By the year 1800 a new concept of life had emerged, 
likening animals to human and even plant life. For the first time, life was 
considered a universal state, and the political ramifications of this idea are seen 
clearly in the literature of the period.” (3) Life, as Ruston explains, was now seen 
as something we share with animals. The potential of science to allow humanity 
control over nature, however, lifted the scientist to a seemingly unnatural god 
like status. Through smaller discoveries science had begun to make alarming 
progress. Within Frankenstein M. Waldman discusses the matter in a positive 
light, perhaps mirroring Percy Shelley’s own avid interested in scientific 
revolution: 
“The ancient teachers of this science,” said he, “promised 
impossibilities and performed nothing, The modern masters promise 
very little; they know that metals cannot be transmuted, and that the 
elixir of life is a chimera. But these philosophers, whose hands seem 
only made to dabble in dirt, and their eyes to pore over the 
microscope or crucible, have indeed performed miracles. They 
penetrate into the recesses of nature, and shew how she works in her 
hiding places. They ascend into the heavens; they have discovered 
how the blood circulates, and the nature of the air we breathe. They 
have acquired new and almost unlimited powers; they can command 
the thunders of heaven, mimic the earthquake and even mock the 
invisible world with its own shadows.” (30-31) 
The potential outcomes of scientific exploration were exposed to Shelley on a 
daily basis by her husband and his friends Polidori and Byron whilst visiting Villa 
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Diodate where the novel was originally conceived.48 An environment of scientific 
dialogue was not unusual for Shelley; as Marilyn Butler explains, she was used to 
listening to her father’s friends discuss similar issues: “As she grew up he let her 
stay in the room when he talked with his intellectual friends, who included 
Coleridge, Holcroft, Lamb, and Haslitt, listening rather than speaking herself “(x). 
Shelley was constantly exposed to intellectual philosophical discussions; a 
unique experience for a female child of her generation. Her radical father, 
William Godwin, and outspoken mother, Mary Wollstonecraft are the reason she 
was given the opportunity. Mary’s education was affected by her mother's legacy 
in the field of women’s rights, which Wollstonecraft discussed at length in A 
Vindication of the Rights of Women.49 Her mother was a mythical figure to Mary 
Shelley; having died in childbirth she never knew her, but would sit by her grave 
reading during her adolescence. Godwin did not fully attest to the methods 
prescribed in Wollstonecraft’s Vindication, but he did share many of her ideals 
about women’s rights, and gave Mary an unusually rich education. 
Although Mary’s elopement made for a drastic transformation in lifestyle, the 
change of intellectual environments from her childhood to her married life was 
not dramatic. According to Butler in her “Introduction” to Frankenstein, Percy 
Shelley’s interest in the subject of the origins of life was astute, and impressed 
itself upon his wife: 
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 A long reading list for the years 1813-1817 can be culled from Percy’s 
letters, the footnotes to annotate works like Queen Mab, and Mary 
Shelley’s Journal; it organizes itself into the pursuit of Enlightenment 
scepticism (Hume, Voltaire, Volney), anthropology (Buffon, Rousseau, 
Monboddo), and the so-called French Materialists, Holbach as author 
of The System of Nature, and from the French-revolutionary period 
Condorcet, Cabanis, and Laplace. (xvi) 
Percy Shelley’s fascination with science and the human body had developed from 
a young age, but his friendship with William Lawrence particularly inspired it. It 
was therefore a primary part of many of the conversations Shelley had with 
Byron and Polidori in Villa Diodati; as a secondary participant Mary received a 
lot of second hand information. Lawrence’s ideas contributed to Charles 
Darwin’s Theory, and his feud with John Abernethy famously represented the 
archetypal debate between materialism and spiritualism. Whilst Abernethy 
argued for a superimposed life-force separate from the corporeal body, 
Lawrence argued the opposite, writing in his controversial Lectures:  
Life has its origin in that of their parents. From these parents they 
have received the vital impulse; and hence it is evident in the present 
state of things, life proceeds only from life; and there exists no other 
but that, which has been transmitted from one living body to another, 
by an uninterrupted succession.50  
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In this context, Lawrence became the rebellious voice of materialism. Ruston 
observes that “Abernathy’s particular brand of vitalism can be viewed as the 
dominant ideology of the Romantic period, with Lawrence as the dissident voice, 
challenging and questioning this.” (6) Lawrence further writes, to contradict 
Abernathy: 
It seems to me that this hypothesis or fiction of a subtle invisible 
matter, animating the visible textures of animal bodies and directing 
their motions, is only an example of that propensity in the human 
mind, which has lead men at all times to account for these 
phenomena, of which the causes are not obvious, by the mysterious 
aid of higher and imaginary beings. (174) 
Lawrence explicitly contradicts accepted Cartesian theory with the implications 
of his words considering religion and the soul, as well as Abernathy’s theory of a 
superimposed life element. In view of Cartesian philosophy, the implications of 
his rejection of the superimposed element are astute when questioning Man’s 
divine superiority. Butler draws attention to the importance of the conflict 
between materialism and traditional religious ideas, focusing on how they 
affected the writing of Frankenstein. She argues that the novel was perhaps an 
encoded form of the argument itself: “It would not be surprising, then, if Mary’s 
contribution to the ghost-story competition to some degree acts out the debate 
between Abernethy and Lawrence, in a form close enough for those who knew 
the debate to recognize” (xx). Considering the novels preoccupation with the life 
principle, and the implementation of an overly materialistic protagonist, Butler's 
assertion is well founded.  
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In the novel there are parts where Mary Shelley explicitly highlights the 
contextual relevance. Percy Shelley’s allusion to the work of scientists in the 
“Preface” foreshadows less obvious references within the novella. For example, 
Shelley mentions experiments used to create a vacuum by scientists including 
Robert Boyle:  
The natural phenomena that take place every day before our eyes did 
not escape my examinations. Distillation, and the wonderful effects of 
stead, processes of which my favourite authors were utterly ignorant, 
excited my astonishment; but my utmost wonder was engaged by 
some experiments on an airpump, which I saw employed by a 
gentleman whom we were in a habit of visiting. (24)  
The air pump experiment has been previously integrated into art by Joseph 







Joseph Wright, An Experiment on a Bird with an Air Pump, Oil on Canvas, 1768 
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Wright was a member of the lunar society; a group of individuals including 
Erasmus Darwin and Josiah Wedgewood who were devoted to learning and 
current advances in science and technology. Wright was an enthusiast, a trait 
that the painting demonstrates, however it also reflects the concern and doubt 
over the perceived brutality of science. The painting itself shows a scientist 
asphyxiating a bird by depriving it of air for the purposes of the experiment. A 
woman looks away in horror whilst a small girl watched with concern. A pensive 
older gentleman looks on whilst the scientist looks directly out of the painting at 
the viewer, as if to perceive the observer’s reaction. Tamar Schlick states that 
“The curious observers offer a window into society. They experience this 
scientific demonstration with various emotions: awe, fright and anxiety but also 
admiration and hope”51. Schlick further argues it is within the scientist’s power 
to decide whether the bird lives or dies. The ambiguity exemplifies the concern 
over morality and also the brutal aspects of science that caused anxiety in the 
era. Shelley’s inclusion of this reference highlights an uncertainty towards the 
developing sciences that was felt by many. Although the painting depicts an air 
pump experiment, it could metaphorically be closely linked with the reaction to 
ideas of evolution, especially considering Wright’s links with Erasmus Darwin. 
The scientist is therefore not only in control of the life of one individual bird, but 
also humanity’s perception of life. The introduction of evolutionary theory was 
viewed as an asphyxiation of moral and religious values by many. In this sense, 
Frankenstein takes the place of the scientist in the painting. 
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Similarly, the question of the origin of life is explicitly mentioned in the novel, a 
definite nod towards evolutionary theory:  
One of the phenomena which had peculiarly attracted my attention 
was the structure of the human frame, and, indeed, any animal 
endued with life. Whence, I often asked myself, did the principle of 
life proceed? It was a bold question, and one which has ever been 
considered as a mystery; yet with how many things are we upon the 
brink of becoming acquainted, if cowardice or carelessness did not 
restrain our inquiries. (33) 
Evolution during the final stage of the Enlightenment was an uncertain theory, 
supported by as much evidence as that which stood against it. Allan K. Hunter 
mentions this by pointing out that: “It is crucial to note that at the turn of the 
nineteenth century, evolutionary theory was not a single, coherent concept but, 
rather, the result of a wide-ranging discussion amongst materialist philosophers 
and gentleman polymaths” (135). Discoveries of Georges Cuvier and Georges-
Louis Leclerc, Comte de Buffon encouraged the growing speculation, and in 
Zoonomia Erasmus Darwin asked:  
Would it be too bold to imagine, that in the great length of time, since 
the earth began to exist, perhaps millions of ages before the 
commencement of the history of mankind, would it be too bold to 
Tabitha Kan 54 
 
imagine, that all warm-blooded animals have arisen from one living 
filament… 52 
The matter was controversial and progressive; a radical idea gaining momentum 
as palaeontology verified the process of extinction, and geologists like James 
Hutton demonstrated the mechanisms of the slowly changing Earth. In light of 
this, Waldman’s words to Frankenstein about the minor yet vital developments 
in science were pertinent during this time of progression that led from the 
Enlightenment to the Industrial Revolution. The scientific revolution was a 
disturbing prospect, and Frankenstein’s actions demonstrate the potential 
consequences of this developing school: “What had been the study and desire of 
the wisest men since the creation of the world, was now within my grasp” (34). 
Frankenstein conjugates an answer to the questions that scientists were asking. 
Once Frankenstein finds a practical use for his understanding, he demonstrates 
the dangerous potential of unchecked knowledge.  
Shelley’s Presentation of the Abyssal Divide in Frankenstein 
In the previous section I focused on the contextual environment in which Shelley 
wrote Frankenstein to provide a background knowledge that will help 
understanding of the conceptual history of the novel. Following this 
concentration is focused on close literary analysis. I divide this part into two 
sections; the first discusses the liminality of the creature, and demonstrates how 
he is considered a boundary residing figure between man and animal. Following 
                                                          
52 Erasmus Darwin, Zoonomia; Or, the Laws of Organic Life: In Three Parts. 1803: D. Carlisle. 
Subsequent page references in text. 
 
Tabitha Kan 55 
 
this is a longer section consisting of three parts that focuses on the different 
interpretations that can be applied to the Creature whilst approaching the 
question of what it is that separates man from animal.  
The Monster of the Abyss; Shelley’s Liminal Creation 
Shelley’s unnamed and undefined monster is a widely discussed literary enigma, 
which has been regularly analysed by critics, and many may argue that because 
it has been so well studied all angles have been covered with regards to analysis. 
Rauch verifies this problem by claiming that “new perspectives on Frankenstein 
are hard to come by” (227). However, Paul Sherwin argues that the creature as a 
plentiful analytical source because of liminality and flexibility of interpretation53. 
The creature as a liminal being falls within the void that separated man both from 
animal and from God. His summary draws attention to how the antagonist is 
interpreted by critics in a variety of ways within various schools of literary 
criticism. Sherwin’s viewpoint demonstrates the philosophical and psychological 
readings of the creature that all contribute to the dubious question of what 
humanity is as a species. Sherwin demonstrates why this is when he discusses 
the reason for such a variety of readings attributed to the creature: 
Frankenstein never speaks more truly than when he calls the 
Creature his “daemon’. A marginal or boundary being, the daemon is 
a powerful representation of our uncertain lot, suspended as we are 
between knowledge and power, nature and supernature, objectivity 
and subjectivity. Conceiving the creature as a genius of liminality, a 
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type of art’s duplicitous interplay of revelation and concealment, 
restores his virtuality, which is betrayed as soon as he comes to 
signify something determinate. (891) 
Sherwin reads the creature as a creation of the unknown. Fitting distinctly 
between the known and the unknowable, the monster is a boundary figure that 
divides man from animal; the theories and potential consequences of science, 
and the natural, supernatural, and unnatural origins of man: “I found myself 
similar, yet at the same time strangely unlike the beings concerning whom I read, 
and to whose conversation I was a listener. I sympathized with, and partly 
understood them, but I was unformed in mind; I was dependent on none, and 
related to none.” (103-104) Here the creature is shown to be unique as a 
marginal boundary residing, and therefore is able to personify the Otherness 
discussed by various schools of thought: 
If, for the orthodox Freudian, he is a type of the unconscious, for the 
Jungian he is a shadow, for the Lacanian an objet a, for one 
Romanticist a Blakean “spectre”, for another a Blakean “emanation”, 
he also has been or can be read as Rousseau’s natural man, a 
Wordsworthian child of nature, the isolated Romantic rebel, the 
misunderstood revolutionary impulse, Mary Shelley’s abandoned 
baby self, her abandoned babe, an abhorrent signifier, difference, or 
as a hypostasis of godless presumption, the monstrosity of a godless 
nature, analytical reasoning, or alienating labor. (890) 
Sherwin argues that the key to discovering the monster’s significance is not to 
see him as one particular signifier, but instead to envision him as a liminal 
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creation, which is by nature undefined due to his state as a number of united 
dichotomies; good and evil, life and death, man and animal. It is therefore the 
creature's abyssal residence that makes it such an important literary creation. 
With consideration of the importance that Sherwin places of the creature’s 
liminality, the purpose of this section is to demonstrate potential readings of the 
novel regarding animality and humanity, and how the creature becomes a 
representative of both, and neither. 
The position of the monster’s narrative highlights his function within the novel. 
Shelley’s framed narrative serves as an abyssal descent, reflecting that which we 
experience when we inquire into our own origins. Beginning on the narratives 
surface with the account of an objective outsider, Shelley takes the reader deeper 
into the novel by introducing the account of the protagonist scientist, who 
endeavours to discover immortality by excavating the abyss. He does this 
through his experiments with the corporeal human body. Consequently, Shelley 
uses the framed narrative to take the reader into the heart of the novel to 
discover humanity’s mortality. The creature’s own narrative found in the centre 
of the novel could be strategically placed to emphasize the abyssal descent of the 
reader. The final resurfacing back into Walton’s narrative signifies a return from 
the abyss, and this cautionary story serves to emphasize the danger of boundary 
crossing. 
The appearance of the creature juxtaposes that of Frankenstein. Primarily, we 
see the creature as a superhuman monster; “We perceived a low carriage, fixed 
on a sledge and drawn by dogs, pass on towards the north, at the distance of half 
a mile: a being which had the shape of a man, but apparently of gigantic structure, 
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sat in the sledge, and guided the dogs” (12). The first view of the monster 
demonstrates both his human aspects but also his inhumanity. The creature’s 
ambiguity is offset by Frankenstein’s appearance, which resembles what was 
conceived to be the pinnacle of human understanding; “He was not, as the other 
traveller seemed to be, a savage inhabitant of some undiscovered island, but a 
European” (13). Shelley’s description of the monster as a “savage inhabitant from 
some undiscovered island” relates to colonial concepts of the “savage” as a 
subhuman being. The “undiscovered island” from which Walton suggests he 
originates symbolically recounts the potential animalistic history of humanity 
yet to be discovered, whilst Frankenstein is distinguished as the pinnacle of 
“civilized” society and humanity. The creature’s gargantuan frame and hideous 
appearance contrasts with Frankenstein’s, and serves to distinguish between the 
animalistic and the human: “I was, besides, endowed with a figure hideously 
deformed and loathsome; I was not even of the same nature as man” (96). Whilst 
the monster is described as hideously ugly, Walton lays emphasis on 
Frankenstein’s beauty: “What a glorious creature must he have been in the days 
of his prosperity, when he is thus noble and godlike in ruin. He seems to feel his 
worth, and the greatness of his fall” (179). Immediately the comparison between 
Frankenstein and Milton's Satan is evident.  Despite the fall, Frankenstein is 
described as angelic. It is therefore possible that Frankenstein is the 
representation of humanity stretched beyond its limits: “When I reflected on the 
work I had completed, no less a one than the creation of a sensitive and rational 
creature, I could not rank myself with the herd of common projectors.” (180) In 
comparison, the creature signifies an inherent fundamentalism of the human 
condition that Frankenstein finds abhorrent, potentially because serves as a 
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reminder of the animalistic being that lies underneath social conventions and 
religious belief. 
Frankenstein and Walton are both characters attempting to conquer the abyss 
and rise above humanities limits, like Nietzsche’s “Superman” : “And now, dear 
Margaret, do I not deserve to accomplish some great purpose?’ (7). Walton in 
particular observes Frankenstein in this manner: ‘He must have been a noble 
creature in his better days, being even now in wreck so attractive and amiable” 
(15). Walton’s journey represents this attempt to better humanity as he 
physically ascends towards the North Pole: “I try in vain to be persuaded that the 
pole is the seat of frost and desolation; it ever presents itself to my imagination 
as the region of beauty and delight” (5). Walton and Frankenstein both attempt 
to further themselves and the human race, by narrowing the gap between 
humanity and God. The only outcomes possible are an admission of defeat, or 
destruction. By creating the monster, Frankenstein attempts to reach a God like 
status: “A new species would bless me as its creator and source; many happy and 
excellent natures would owe their being to be.” (36) Yet he dies bitter and alone, 
having caused the destruction of everyone he loved. 
Not only does Frankenstein resemble the “Übermensch”, but his aim is to 
discover him, and to elevate humanity to a new plane of evolutionary existence: 
“…but what glory would attend the discovery, if I could banish disease from the 
human frame, and render man invulnerable to any but a violent death!” (23) 
Frankenstein’s experiment is aimed at the attainment of the Superman; in many 
ways he achieves this goal. The monster has super-human skills of strength and 
speed; he is also portrayed as immune to destruction. Hunter, in his discussion 
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of evolutionary science in Frankenstein, argues that Frankenstein’s creation is a 
success, suggesting that the creature is the next step in human evolution: 
She responds to the theory of evolution formulated by Erasmus 
Darwin in Zoonomia (1794), The Botanic Garden (1795) and The 
Temple of Nature (1803) and conceives of a situation in which human 
agency and imagination have made possible the next evolutionary 
step. The creature is a new species that threatens to supplant the 
supremacy of man, not out of evil intent, but simply by enacting the 
natural process described by Darwin. (134) 
Hunter argues that Erasmus Darwin’s theories are central to the plot; a 
conclusion that is drawn considering Shelley’s opening sentence in the Preface: 
“The event on which this fiction is founded has been supposed, by Dr Darwin, and 
some of the physiological writers of Germany, as not of impossible occurrence” 
(3). Hunter focuses on the importance of the creature, primarily as an 
improvement on the human but later a potential usurper: “The monster is not 
simply the sum of reanimated body parts, but an improved and unique species 
that Victor believes ‘would bless [him] as its creator and source.” (139) He argues 
that, further to this, the creature shows a full improvement of the human form, 
following Erasmus Darwin’s particular ideas of an evolution constantly striving 
for improvement and betterment: 
As an improved design, this new species is the product of what 
Darwin believed to be a set of natural laws that operated in a 
perpetual drive for improvement. The creature is eight foot tall, 
stronger, more agile and possessed of a more highly developed 
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physical survival mechanism that regular humans. He can scale 
glaciers with ease, subsist on acorns and berries and he demonstrates 
his superior intelligence by learning to read Milton, Plutarch and 
Goethe just two years after his birth. (140) 
Hunter’s argument is persuasive in the discussion of Shelley’s treatment of ideas 
of evolution. Shelley’s interpretation therefore potentially pre-empts not only 
Nietzsche’s “Superman” but also the inherent problem with eugenics: “Oh! Be 
men, or be more than man” (183). However, a further complication of the 
argument is the brutal and animalistic form of the creature. The greater strength 
and agility of the creature is associated more with a regression into animality 
rather than a furthering in human evolution; “Besides, the strange nature of the 
animal would elude all pursuit…” (57) Wells further writes on the potential of 
this regression in The Time Machine (1896), in which he describes the de-
evolution of humanity into more animalistic creature, an element of the novel 
that will be discussed in the last chapter.  Charles Darwin approaches this 
concept in The Descent of Man (1871), in which he argues that whilst most animal 
develop stronger physical attributes over time, humanity’s development of 
reason renders physical evolution less necessary than mental progress: 
Mr Wallace, in an admirable paper before referred to, argues that 
man, after he had partially acquired those intellectual and moral 
faculties which distinguish him from the lower animals, would have 
been but little liable to body modifications through natural selection 
or any other means. For man is enabled through his mental faculties 
to keep with an unchanged body in harmony with the changing 
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universe…The lower animals, on the other hand, must have their 
bodily structure modified I order to survive under greatly changing 
conditions. They must be rendered stronger, or acquired more 
effective teeth and claws, for defence against new enemies; or they 
must be reduced in size, so as to escape detection and danger.54 (152) 
Here Darwin argues that humanity has the ability to adapt because of improved 
mental functions rather than bodily traits; he further claims that whilst animals 
with changes of climate and environment need to grow fur or become equipped 
with sharper claws, man makes clothes or develops tools. He suggests that 
humanity does not need to develop bodily because of our higher mental 
functions. This physical “evolution” Hunter suggests that the creature represents 
does not correlate with the Darwinian principle of human evolution; rather it is 
suggestive of animal evolution. It is consequently possible that although Shelley’s 
creature might resemble the next stage in evolution, he also could demonstrate 
a regression. Furthermore the two concepts are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive. The next stage in human evolution could mean a step back to the 
animalistic; a step that Frankenstein did not anticipate. Frankenstein would 
therefore resemble Wells's Time Traveller as a genius who, despite his 
knowledge, miscalculated the future of humanity. This step into the animalistic 
reminds humanity of its origins, and presents the more randomized evolution 
that Charles Darwin suggests, as opposed to the directed evolution conceived by 
Erasmus Darwin, a difference that Hunter further examines: 
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In On the Origin of Species (1859), Charles describes a divergent 
course of change that expands outward and lacks any sort of 
purposeful direction. Erasmus, on the other hand, draws upon a 
broad scope on Enlightenment ideology to conclude that ‘all nature 
exists in a state of perpetual improvement by laws impressed on the 
atoms of matter by the great cause of causes; and that world may still 
be in its infancy and continue to improve for ever and ever. (135) 
The narrative presents the contrast in the evolutionary product conceived by 
Erasmus and Charles Darwin. Erasmus Darwin conceived an optimistic 
evolution, which achieved an ever improving form of humanity: “Thus it would 
appear all nature exists in a state of perpetual improvements by laws impressed 
on the atoms of matter by the great causer of causes; and the world may still be 
in its infancy and continue to improve for ever and ever.” (431) Though Shelley 
is inspired by Erasmus Darwin, her narrative resembles and potentially pre-
empts Charles’s concepts considering the outcome of Frankenstein’s 
experiments. Frankenstein attempts the next stage in evolution with the 
intention of creating a greater humanity, and instead unearths a more primal 
being that resembles the missing link. Furthermore, although the creature’s 
study of Milton, Goethe, and Plutarch demonstrates improved intelligence, it is 
more conceivable that they are used as a literary device to explain the creature’s 
ability to speak and read, and to also highlight some of Shelley’s most important 
inspirations for the novel. Therefore, the creature, I would argue, albeit potential 
“Übermensch”, is a cocktail of animalistic and human features. Shelley therefore 
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highlights the ugliness of evolution, through the creation of an exemplary abyssal 
resident.  
In light of this both Frankenstein and Shelley seem unsure of whether the 
creature is animal or man. On the one hand he is described like an animal: “I do 
not doubt that he hovers near the spot which I inhabit; and if he has indeed taken 
refuge in the Alps, he may be hunted like the chamois, and destroyed as a beast 
of prey.” (169)  The creature is uncatchable because of his animalistic speed and 
strength combining the most advantageous strengths of animality against 
humanity:  
I would willingly afford you every aid in your pursuit; but the creature 
of whom you speak appears to have powers which would put all my 
exertions to defiance. Who can follow an animal which can traverse 
the sea of ice, and inhabit caves and dens, where no man would 
venture to intrude? (169)  
Once again Shelley demonstrates the contrasts between the human Frankenstein 
and the animalistic creature. There is acknowledgement here of the creatures 
animalistic traits by Frankenstein and the Magistrate, however the creature 
himself also recognizes this aspect of himself: “I was like a wild beast that had 
broken the toils; destroying the objects that obstructed me, and ranging through 
the wood with a stag-like swiftness.” (111) He describes a kind of peace that he 
found whilst abiding in the natural world, and an affinity towards animals like 
birds: 
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 Some years ago, when the images which this world affords first 
opened upon me, when I felt the cheering warmth of summer, and 
heard the rustling of the leaves and the chirping of the birds, and 
these were all to me, I should have wept to die, now it is my only 
consolation (190).  
The descriptions of his natural durability and ability to live off the natural 
subsistence in the forest are also suggestive of animalistic hardiness, as well as 
an affinity to the natural world: “My food is not that of man; I do not destroy the 
lamb and the kid, to glut my appetite; acorns and berries afford me sufficient 
nourishment.” (120) Similarly, the creature’s superhuman powers of strength 
and agility are widely attributed more to animals that to humans. For example 
when considering humanity Jean-Jacques Rousseau writes that “…I see an animal 
less strong than some, less agile than others, but, all things considered, the most 
advantageously physically organized of all” (66). Rousseau’s description could be 
perfectly attributed to Frankenstein, who although weaker, is beautiful in 
appearance and mentally gifted, which according to Rousseau is the unique 
quality of humanity. The monster, instead, is not a creature of prime physical 
organization. He is, nevertheless a more powerful creature: “I was more agile 
than they, and could subsist upon a coarser diet; I bore the extremes of heat and 
cold with less injury to my frame; my stature far exceeds theirs” (96). The 
creature is more brutish, as he can survive in a harsher climate, and more 
extreme environments, whilst having developed an affinity with nature. Man in 
comparison, does not require the strength of this animality to thrive due to his 
ability to reason. 
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Yet the monster also has a capacity for reason. The monster describes his human 
attributes, and his ability to do this suggests that he is a rational reasoning being, 
and consequently perhaps human: “The picture I present to you is peaceful and 
human, and you must feel that you could deny it only in the wantonness of power 
and cruelty” (120). Shelley presents an image of a rational, speaking creature, 
which pertains to humanity according to a variety of philosophers. When 
Descartes’s defines the primary attribute of humanity as the faculty of reason, 
James Burnet demonstrates humanities development of language to form 
society:  
The inquiry becomes the more interesting, as well as of greater 
curiosity, when we consider, that it leads us back to what may be 
called the origin of human race, since without the use of reason and 
speech we have no pretensions to humanity, nor can with any 
propriety be called men; but must be contented to rank with other 
animals here below, over whom we assume so much superiority, and 
exercise dominion chiefly by means of the advantages that the use of 
language gives us.55  
In his dialogue with Frankenstein the creature shows not only that he has 
skills of speech and rationality, but that he has become master of them, and 
speaks with surprising eloquence considering previous ghoul-like 
descriptions. It is here that the creature succeeds in demonstrating that he not 
only has a sense of reason, but also of morality: 
                                                          
55 James Burnet,  On the Origin of Language. Vol. 1. 1967, Menston: The Scholar press Ltd. (1-2) 
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 This trait of kindness moved me sensibly. I had been accustomed, 
during the night, to steal a part of their store for my own 
consumption; but when I found that in doing this I inflicted pain on 
the cottagers, I abstained, and satisfied myself with berries, nuts, and 
roots, which I gathered from a neighbouring wood. (88) 
The creature’s ability to sympathize with others inherently demonstrates 
goodness, albeit one that is warped due to ill treatment. The monster, in addition 
to this, has a sense of self-awareness, exemplified when he sees his own 
reflection; a moment which could be considered inherently Lacanian: “I had first 
admired the perfect forms of the cottagers-their grace, beauty, and delicate 
complexions: but how was I terrified, when I viewed myself in a transparent 
pool!” (90) By discovering his reflection, the creature experiences his own birth 
into self-awareness. Even Frankenstein at certain points, also recognise him as a 
man: “…I conceived the idea, and executed the creation of a man” (180). The 
creature certainly bears an uncanny resemblance to a human being despite 
deformity, and is perhaps, so terrifying because it portrays an unflattering 
reflection of ourselves.   
Nevertheless, the creature cannot be read as a fully human being. His crimes, 
though understandable are nevertheless portrayed as being too dark to be truly 
human: “I was firmly convinced in my own mind that Justine, and indeed every 
human being, was guiltless of this murder.” (60) Frankenstein’s opinion is not 
presented as mistaken. The act of infanticide is used to present a chilling 
inhumanity, and functions to separate the creature from man. The creature’s 
crimes are portrayed as being neither animal, nor human, but something perhaps 
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supernaturally driven; “Many times I considered Satan as the fitter emblem of 
my condition; for often, like him, when I viewed the bliss of my protectors, the 
bitter gall of envy rose within me.” (105). Shelley’s reference to John Milton’s 
Satan demonstrates a fall of the creature into liminal territory; and like Satan, 
Frankenstein’s creature also achieves an abyssal descent into which he becomes 
a force of wrathful vengeance. The abyss can possibly be considered as the gap 
between morality, associated with humanity, and amorality, associated with 
animality. If this is the case, then the space in between morality and amorality is 
immorality, the knowledge of what is ethical but defiance against it. It is possible 
that the monster falls into this category, as he understands morality, but chooses 
to purposefully act in an immoral manner. 
The creature, after being rejected from humanity falsely assumes he has the 
choice to become defined as animal or human, and pleads with Frankenstein to 
allow him an animalesque existence with a female version of himself in South 
America: ‘‘You propose,’ replied I, ‘to fly from the habitations of man, to dwell in 
those wilds where the beasts of the field will be your only companions’’ (120). 
The creature’s plea is evocative of an inherent urge to be defined, which is also 
signified by the desire for a female like him to be created, so that he can be 
liberated from isolation. Yet Frankenstein recognises that the creature is more 
than an animal, and realizes that although the monster claims to be satisfied with 
an animal's existence, he cannot speak for an entire species. The human attribute 
of the creature which allows him rational thought means that Frankenstein 
cannot allow the creature to choose, consequently abandoning him to liminality: 
“He had sworn to quit the neighbourhood of man, and hide himself in deserts; 
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but she had not; and she, who in all probability was to become a thinking and 
reasoning animal, might refuse to comply with a compact made before her 
creation.” (138) The potential for free will in the creature forces Frankenstein to 
abandon him due to the potential for evolution, which threatens to usurp the 
human race:  
Even if they were to leave Europe, and inhabit the deserts of the new 
world, yet one of the first results of those sympathies for which the 
daemon thirsted would be children, and a race of devils would be 
propagated upon the earth, who might make the very existence of the 
species of man a condition precarious and full of terror. (138) 
This passage demonstrates a fear at the concept of extinction, a theory recently 
approved by Cuvier who suggested that races were finite. The potential 
consequences of extinction applied to the human race caused anxiety 
demonstrated by Shelley here, and further in The Last Man, in which the entire 
human race is destroyed by plague:  
Will the mountains remain unmoved, and the streams still keep a 
downward course towards the vast abyss; will the tides rise and fall, 
and the winds fan universal nature; will beasts pasture, birds fly and 
fishes swim, when man, the lord, possessor, perceiver, and recorder 
of all these things, has passed away, as though he had never been? O, 
what mockery is this! Surely death is not death, and humanity is not 
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extinct; but merely passed into other shapes, unsubjected to our 
perception.56  
With this fear of the extinction exemplified in the later novel, Shelley 
demonstrates concern over the human race’s finite existence that is attributed to 
animalistic corporeal mortality. When Frankenstein decides to destroy the 
female creature Shelley alludes to the potential for extinction caused by 
usurpation by a stronger race. By deciding to destroy the creature, Frankenstein 
reveals an inherent fear of both evolution and man’s mortality that the creature 
represents.  
In this section I have reflected on how the creature functions as a liminal being, 
whose literary power lies in its lack of definition. I have demonstrated how he 
contrasts to the character of Frankenstein regarding the two limits of humanity, 
and have focused on the animal/human dichotomy in the monster. By doing this, 
I have shown how the monster represents neither animal nor human, but 
incorporates elements of both. He is too human to be animal, too animal to be 
human, and its immorality gives it an extra element of inhumanity. Hence, as a 
liminal figure, the creature can be read as a literary interpretation of the abyss 
that separates man from animal. My demonstration of the uncertain nature of 
the creature now allows me to explore the implications of this liminal figure; 
what it tells us about Mary Shelley’s digestion of the contemporary science, and 
how she used this to explore what man is. 
                                                          
56 Mary Shelley, The Last Man. 2004, Ware: Wordsworth Classics. (330) Subsequent page 
references in text. 
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The Significance of the Monster as an Abyssal Resident 
I have examined the abyssal habitation of the creature in the previous section, so 
now I move on to discuss the significance of this in consideration of argument 
exploring humanity’s relationship with animality, and how it is represented 
within the novella. Primarily, I consider Cartesian philosophy which suggests 
that dualism is the quality of man that separates us from animals, a duality that 
the creature lacks. Secondly I examine society as the principle that divides animal 
from man. The creature craves society but is entirely isolated and therefore 
abjected from normal human life. Finally, I discuss the creature as the “inhuman” 
part of humanity, psychologically as the animal part of the human psyche that is 
abjected. I use these arguments to demonstrate how Shelley digested concepts 
of man being a divine creation or a corporeal machine.  
The Monstrous Body: Matter without Meaning 
Primarily, my discussion explores and examines ideas that suggest the monster 
represents a soulless humanity. Kristeva writes of the corpse as an 
exemplification of the abject, as it is neither subject nor object, it abides in a 
liminal space between the two: “A body without soul, a non-body, disquieting 
matter, it is to be excluded from God’s territory as it is from his speech” (109). 
Frankenstein’s creature is created from the disused parts of various corpses 
reanimated to create a live being. The creature is both a body and a non-body. 
The creature consequently can be considered a reanimated corpse, and 
regarding Kristeva’s theories of abjection would be particularly threatening, as 
it defies the boundary limits of self and matter. When considering how often the 
“undead” are used as fictitious antagonists in literature and media, Kristeva's 
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principle of abjection becomes important. The creature represents the opposite 
of a ghost; rather than spirit without a body, he is a body without spirit, 
consequently Shelley pre-empts the twentieth and twenty first century 
fascination with a zombie apocalypse. The creature could be the progenitor of 
this new evolutionary race that is evident in so much current media. Recent 
examples include the current popular television series, “The Walking Dead”57, 
and the film “World War Z”58. If Shelley had combined Frankenstein with The Last 
Man, the product would have most likely become a much more literary imagining 
of a similar zombie apocalypse. Therefore it is viable that through this narrative 
Shelley epitomizes the liminal space separating human and animal by creating a 
creature whose chthonic origins make him entirely abject. In the novel there is 
no explicit mention of the creature being without a soul. To the contrary, in one 
instance Frankenstein mentions his soul; “His soul is as hellish as his form, full of 
treachery and fiend-like malice.” (178) However, despite this there is a strong 
implication in the novella that the creature’s divide from humanity is due to his 
being created by man, and not by God, and consequently lacking the divine 
essence of humanity.  
According to Butler, Frankenstein’s suggestion that electricity provides the 
essential life element mirrors Abernathy’s theory: “Frankenstein the blundering 
experimenter, still working with superseded notions, shadows the intellectual 
position of Abernathy, who proposes that the superadded life-element is 
analogous to electricity” (xx-xxi). Butler suggests that Frankenstein serves as a 
parody of Abernethy who proposed the presence of electricity as the life force 
                                                          
57 Walking Dead, dev. Frank Darabont, feat Andre Lincoln and John Bernthal, (AMC, 2010) 
58 World War Z, dir. Mark Foster, feat Brad Pitt and Matthew Fox, (Paramount Pictures, 2010) 
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that drives the body; Frankenstein assumes that by imbuing the creature with 
electricity he can give it life force: “With anxiety that almost amounted to agony, 
I collected the instruments of life around me, that I might infuse a spark of being 
into the lifeless thing that lay at my feet” (38). It is, however, suggested within 
the novel, that though electricity is used to give animation to corporeal matter, it 
cannot be used to create an exact replica of humanity. The creature fails to meet 
Frankenstein’s expectations. From the moment of its creation the creature is 
inexplicably repulsive despite Frankenstein’s efforts to make him beautiful:  
His limbs were in proportion, and I had selected his features as 
beautiful. Beautiful-Great God! His yellow skin scarcely covered the 
work of muscles and arteries beneath; his hair was of a lustrous black, 
and flowing; his teeth of a pearly whiteness; but these luxuriances 
only formed a more horrid contrast with his watery eyes, that seemed 
almost of the same colour as the dun white sockets in which they 
were set, his shrivelled complexion, and straight black lips. (39) 
The ugliness of the creature can be attributed to the absence of a soul, the latter 
being something that can only be given through divine natural creation. As the 
creature is purely a product of man and science, Shelley suggests that there is an 
important element absent from the creature that inspires automatic repulsion: 
“A flash of lightning illuminated the object, and discovered its shape plainly to 
me; its gigantic structure, and the deformity of its aspect, more hideous than 
belongs to humanity, instantly informed me that it was the wretch, the filthy 
daemon to whom I had given life” (56). The hideousness of the creature is 
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juxtaposed with the beauty of the human form specifically to highlight the 
inhuman aspect: 
I had admired the perfect forms of my cottagers-their grace, beauty 
and delicate complexions: but how was I terrified, when I viewed 
myself in a transparent pool! At first I started back, unable the believe 
that it was indeed I who was reflected in the mirror; and when I 
became fully convinced that I was in reality the monster that I am, I 
was filled with the bitterest sensations of despondence and 
mortification. (90) 
The pleasing appearances of human characters like the cottagers are used as a 
contrast, evoking the abhorrence of the creature. The trope is used similarly by 
Robert Louis Stevenson in his gothic horror novella The Strange Case of Dr Jekyll 
and Mr. Hyde59. Hyde is physically repugnant to all those who encounter him. In 
Jekyll’s final revelation of events he reveals that this is because Hyde is a creature 
driven by pure evil, unlike any other of the human species: “This, as I take it, was 
because all human beings, as we meet them, are commingled out of good and evil: 
and Edward Hyde, alone in the ranks of mankind, was pure evil.” (58) Hyde’s 
repulsiveness stems from an absence of goodness that Jekyll argues is an integral 
part in all humanity. In this case, it is not goodness that the creature is missing, 
but the divine essence of supernatural creation. It is therefore complex as to 
whether Shelley is parodying Abernethy in the false attempt to add the “life-
                                                          
59 Robert Louis Stevenson, and R. Mighall, The Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde and Other 
Tales of Terror. 2002: Penguin. Subsequent page references in text. 
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element”, she is instead perhaps suggesting that the theory is valid, but that the 
“life element” is not something controllable and conceivable by humanity like 
electricity. Potentially, she suggests that electricity is a poorer synthetic form of 
the life element than that which animates the human form. She uses Abernathy’s 
ideas to consider Cartesian ideology of the divine soul. The absence of this 
component part of humanity brings the creature closer to animality than 
humanity. Shelley therefore also perhaps parodies Lawrence, who suggests that 
humanity is entirely corporeal.  
Cartesian dualism suggests that the reason for the divide between animal and 
human is the presence of a soul. Therefore, although the creature is made of the 
component parts of a human, he lacks its essence. It could be, in this way, a 
product of the abyss, as Rene Descartes explains in his Discourse of the Method 
(1637):  
For, examining the functions which might in accordance with this 
supposition exist in this body, I found precisely all those which might 
exist in us without our having the power of thought, and consequently 
without our soul-that is to say, this part of us, distinct from the body, 
of which it has just been said that its nature is to think-contributing 
to it, functions which are identically the same as those in which 
animals lacking reason may be said to resemble us.60  
The creature, unlike the Cartesian animal, has the faculty of reason; of thought 
and rationality: “And this does not merely show that the brutes have less reason 
                                                          
60 Rene. Descartes, E.S. Haldane, and G.R.T. Ross, Key Philosophical Writings. 1997: Wordsworth 
Editions, Limited. (100-101) Subsequent page references in text. 
Tabitha Kan 76 
 
than men, but that they have none at all, since it is clear that very little is required 
in order to be able to talk” (108). However, there is no way the creature could 
possess the soul that Descartes suggests endows humanity with rational thought. 
To do that would be tantamount to suggesting that the creations of men are equal 
to that of God, a concept that most Christians living in the regency period would 
abhor. Descartes describes how the soul can only be ‘expressly created’, a feat 
which can only be achieved by a deity: “I had described after this the rational soul 
and shown that it could not be in any way derived from the power of matter, like 
the other things of which I had spoken, but that it must be expressly created” 
(109). The creature is therefore in an inherently problematic position; being 
imbued with human rationality but not human essence. 
According to Cartesian dualism, although fundamentally conjoined in many 
ways, there are two separate aspects of humanity; the corporeal and the 
incorporeal:  
I showed, too, that it is not sufficient that it should be lodged in the 
human body like a pilot in his ship, unless perhaps for the moving of 
its members, but that it is necessary that it should also be joined and 
united more closely to the body in order to have sensations and 
appetites similar to our own, and thus form true man (109). 
 It is Frankenstein’s attempt himself to integrate the immortal aspect of the soul 
within the mortal body that disfigures the creature. However, with the discovery 
of the immortal body, the absence of the soul is distinguished. It is evident 
through the description of Frankenstein’s endeavours to build the creature that 
he only concentrates attention on the physical necessities of the creature: “After 
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days and nights of incredible labour and fatigue, I succeeded in discovering the 
cause of generation of life; nay, more, I became myself capable of bestowing 
animation upon lifeless matter” (34). Mistakenly Frankenstein believes that all 
he must do to ensure man’s immortality is to reanimate dead flesh. According to 
Cartesian principle, once the body has died the soul separates from it; as 
Descartes said himself on his deathbed: “Now my soul, ‘tis time to depart” (105) 
The souls that supposedly inhabited the body parts used to create the creature 
would therefore be absent in the new form.  
Shelley uses the circumstances in which the creature is created to highlight this 
point, as Paul Sherwin argues: “The oppressively close, enveloping tomb world 
into which he descends is a self-engendered abyss that discloses what our finite 
bodily ground looks like from the heights to which the spirit has ascended.” (896) 
Sherwin reflects on juxtaposition caused by Frankenstein’s actions. The spirit is 
the divine attribute of humanity, whilst Frankenstein’s actions necessitate him 
to physically descend into the chthonic. The creature’s creation contrasts directly 
with divine human creation. Shelley could perhaps have formulated a 
comparison between divinely created humanity, and humanity created through 
evolution. Evolution allows little direct potential for the creation of a soul. 
Therefore the creature can be considered merely a mirror of humanity, created 
through natural (or in this case unnatural) selection. Burton R. Pollin discusses 
this in his nineteen sixties analysis of the various influences of Mary Shelley, 
including Polidori: “on June 15 Shelley and he conversed about “principles-
whether man was to be thought merely as an instrument,” the primal source of 
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life, Erasmus Darwin’s theories, and galvanism.”61 The idea of man being “a mere 
instrument” is suggestive of the fear of corporeal humanity. Shelley has taken 
this idea of an instrumental body of humanity, and created a monster. In The Last 
Man Shelley demonstrates a similar fear of the corporeal mortality of humanity: 
We had called ourselves the “paragon of animals”, and lo! we were a 
quintessence of dust’. We repined that the pyramids had out lasted 
the embalmed body of their builder. Alas! The mere shepherd’s hut of 
straw we pass on the road, contained in its structure the principle of 
greater longevity than the whole race of man. How reconcile this sad 
change to our past aspirations, to our apparent powers. (318) 
Here Shelley demonstrates doubt about the incorporeal nature of humanity, 
conceiving a mutable idea of humanity that H.G. Wells develops in his later works. 
However later in the novel she overturns this pessimistic view of humanity and 
argues that there must be a higher element that brings us closer to God: “Death 
is a vast portal, an high road to life: let us hasten to pass; let us exist no more in 
this living death, but die that we may live!” (330) Shelley convinces herself as she 
attempts to convince her reader that the body is merely a vessel for our 
incorporeal selves. Though she explores the concept of purely corporeal 
humanity, she is not able to attest to it completely, and instead demonstrates a 
spiritual need for dualism. By attributing this aspect to humanity, she creates a 
problematic being who lacks this further element. 
                                                          
61 Burton R. Pollin “Philosophical and Literary Sources of Frankenstein”. Comparative 
Literature, 1965. 17(2): p. 97-108. (98) Subsequent page references in text. 
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The concept of the man-made creature is problematic for the creature himself, 
who is fully aware of his origins, and is resentful of divinely created humanity: 
Like Adam, I was created apparently united by no link to any other 
being in existence; but his state was far different from mine in every 
other respect. He had come forth from the hands of God a perfect 
creature, happy and prosperous, guarded by the especial care of his 
Creator; he was allowed to converse with, and acquire knowledge 
from the beings of a superior nature: but I was wretched, helpless, 
and alone. Many times I considered Satan as the fitter emblem of my 
condition; for often, like him, when I viewed the bliss of my 
protectors, the bitter gall of envy rose in me. (105)  
The creature laments his creation at the hands of a man rather than God; the 
insinuation is that man is in an inherently favourable position because he was 
divinely created. As a non-divine creation the creature lack man’s primary 
essence: 
Cursed creator! Why did you form a monster so hideous that even you 
turned from me in disgust? God in pity made man beautiful and 
alluring, after his own image; but my form is a filthy type of yours, 
more horrid from its very resemblance. Satan had his companions, 
fellow-devils, to admire and encourage him; but I am solitary and 
detested. (105)  
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Here Shelley explicitly demonstrates how man cannot reproduce God’s creation. 
The imperfections of man’s creations are distinguished from those of God, 
established by the ugly features of the creature.  
The absence of a soul is confirmed by both the creature’s demonic appearance, 
and perhaps also by his actions, which he claims were primarily well intentioned, 
although Frankenstein only directly experiences the creature’s evil activities: 
“Nothing in human shape could have destroyed that fair child.” (56). The 
creature, whose perspective we are shown, confesses to a primary goodness in 
his intentions, yet these are overturned by his crimes later in the novel. Even 
though we are forced to sympathise with the creature through his experiences, 
his wrathful acts outweigh the good, and he demonstrates an inherent darkness 
that, considering the Romantic positive outlook on human nature, seems 
inhuman: “A grin was on the face of the monster; he seemed to jeer, as with his 
fiendish finger he pointed towards to corpse of my wife” (166). From 
Frankenstein’s perspective, these actions are inherently linked to the creature’s 
appearance. We see ugliness and brutality intertwined, despite the moments of 
sympathy: “He approached; his countenance bespoke bitter anguish, combined 
with disdain and malignity, while its unearthly ugliness rendered it almost too 
horrible for human eyes.” (76) It is these moments when the creature is most 
“other”. Here the division between man and animal is defined by morality. If 
humans are considered moral beings, and animals are amoral, then immorality 
falls in the gap between, defining the abyss.  The creature knows morality, but is 
purposefully defiant of it.  
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For those who Frankenstein has lost, there is hope in the afterlife, demonstrated 
through a passionate entreaty by Frankenstein in which he pits materialism 
against spiritualism, shadowing the argument between Abernathy and 
Lawrence. In this scene Frankenstein demonstrates disbelief that Henry Clerval 
can be truly lost through death:  
And where does he now exist? Is this gentle and lovely being lost 
forever? Has this mind so replete with ideas, imaginations fanciful 
and magnificent, which formed a world, whose existence depended 
on the life of its creator; has this mind perished? Does it now only 
exist in my memory? No, it is not thus; your form so divinely wrought, 
and beaming with beauty, has decayed, but your spirit still visits and 
consoles your unhappy friend. (130) 
The creature, however, has no new home to which his spirit can ascend. He is 
entirely chthonic and thus death would render him non-existent. Furthermore 
his act of self-immolation demonstrates a desire to eradicate his bodily remains 
as well as his consciousness; an act that demonstrates the importance attributed 
to the creature’s corporeal form. Death is a state that the creature primarily fears, 
and though he sees it as a potential option to relieve its misery, the uncertainty 
terrifies him: “I wished sometimes to shake off all thought and feeling; but I 
learned that there was but one means to overcome the sensation of pain, and that 
was death-a state which I feared yet did not understand” (96-97). However 
despite this primary aversion to death, by the end of the novel the creature 
embraces mortality;  
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I shall die. I shall no longer feel the agonies which now consume me, 
or be the prey of feelings unsatisfied, yet unquenched…Some years 
ago, when the images which this world affords first opened upon me, 
when I felt the cheering warmth of summer, and heard the rustling of 
the leaves and the chirping of the birds, and these were all to me, I 
should have wept to die; now it is my only consolation. Polluted by 
crimes, and torn by bitterest remorse, where can I find rest but in 
death? (190) 
The creature reminisces about why he feared death previously; because the 
pleasant bodily sensations of life would be lost to him, but as such pleasures have 
become impossible for him he sees death as his only escape from immense guilt 
and loneliness. At no point does he consider a part of himself that would exist 
after his death, a strange attitude considering much of his education came from 
Milton’s Paradise Lost. He knows that there is no heaven or hell for him, and 
oblivion can be no worse than the hell he has had to experience alive in solitude. 
He chooses to lose his self-awareness so as to escape his existence. According to 
Cartesian principles, he therefore would experience an animal’s death, having no 
soul to be sent to the next life.  
In this section I focused on the corporeal nature of the creature, and how that 
represents a division from humanity according to Cartesian dualism typical of 
the religious attitude towards humanity within the Regency period. In the 
following argument, the relationship between animal and man becomes more 
complex, and within this analysis with respect to Shelley’s novel we can witness 
the narrowing of the abyss. 
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The Social Monstrosity  
In the previous section I demonstrated how the man-made element of the 
creature sets him apart from humanity. He is therefore born outside of society, 
as a separate, singular entity: “But I was perfectly unacquainted with towns, and 
large assemblages on men” (104). The creature’s lack of society could potentially 
be the element that separates him from humanity. Even scientists like 
Ramachandran as previously discussed believe that humanity is defined by a 
need for society.  Theodore Ziolkowski claims that the novels primary concern is 
the effect that science has on society: “Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein expresses 
society’s concern at what it perceived to be the mindless pursuit of knowledge 
with no thought for its social implications.”62 Underlying other concerns about 
concepts of evolution, there was the apprehension that it would cause a social 
upheaval, redefining approaches to the law, religion, and the social contract. 
Butler argues that it is for this reason the scientific machinations of the day were 
rejected by many who could not stand to look on their ancestral past: “When 
Natural Man appears in this family’s midst it cannot recognise him, and will not 
give him room” (xxxix). Similarly to natural man, the creature is not given a place 
in society, and consequently, like evolutionary theory, he is expelled by those 
who are inherently repulsed by his existence. 
The creature, as a representative of the abyssal divide, embodies a form of 
humanity that may have existed prior to society. In certain parts of the novel the 
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reader is reminded of primitive man in his near animalistic state: ‘‘This roused 
me from my nearly dormant state, and I ate some berries which I found hanging 
on the trees, or lying on the ground, I slaked my thirst at the brook; and then 
lying down, was overcome by sleep” (80). Rousseau considers this state as better 
form of human existence compared to corrupted social man: 
Now, if one compares the prodigious diversity of educations and ways 
of life that prevail in the different social orders of the civil state with 
the simplicity and uniformity of animal and savage life, in which all 
feed on the same foods, live in the same manner, and do exactly the 
same things, it will be understood how much less the difference from 
man to man must be in the state of nature than in that of society, and 
how much natural inequality in the human species must increase 
through instituted inequality. (88) 
Rousseau denounces society as an evil that has lead humanity from a simpler, 
noble existence into one that is deceitful and vain. However, society is also the 
explanation Rousseau gives for the progress of humanity. Darwin similarly 
attributes much of humanity’s evolutionary success to its development in 
society:  
It deserves notice that, as soon as the progenitors of man became 
social (and this probably occurred at a very early period), the 
principle of imitation, and reason, and experience would have 
increased, and much modified the intellectual powers in a way, of 
which we see only traces in the lower animals. (154) 
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 The creature attempts to enter into the human social contract. However, he is 
rejected at every potential opportunity for integration, possibly causing a 
reversion to a more primal state of humanity. The creature could represent 
humanity without the nurture of society, consequently marking a departure 
from Rousseau’s concept of inherent positive human nature, and suggesting that 
to flourish humanity requires civilization. It could also show how a lack of society 
leads to regression into a more animalistic form of humanity. Marilyn Butler 
considers the opposing idea to Rousseau’s philosophy, suggesting that the 
creature’s singular upbringing in the woods is unnatural: 
The significant point of Mary Shelley’s treatment of the Creature’s 
rearing in isolation from humanity is that it makes none of the 
common exaggerated claims. The Creature’s life in the woods is 
neither superior, nor even natural; it is not introduced as evidence of 
the existence of a sub-species, whether now or in a remote past, nor 
of man’s affinity with the primates. Mary Shelley takes a more 
cautious view, and could even be evading or excluding the 
evolutionist perspective both Erasmus Darwin and Lamark had 
advanced, that all forms of life had evolved from single cells.63 
Here Butler suggests that Shelley purposefully avoids the subject of evolution 
and its implications. In this point, I disagree; it is evident that ideas of evolution 
permeate Shelley’s thinking when considering the nature of humanity. However, 
Butler does suggest an inherent difference between humanity and animality that 
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the creature embodies. Humanity is defined by development of the individual 
within human society, whereas the creature’s primary life was spent in the 
woods. His divide from humanity is inhuman and his abandonment by 
Frankenstein could be argued to be the primary deciding factor as to the monster 
he becomes. The events following his abandonment force the creature to resort 
to criminality; as he is not accepted by society he rejects civilizations constraints 
in an act of rebellion: “I declared everlasting war against the species, and, more 
than all, against him who had formed me, and sent me forth to this insupportable 
misery” (111). It is not until the creature faces rejection multiple times that he 
becomes the malevolent force that haunts Frankenstein until his death. Primarily 
within the creature we therefore recognize a potential for humanity that is not 
nurtured by the bonds of a social system. It is therefore possible that Shelley 
adheres to Rousseau’s theory to some extent, and that the creature is 
transformed into a monster, as opposed to being born as one. James O’ Rourke 
identified the Rousseauean principles being applied to Shelley’s novella, albeit in 
a less derivative way than has previously been explored:  
The central enigma of Frankenstein is the evolution of this benign 
creature into a child-murderer, and in sketching this development 
Mary Shelley uses Rousseauean principles, but she shows an even 
more fluid transition between the attributes of the natural man and 
the social being than Rousseau did in his Discourses.64  
                                                          
64 James O'Rourke, ‘"Nothing More Unnatural": Mary Shelley's Revision of Rousseau’, ELH, Vol. 
56, No. 3 (Autumn, 1989), (550) Subsequent page references in text. 
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O’Rourke identifies that Shelley uses Rousseau’s principles, but in a more 
fluid manner, allowing the creature only a short amount of time to be 
transformed from natural man to fiend.  
Beer provides a potential explanation as to why the creature is excluded from 
human society. She suggests that it is because he is manufactured rather than 
born, and thus the man-made principle remains relevant, as Frankenstein’s 
method of creation denies the creature the opportunity to grow: 
When Mary Shelley came to describe a monster in Frankenstein she 
shows a creature denied the experience of growth. He is fabricated as 
if he were a machine, but out of organic bits and pieces. There is a gap 
between concept and material. Though he is a creature capable of 
undergoing the full cultural development of man, he is excluded from 
humanity because he has never partaken of the primary experience 
of human kind: that of physical growth. (103)  
Beer argues that he is denied the fundamental experience of humanity, that of 
childhood, which means that he is forever barred from human companionship. 
Beer further explains that this is the reason for the creature’s monstrosity. The 
absence of a mother in his creation is a possible additional factor to this 
consideration of manufacture, and a close link between the creature and Shelley.  
The cottagers function as the first form of human society that the creature 
experiences; they demonstrate the importance of social acceptance and 
interaction: “The patriarchal lives of my protectors caused these impressions to 
take a firm hold on my mind; perhaps, if my first introduction to humanity had 
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been made by a young soldier, burning for glory and slaughter, I should have 
been imbued with different sensations” (104). Rejected by society themselves 
they represent a microcosm of patriarchal civilization. The family model 
represents civilization on a grander scale; the patriarchal head served by the 
children. The De Laceys symbolize an idealized version of this system, and 
represent the civilization that the creature observes: 
 I admired virtue and good feelings, and loved the gentle manners and 
amiable qualities of my cottagers; but I was shut out from intercourse 
with them, except through means which I obtained by stealth, when I 
was unseen and unknown, and which rather increased than satisfied 
the desire I had of becoming one among my fellows. The gentle words 
of Agatha, and the animated smiles of the charming Arabian, were not 
for me. The mild exhortations of the old man, and the lively 
conversation of the loved Felix, were not for me. (97) 
The creature, as a rational being desires approval, representing a turning point 
in the novel. If he had been accepted by the cottagers, from everything we have 
learnt from the creature there may have been potential for him to have entered 
into some form of society, and perhaps he would then have not become a beast: 
“I learned, from the views of social life which it developed, to admire their 
virtues, and to deprecate the vices of mankind.” (102) The creature develops an 
understanding of the fundamental components of society as he attempts to 
emulate Felix in his work: 
I discovered also another means through which I was enabled to 
assist their labors. I found that the youth spent a great part of each 
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day in collecting wood for the family fire; and, during the night, I often 
took his tools, the use of which I quickly discovered, and brought 
home firing sufficient for the consumption of several days. (88) 
The creature’s understanding of society and desire to integrate are inherently 
human traits. Shelley emphasized the goodness of the creature as he strives to 
become a part of the greater unit. When he finally speaks to the older De Lacey 
the creature appeals to this fundamental trait of humanity that allows a society 
to form as factions grow larger. The sightless De Lacey does not question the 
creature’s humanity, as without his abhorrent appearance, the creature shows 
every aspect of a man through his reasoning and his sympathy, traits which 
inspire empathy in De Lacey: ‘‘I am poor, and an exile; but it will afford me true 
pleasure to be in any way serviceable to a human creature’’ (109). De Lacey 
perhaps speaks falsely when he discusses the superior moral feeling of 
humanity, which he emphasizes is fundamentally good: ‘‘To be friendless is 
indeed to be unfortunate; but the hearts of men, when unprejudiced by any 
obvious self-interest, are full of brotherly love and charity.’’ (109) His declaration 
seems naïve, yet it could echo Rousseau’s concept of the noble savage, which 
asserts that before being endowed with social feelings, man is inherently good, 
and it is society that makes him cruel. De Lacey may proclaim the inherent 
goodness in man, which is blinded by societies prejudice against the “other”. The 
creature’s acceptance by the patriarchal head of the family seems promising, but 
the children, representative of the citizens of society, cannot be swayed by the 
creature’s words, as his ugliness blinds them to his potential for humanity. The 
creature is shunned because he is “other”, and perceived as a danger to the social 
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unit. The creature is treated cruelly because he is an outsider, and therefore a 
potential threat. It is this division between sameness and otherness that is 
inherently human and also necessarily cruel. Humanity is not humanity without 
society, therefore Rousseau’s concept of goodness is instead attributed to 
something more primal than humanity. Hence, perhaps it is not only 
monstrousness that is found within the abyss, but also goodness. This, however, 
conflicts with notion of morality belonging to humanity, as previously discussed. 
The creature only begins to act nefariously after he is rejected, first by burning 
the cottager’s house, then by murdering William: “Believe me, Frankenstein: I 
was benevolent; my soul glowed with love and humanity: but am I alone, 
miserable alone?” (78). The appearance of the creature now has no bearing on 
his separation from humanity; even Justine who was accused of his crime was 
seen as too terrible to be included in society: “I could not consent to the death of 
any human being; but certainly I should have thought such a creature unfit to 
remain in the society of men” (71). According to this perspective the creature, 
rather than being born an abyssal monster, has instead become submerged in 
the abyssal liminality that has made him a fiend, and despite his ugliness, his 
actions make him an abhorrence to society. Justine was cast out of society by 
death; the creature can never be punished for his actions as he was never part of 
civilization and its laws. In this manner, Agamben’s concepts of the “Homo Sacer” 
could be considered relevant. The creature is not acknowledged by society, and 
therefore cannot be considered human in terms of political life, only bare life. It 
is perhaps his treatment in this manner which causes him to commit criminal 
acts. As he is shunned as a criminal, he behaves like a criminal. Shelley could 
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therefore, in this manner, criticise certain societal institutions which help create 
the anthropological machine. Shelley insinuates that without even the most 
fundamental of social inclusion, the monster becomes the “daemon”.  Yet even at 
this stage the creature appeals to certain attributes of human society:  
The guilty are allowed, by human laws, bloody as they may be, to 
speak in their own defence before they are condemned Listen to me, 
Frankenstein. You accuse me of murder; and yet you would, with a 
satisfied conscience, destroy your own creature. Oh, praise the 
eternal justice of man! (78) 
His statement is ironic; the creature is reliant on the ability to reason and ‘stand 
trial’, but also hates any semblance of the human society that he cannot attain. 
The monster is therefore conflicted, he loathes human society but also prescribes 
to it.  
The creature demonstrates in other ways his subservience to civilization; for 
example by showing religious understanding; hating and lording Frankenstein 
in equal measure, allowing himself to be ruled by his creator. Shelley shows 
religion to be an inherent part of a social being-it is natural for the creature to 
worship Frankenstein as well as loathe him, which is why he is so resentful: 
Remember, thou hast made me more powerful than thyself; my height 
is superior to to thine; my joints more supple. But I will not be 
tempted to set myself in opposition to thee. I am thy creature, and I 
will be even mild and docile to my natural lord and king, if though wilt 
also perform thy part, that which thou owest me. (77) 
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The creature’s understanding of the mechanisms of society only serves to make 
his isolation more unnatural. Again, he fits between humanity, which 
understands and is included in civilisation, and animality, which does not 
understand it and is not included. A being that knows society, but is not included, 
could also be considered a rendering of the abyss. 
In The Last Man Shelley demonstrates the effect of loneliness on civilized man; 
Verney’s isolation transforms him into a more animalistic being resembling the 
creature: “My hair has become nearly grey-my voice, unused now to utter sound, 
comes strangely on my ears. My person, with its human powers and features, 
seems to me a monstrous excrescence of nature” (372). Verney experiences a 
regression due to the dramatic isolation of the protagonist. This novel published 
eight years after the first edition of Frankenstein could demonstrate the 
transformation from human to monster, and thus how closely we resemble the 
creature when we are deprived of social order. Shelley is not alone in using 
isolation as a zoomorphic tool. In The Rime of the Ancient Mariner (1798) the 
mariner’s isolation induces him to find affinity with the animals of the sea, and 
even after he is saved he leads a singular, nomadic existence. Later in the century, 
H.G. Wells places his protagonists in positions of isolation from the rest of 
humanity, which in turn makes them into more animalistic beings. These 
examples are discussed in more depth later in this thesis.  
I have previously argued that the creature’s wish to leave for South America 
demonstrates a desire for definition, if not as a human, as an animal instead. 
Furthermore, the request could represent the desire to begin a new society; if he 
is unable to become a part of humanity, the creature looks to create his own 
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society in South America with his female: “On you it rests, whether I quit for ever 
the neighbourhood of man, and lead a harmless life, or become the scourge of 
your fellow-creatures, and the author of your own speedy ruin” (79). Rauch 
argues that Frankenstein’s inability to conceive of the social application of his 
findings leads to the ensuing tragedies. The creature demands the mate to 
attempt to verify his existence socially: “But the fact of the matter is that the 
monster, in asking for a mate, is merely trying to find a social context for his own 
existence” (231). Frankenstein’s denial of this potential is driven by the desire to 
preserve his own species from the potential threat of these stronger yet rational 
beings.  It is another societal drive; kill, or be killed.  
Shelley insinuates that humanity is formed through our social interactions. 
Frankenstein’s creature is barred from this and effectively resembles the 
vengeful Satan from Milton’s Paradise Lost.  I have previously discussed how 
although the creature directly links himself to Satan, Frankenstein can also be 
considered akin to the biblical antagonist. In equal measures, Frankenstein can 
be considered God-like, and the creature satanic. Like Satan, the monster is 
banished by his creator and instead inhabits a place so undesirable it enlarges 
the animosity towards Frankenstein. For Frankenstein’s creature, Hell is a state 
of being rather than a physical place, a fact that Shelley’s use of Paradise Lost puts 
into perspective, as Pollin argues: “The monster himself reflects that hell is an 
internal condition, which is intensified, if not produced, through loneliness” 
(104). The creature was not born into the abyss, but was reduced to it due to 
neglect. Hunter asserts that the creature was created by a lack of familial 
influence and the stability of religion: “Shelley personified this conflation in a 
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creature that was a product of Enlightenment materialism, without the morality 
formed from familial connections or a regulating religious philosophy” (135). 
Hunter argues that Shelley demonstrates a concern about scientific progress 
being without social context. Hunter’s statement demonstrates the effect of the 
purely corporeal body of man, and the implications it has on society.  The 
corporeal body is separated from society by ideas of natural creation and 
evolution which undermine the structure of civilization built on a specific dogma. 
The creature is a product what is conceived to be this uncivilised, inhuman 
pursuit of knowledge that strives to undermine the foundations of society. 
 Through this argument a creature has been discussed that is much closer to 
humanity than that which has been previously considered. In the next argument 
the gap will be closed and the creature will be demonstrated to be a 
personification of the part of ourselves that represents our link to animality. 
The Monster of the Mind 
Shelley’s aim in writing Frankenstein was to explore potential consequences of 
recent theories of life. However, it was also her intention to explore human 
nature itself; as Pollin notes in his discussion of her philosophical and literary 
influences: “She herself aptly wrote on February 25, 1822: “Let me fearlessly 
descend into the remotest caverns of my own mind, carry the torch of self-
knowledge into its dimmest recesses” (107). The creature could therefore be 
used as a reflection of human nature, and our abhorrence at the corporeal, 
animalistic motivations that are found within the “dimmest recesses” of our 
primitive minds.  Inspired by concepts of evolution that link humanity to other 
forms of life, she most likely felt various doubts and insecurities pertaining to the 
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individuality of humanity. These doubts perhaps led to an interpretation of the 
animalesque part of humanity that includes how it could be conceived and what 
it would mean. Her short story “Mathilda”, written soon after the publication of 
Frankenstein, demonstrates her desire to explore the dark drives of the human 
psyche. The result was the narrative’s incestuous subject matter which lead to 
the story being banned for over a hundred years65. Shelley certainly used her 
writing to explore darker psychological themes, especially considering a 
Freudian approach to narrative pertaining to the Electra complex. My final 
interpretation conceives of the monster as the Freudian “other”; exemplary of 
the “uncanny”, representing an inherent dichotomy that resides within the mind. 
The creature is consequently troubling because he stirs within ourselves the 
“unheimlich”: that is, the familiar stranger. 
Kristeva’s ideas of abjection can be used to explore the creature’s representation 
of primal humanity. Kristeva writes that the corpse is something inherently 
abject because it neither represents ourselves, nor the ‘other’ and in that absence 
of selfhood, neither life, nor death. The corpse is therefore a symbolically 
pertinent tool whilst considering that abhorrent part of ourselves that we cannot 
fully desert, as Kristeva explains: “The corpse, seen without God and outside of 
science, is the utmost of abjection. It is death infecting life. Abject. It is something 
from which one does not part, from which one does not protect oneself as from 
an object.” (4). According to this principle, a creature made of second-hand body 
parts is invoked to stir horror and revulsion. He is the epitome of death that has 
infected life, as life has infected his dead body parts; this principle stirs an 
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inherent revulsion within the psyche of humanity. The creature embodies a 
dichotomy that encourages us to reflect on what we are; the principles of death 
and the corporeal matter of which human beings are formed.  
Frankenstein’s creature is abhorred for his liminality-he serves as a reminder of 
our corporeal selves separated from the spiritual. Yet much of our corporeal self 
is psychological rather that material. Sherwin describes Frankenstein’s success 
as not being corporeal, but psychological: “Frankenstein’s astonishing psychic 
achievement, in Freudian terms, is the construction of a primal repression, 
whose constitutive role in psychic development is to structure the unconscious 
as an articulate erotogenic zone” (886). Sherwin argues that Frankenstein’s 
creature represents an embodiment of the id. Once; again the creature is 
inherently linked to the antagonist Mr. Hyde of Stevenson’s novella. Both Mr. 
Hyde and Frankenstein’s creature are creations of scientists curious about the 
nature of man. According to Sherwin’s argument, in this endeavour both 
scientists attempt to discover the principles of humanity by separating man’s 
psyche into its component parts. By identifying the part of them that is primal, 
the animal part of the human, their reaction is horror.  They find a being that is 
neither subject nor object, neither self nor other, the perversion of this boundary 
is abhorrent. The scientists discover the contents of the space that separates man 
and animal, and compulsively reject their findings.  
The creature is now considered not as a separate entity from man, but an 
inherent principle part that is rejected by society and the self. Shelley’s warning 
against the products of ambition does not only point to concern over our roots 
as animals, but also to that inherently animalistic part of ourselves, which 
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remains unacknowledged by society and the self. My argument considers the 
psychological implications of the creature, and the ways in which he is used to 
explore the unchartered terrain of the mind. The final part of this chapter begins 
by considering this revelation of an animalistic other of humanity as a collective. 
Following this the animalistic other shall be considered a part of Frankenstein’s 
psyche, and subsequently of Shelley’s psyche also. As Percy Shelley writes: “I 
have thus endeavoured to preserve the truth of the elementary principles of 
human nature, while I have not scrupled to innovate upon their combinations” 
(3). Shelley’s motivation was the discovery of true human nature. 
At this point, Marilynn Butler’s argument should be reconsidered; that the 
creature could be seen as the animalistic part of humanity that society 
endeavours to reject: “Above all it represents the attempt of an over-civilized 
elite to reject its real past and its membership of a wider animal community” 
(xlv). The novel could suggest the consequences of the rejection of this 
animalistic part of ourselves as we attempt to play God, and the abject product 
of this rejection: “You seek for knowledge and wisdom, as I once did; and I 
ardently hope that the gratification of your wishes may not be a serpent to sting 
you, as mine has been” (17).  Frankenstein warns against scientific investigation 
because it inflicts pain. However, according to this perspective, the Promethean 
scientist is not punished by the Gods, but by his self. 
The creature himself, as discussed previously, through his own action and 
appearance remind us of our own corporeal selves. However, as a rational 
outsider he also has the ability to judge humanity himself; a technique Shelley 
uses to allow him the ability to verbalize and rationalize his response to the race: 
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Was man, indeed, at once so powerful, so virtuous, and magnificent, 
yet so vicious and base? He appeared at one time a mere scion of the 
evil principle, and at another as all that can be conceived of noble and 
godlike. To be a great and virtuous man appeared to be the highest 
honour that can befall a sensitive being; and to be base and vicious, as 
many on record have been, appeared the lowest degradation, a 
condition more abject than that of the blind mole or harmless worm. 
(95-96) 
The creature demonstrates the two sides of man; the noble, rational, virtuous 
side, and the blood thirsty, aggressive, violent side. Objectively he witnesses the 
goodness of man through observation and study, but his own personal 
experiences reveal another, darker side of humanity: “Here then I retreated, and 
lay down, happy to have found a shelter, however miserable, from the 
inclemency of the season, and still more the barbarity of man” (84). Jacques 
Derrida’s illustration of his cat’s eyes reflecting our more barbaric nature is apt 
in this regard. Shelley uses her creature, which represents neither man nor 
animal, to verbalize an outsider’s view on the human race.  
Shelley also demonstrates the duality of man through the words of Elizabeth 
Lavenza, whose responds to the creature’s actions by condemning the depravity 
of man:  
Before, I looked upon the accounts of vice and injustice, that I read in 
books or heard from others, as tales of ancient days, or imaginary 
evils; at least they were remote, and more familiar to reason than to 
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the imagination; but now misery has come home, and men appear to 
me as monsters thirsting for each other’s blood. (71)  
In many ways, she reacts to the creature’s actions, but her statement relates 
more to the treatment of Justine by the justice system. Justine’s name is ironic, 
as she experiences an extreme carriage of injustice. Through Justine’s trial, 
Shelley demonstrates the brutality of man, how as a collective they “thirst for 
blood” in response to crime. Elisabeth vocalises how on the surface societal 
doctrine like the law is based on wisdom and justice, yet underneath it is driven 
by the primal instincts of man to seek retribution. When removed from the 
brutalities of humanity, a positive view of human nature may be maintained. 
However, when the brutality of human nature is experienced, a more realistic 
notion of humanity is revealed.  
Not only is the creature representative of the dual aspects of man as a general 
concept, but also of Frankenstein himself, who is on many occasions 
demonstrated to be psychologically in turmoil: “Can you wonder, that sometimes 
a kind of insanity possessed me, or that I saw continually about me a multitude 
of filthy animals inflicting on me incessant torture, that often extorted screams 
and bitter groans?” (123). Prior to this the creation of the creature was driven by 
his own mental instability when faced with the death of Caroline Beaufort, which 
caused his fear of human mortality. The dream that he experiences after the 
creature’s creation exemplifies his fears, presenting his own difficulties with the 
corporeal nature of humanity: “a shroud enveloped her (Caroline’s) form, and I 
saw the grave-worms crawling in the folds of the flannel.” (57) The creature is 
real, verified by Walter’s own experience, yet there is suggestion throughout that 
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he is perhaps a formulation of Frankenstein’s imagination, as within his 
narrative Frankenstein is the only character who bears witness to him: “After 
passing several hours, we returned hopeless, most of my companions believing 
it to have been a form conjured by my fancy.” (166) The creature could be 
interpreted as a mental formulation of Frankenstein; although shown to be a 
physical creation he is often connected to Frankenstein as more than this. In 
numerous ways Frankenstein and the creature become interchangeable.  
This principle is evident when Frankenstein attributes the creature’s crimes to 
himself: “As the memory of past misfortunes pressed upon me, I began to reflect 
on their cause-the monster whom I had created, the miserable daemon whom I 
had sent abroad into the world for my destruction” (168). As the creator of the 
creature the murders are caused by Frankenstein’s actions; nevertheless he 
speaks as if he was the murderer directly: ‘‘Have my murderous machinations 
deprived you also, my dearest Henry, of life? Two I have already destroyed; other 
victims await their destiny, buy you, Clerval, my friend, my benefactor-“(148). 
The creature acts as Frankenstein’s own Hyde; a being born out of the neglected, 
destructive facets of human nature: “William, Justine, and Henry-they all died by 
my hands” (156). The inherent connection between Frankenstein and the 
creature is highlighted specifically when Frankenstein refers to him as “his own 
vampire”, an acknowledgement that the creature is possessed by his own spirit: 
I considered the being whom I had cast among mankind, and 
endowed with the will and power to effect purposes of horror, such 
as the deed which he had now done, nearly in the light of my own 
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vampire, my own spirit let loose from the grave, and forced to destroy 
all that was dear to me. (57) 
Here Shelley demonstrates both the abject and the uncanny; the creature is 
neither Frankenstein, nor an outside force, as if he has let loose a Hyde-like part 
of his self that cannot be controlled. Shelley determines the problematic 
principle of life infected with death, that which the creature embodies; a personal 
compunction for self-destruction and the problematic relationship between the 
spirit and the body. 
The creature becomes a mirror of the scientist, as Frankenstein experiences 
elements of the creature’s life despite the surface impression of being 
juxtaposed: “I saw an insurmountable barrier placed between me and my fellow-
men; this barrier was sealed with the blood of William and Justine; and to reflect 
on the events connected with those names filled my soul with anguish.” (131) 
Like the creature, with the demise of his family, and his guilt over the creature’s 
actions Frankenstein also begins to suffer solitary exclusion. Frankenstein’s fate 
and that of the creature become inherently intertwined. The creature follows 
him and murders his family, the situations are then reversed, and Frankenstein 
becomes the vengeful pursuer, following the creature through the Arctic. The 
delight of the creature at the chase shows that the dismissed element is now 
finally fully acknowledged. Frankenstein’s death and the following death of the 
creature symbolize the conjoining of these two unnaturally separated elements 
of Frankenstein.  
So far, I have demonstrated that the creature personifies that animalistic, 
unconscious ignored part of ourselves. I now further develop the argument to 
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consider the novel as a platform of introspection for Mary Shelley personally, as 
she struggled with her own psychological concerns. Anthony Badalamenti writes 
about this aspect of the novel, focusing on how the creature can potentially 
depict a psychological representation of the problematic relationship between 
herself and Percy: “Thus, the monster is here decoded as what Percy did to the 
love between himself and Mary”66. Badalamenti makes numerous comparisons 
between the events of the book and the events in the lives of the Shelleys 
demonstrating how the novel can be read as an unconscious expression of Mary’s 
emotional turmoil. For example, Shelley’s visits to Scotland, he argues, are 
similar to Frankenstein’s trip to build the second monster, and the gestation 
period of the monster mirrors that of Mary’s. During the writing of the novel, 
Mary was pregnant, and therefore working on a creation of her own (428). 
Badalamente argues that the novel is an expression of Mary’s anger at Percy: 
“The eight-foot monster complains that not only is he alone, he is unique in the 
world and rejected by it. He accuses his maker of abandoning him, a feeling deep 
in Mary Shelley’s makeup, with likely reference to Percy, as well as her mother 
and father” (429). It is more poignant, however, to consider the book a 
demonstration of anger at herself; the mortified, unloved creature, who is 
encouraged both to be hated and sympathetic. During the years leading up to the 
creation of the novel Mary Shelley had many reasons to be plagued with guilt and 
mortification, as Butler notes: 
 In the four and a half years from 1815 to mid-1819 she was to lose 
the first three of her four children. Her suffering over their deaths was 
                                                          
66 Anthony F Badalamenti, Why did Mary Shelley Write Frankenstein? Journal of Religion and 
Health, 2006. 45(3): (420) Subsequent page references in text. 
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complicated by her first realization that her own birth had caused the 
death of her mother. Mary’s capacity for guilt must have been further 
exercised by two pathetic and from her point of view reproachful 
suicides in the autumn of 1816: those of Fanny Imlay, Mary’s half-
sister, on 9 October, and of Harriet (Westbrook) Shelley, Percy’s wife 
in November-December. (xiii) 
If she was to believe that her own creation and subsequent life was the cause of 
all this death, it is natural that she would create a creature to represent her own 
feelings of self-loathing: “Was I then a monster, a blot upon the earth, from which 
all men fled, and whom all men disowned?” (96). The suicide of Harriet Shelley, 
her unsuccessful pregnancies, and her mother’s death could have induced 
feelings of guilt: “I, not in deed, but in effect, was the true murderer” (72). When 
considering the emotional turmoil inflicted on Shelley it is evident that there are 
various parallels between the creature and herself. Potentially, she recognises 
the animalistic side of herself that resembles the creature. The monster may 
represent, rather than a mere abstract concept, the guilt that she felt and must 
have subsequently attempted to ignore. Rather like Frankenstein’s reaction of 
abjection to his monster, Shelley rejects herself in an imaginative liminal space. 
The reason why the creature is so sympathetic is because she sees herself 
reflected within him. Therefore the more shameful instincts of the human mind 
that we attempt to repress can be found within the abyss.  
Conclusion 
The primary purpose of this chapter has been to demonstrate how the 
undiscovered and unsettling principles of humanity have been explored in 
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Frankenstein. In the first part of this argument, I focused on the contextual 
history of the novel, and how it relates to concepts of the abyssal divide 
separating man and animal. I further continued to discuss the liminality of the 
creature, envisioning him as a liminal being between animal and man, and 
therefore an abyssal resident. Throughout the second part of this argument I 
specifically focused on how the concept of the abyss can be considered in light of 
the novel.  Primarily, I argued that the novel demonstrates a gaping abyss that 
separates man from animal, using Cartesian ideas that stress how man is both 
corporeal and incorporeal, whilst the creature, like an animal, is purely 
corporeal. The gap narrowed however, as I further consider the perspective that 
social structure and civilization is what separated man from animal. The creature 
had a human yearning for civilization, but was denied it; he therefore cannot be 
considered fully human. Yet this yearning demonstrates how he differs from 
animals, so that he once again falls into a liminal space, which this time is slightly 
narrower. The third argument considered a bridging of the abyss, as the creature 
was conceived as an abjection of humanity. With the emergence of the theory of 
evolution, this rejected part of ourselves pertains to our animal origins. 
Therefore throughout the argument the gap between animal and man has been 
narrowed. I have also demonstrated that underneath traditional dogmatic 
opinions of the difference between man and animal, there is a fundamental doubt 
or query about humanity’s animality, and how we define ourselves as wholly 
separate.  
Perhaps when Shelley introspects, she sees a different way of conceiving man as 
separate from animal. Within the novel, higher feelings like prejudice, loathing, 
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and society are seen as fundamentally human. It is possible that she imagined 
these as restraints from an easier, simpler, more animalistic life, in which feelings 
like guilt and loneliness had no place: 
Alas! Why does man boast of sensibilities superior to those apparent 
in the brute; it only renders them more necessary beings. If our 
impulses were confined to hunger, thirst and desire, we might be 
nearly free; but now we are moved by every wind that blows, and a 
chance word or scene that that word may convey to us. (75) 
In this sense, it seems that Shelley laments humanity’s lack of animality; possibly 
making the Rousseau’s argument for natural man more pertinent, Shelley 
demonstrates potentially humanity’s weakness at our exclusion of the 
animalistic aspects. Shelley also observes that higher human feeling causes 
human existence to be more problematic than the life of an animal. Perhaps, 
therefore, she is envious of the more natural life of an animal, spared from guilt, 
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“I grin at thee, thou grinning whale” the blurring of boundaries and animal Will 
in Moby Dick 
In the previous chapter, I discussed Mary Shelley’s pre Darwinian reaction to 
ideas pertaining to the origins of life, evolution, and the abyss. Shelley 
demonstrates, through the medium of her novel a myriad of doubts and 
insecurities. New ideas seemed to undermine an older form of knowledge, which 
caused the Shelley to question the place of man in her literature. Although 
Herman Melville was writing many years later, these doubts and insecurities 
remain evident in his work. They may even be more pronounced, as the ideas 
that were still raw in Shelley’s time had developed by the time he was writing. 
Like Frankenstein, Herman Melville’s Moby-Dick (1851) is a primary example of 
a layman’s reaction to evolutionary theory in the early Darwinian time frame. 
Although not a scientist himself, he actively engaged with much of the scientific 
writing of the era, and famously acquired a copy of Voyages of the Beagle in 
184767. On the Origin of Species (1859) was yet to be published, but science in the 
1850s was on the cusp of the revolutionary breakthrough that would transform 
much philosophical and religious thought. The atmosphere was primed for the 
publication of Darwin’s most seminal work. There was gathering momentum 
behind theories of natural selection, but they were still yet to be effectively 
communicated, leading thinkers like Melville to consider and doubt the origins 
of humanity. The debate on the origins of life were likely a great part of his 
inspiration whilst writing Moby-Dick, evident when he describes the “horrible 
vultureism of earth! From which not the mightiest whale is free.” (278) His 
                                                          
67 Charles Darwin, E.J. Browne, and M. Neve, The Voyage of the Beagle. 1989: Penguin Adult. 
Subsequent page references in text. 
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statement reveals a pessimistic outlook on concepts of evolution; Melville’s 
attitude is uncannily similar to Tennyson’s, who published In Memoriam (1849) 
just a few years earlier, in which he describes nature “red in tooth and claw”.68 
Their writing is indicative of a widespread philosophical insecurity over 
humanity’s place within the animal kingdom. This is observable in the 2015 film 
In The Heart of the Sea is based on the true story of The Essex that inspired Moby-
Dick.69 During a conversation between Captain Pollock and Owen Chase, Pollock 
asserts “We are supreme creatures made in God’s own likeness. Earthly kings 
whose business it is to circumnavigate the planet bestowed to us. To bend nature 
to our will.” In response, Chase questions this belief: “You really feel like an 
earthly king? We’re specks, dust.” By including this scene, Charles Leavitt draws 
attention to how doubt surrounding humanity’s place in the world effected the 
individual within the early Darwinian period.  
There have been various authors who have approached the influence of Darwin 
over Melville’s work. Eric Wilson, however, asserts that much of previous work 
is focused on Melville’s trip to the Galapagos, which shares uncanny similarities 
to Darwin’s own trip70. His treatment of the question of man and animal, 
therefore, has perhaps not been explored to its full potential. James Hecht writes 
that ‘…Melville knew something of the evolutionary account of speciation, which, 
after all, rationalizes the origin of species and dispenses with the mythos of divine 
artifice’71 (121). Melville as a religious man, yet also a scientific and philosophical 
                                                          
68 Alfred, Lord Tennyson,  In Memoriam, London: W. W. Norton & Company, 2003 
69 In the Heart of the Sea, Directed by Ron Howard, Birbank: Warner Bros, 2015 
70 Eric Wilson, Melville, Darwin, and the Great Chain of Being. Studies in American Fiction, 2000. 
28(2): p. 131. Subsequent page references in text. 
71 James Hecht, Scarcity and Compensation in Moby-Dick. The Massachusetts Review, 1999. 40(1): 
p. 111-130. Subsequent page references in text. 
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thinker was aware of the conflicts caused by evolution and how it affected the 
relationship between science and faith. This could partially explain how the 
novel is written like Hamlet; Ishmael left as Horatio, the only survivor after the 
devastation caused by the pursuit for vengeance of a dubious hero 72. The idea of 
the world being billions of years old is a notion Melville found engaging, but also 
tragic, leading to confused and somewhat contrary ideas of the whale. Within the 
novel he suggests that the whale predates man, which is indicative of the idea 
that man represents a short part of history:  
When I stand among these mighty Leviathan skeletons, skulls, tusks, 
jaws, ribs, and vertebrae, all characterized by partial resemblances to 
the existing breeds of sea-monsters; but at the same time bearing on 
the other hand similar affinities to the annihilated antichronical 
Leviathans, their incalculable seniors; I am, by a flood, borne back to 
that wondrous period, ere time itself can be said to begun; for time 
began with man. (408) 
The comforting and ordered theory of “The Great Chain of Being” was being 
compromised by Georges Cuvier’s ideas of extinction, coupled with Charles 
Lyell’s very recent and successful argument in favour of uniformitarianism73. The 
“Great Chain of Being” was an idea that achieved particular prominence during 
the Enlightenment, depicting a hierarchy that represented order and harmony in 
creation, implemented by divine forces. Concepts of evolution disturbed this 
harmonic order, demonstrating flaws with initial theories of creation.  
                                                          
72 William Shakespeare, and G.R. Hibbard, Hamlet. 1998: Oxford University Press. 
73 Charles Lyell, Principles of Geology: Or, The Modern Changes of the Earth and Its Inhabitants 
Considered as Illustrative of Geology. 1872: John Murray. Subsequent page references in text. 
Tabitha Kan 110 
 
This chapter is split into five parts. The first of these considers the context in 
which Melville was writing. Following this I begin the main body of the argument, 
in which humanity’s relation to animality is considered in four different ways. 
The first of these is a focus on whaling and the objectification of the animal body, 
which integrates much of Kristeva’s theories into my analysis of the novel. Focus 
on the abject is then extended into the next section in which I consider the 
blurring of boundaries and integration of bodies, specifically of Moby-Dick and 
Captain Ahab. I then turn my focus to a consideration of Schopenhauer’s theories 
theory of the Will and how these can be used to consider humanity’s relationship 
with animality. Finally I consider a more optimistic reading of the novel, which 
interacts with Rousseauian concepts of the “Noble Savage”. From these elements 
I draw a conclusion. 
Eons of Doubt; Melville living on the brink of scientific revolution 
Within his Journal of a Visit to London and the Continent, documenting a trip 
which took place from 1849-1850, Melville describes one of his hosts, Mrs. 
Lawrence as belonging “to the category of the female sex there are no words to 
express my abhorrence of, I hate her not - I only class her among the persons 
made of reptiles and crawling things.”74 Although written humorously, Melville 
explicitly describes Mrs Lawrence as a lower class of life. Melville wrote this very 
close to the time that he acquired a copy of Voyages of the Beagle, and shortly 
before he started writing Moby-Dick. By including this link between animal and 
man, Melville demonstrates both how Darwin’s preliminary work was at the 
                                                          
74 H. Melville, and E.M. Metcalf, Journal of a Visit to London and the Continent: 1849-1850. 1948: 
Harvard University Press. 
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forefront of his mind, and how it inspired him to consider the relationship 
between human and animal.  
It is important to note that, at the time in which Melville was writing, the 
scientific community was being primed for Darwin’s theories. On the Origin of 
Species, published in 1859 followed the publication of Moby-Dick by only eight 
years, however Darwin’s work took him twenty years to write, meaning that 
although On the Origin of Species was published after Melville’s most seminal 
work, it was conceived many years previously. Throughout Darwin’s early 
scientific career, there were a variety of advancements that made it possible for 
him to introduce the theory of natural selection. Charles Lyell, for example, was 
one of Darwin’s greatest influences. By establishing a strong argument for 
uniformitarianism, he became one of the most well established scientists of the 
early Darwinian period. Another important figure to publish at this time was 
Robert Chambers, who communicated a speculative theory close to Darwin’s 
own, yet without the scientific credibility. 
Uniformitarianism is a concept necessary for the acceptance of ideas of evolution 
because it allows for the immense time frame required. It argues against ideas of 
catastrophism proffered by William Buckland that explain the findings of Cuvier 
by suggesting that a series of great world events caused the mass extinction of 
previous species. Buckland, by offering this explanation, effectively explained the 
existence of fossils without upsetting traditional biblical ideas.75 As John 
Armstrong notes, Buckland’s doctorate was in divinity, not science, so his vested 
                                                          
75 John R. Armstrong, “William Buckland in Retrospect”, PSCF 42 (March 1990): 34-38. 
Subsequent page references in text. 
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interest was in preserving Christian dogma. Buckland’s theory embraced the 
biblical brevity of the Earth’s age and even suggests that the Flood could have 
been one of these catastrophic events. Uniformitarianism, however, argues for a 
slower process that was driven by heat under the earth’s surface. James Hutton 
had previously explored the concept in 1785, when considering heat as an agent 
in geology. Patsy A Gerstner, however, illustrates how his ideas were dismissed 
by many scientists of the era when heat was considered “caloric” or a material 
substance.76 As Gerstner establishes, “arguments against Hutton continued until 
the time of Charles Lyell.” (361) When Lyell was writing, however, science had 
dramatically shifted and his work cemented the concept as the true mechanism 
which formed the world. Lyell, a student of Buckland, developed concepts 
proffered by Hutton, and made them acceptable within the scientific community. 
Roy Porter writes that in his autobiographical account Lyell considered himself 
the “spiritual saviour of geology”77. Porter further argues that he freed science 
“from the old dispensation of Moses” (91) to some extent. The heretical 
implications of this theory are clear; by allowing for a longer timescale, Lyell 
revealed the more dissenting inferences of an extensive time frame. Furthermore 
Porter argues that this extended time period of the earth forced humanity out of 
the centre of the creation. Being a relatively new addition, humanity was no 
longer the centre of the world anymore:  
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For Lyell, so many theories of the earth had been scientifically useless 
because the earth had been conceived anthropocentrically and 
anthropomorphically…Only the mature natural philosopher has the 
courage to stare resolutely into a world of infinite space and time, and 
to admit squarely that man is not the sole end of existence. (93-94) 
Lyell was, perhaps, the most important contributor to the theory of evolution 
before Darwin. His theories of uniformitarianism laid the groundwork needed 
for the acceptance of the theory of natural selection. It gave Charles Darwin the 
necessary timescale that he needed to develop his theory. Despite the evident 
implications of his work, however, Lyell was not keen to associate his work with 
theories of evolution. Porter emphasises this whilst considering Lyell’s attitude 
towards the wider implications of his work:  
Lyell sought to preserve the dignity of man at the same time as freeing 
the earth for geological science. But Lyell's distinction between man 
and geology was, however, formal and superficial-a defensive reflex, 
specifically to reading Lamarck. Right from I830 Lyell was trapped in 
that web of religious and humanistic projections upon the earth for 
which he was so eager to ridicule and rebuke others. (94) 
The situation was difficult for Lyell. Despite his ardent desire to progress the field 
of geological sciences, he was wary of concepts of evolution. He was particularly 
ardent to maintain distance from thinkers like Jean-Baptiste Lamark, whose had 
outlined his own theory of evolution called “Lamarkism” in Philosophie 
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Zoologique (1809)78. His idea, despite being acknowledged as a forerunner for 
evolution, was dismissed by the general scientific population. Lyell’s misgivings 
were not unreasonable, for despite targeting the right area of study, Lamarck’s 
explanations of evolution seemed to lack credibility. He rightly observes 
adaptations of animals, but wrongly attributes them to changes that occur within 
the animal’s lifetime, writing that: “The influence of the environments as a matter 
of fact is in all times and places operative on living bodies; but what makes this 
influence difficult to perceive is that it effects only become perceptible or 
recognisable (especially in animals) after a long period of time.”79 Although he 
attributed the change in species to eons of time, the mechanism he suggests is 
farcical, perhaps even creating a setback for concepts of evolution. Even Darwin, 
when writing to Hooker in 1844 described Lamarck’s work as “veritable 
rubbish”80. It is therefore perhaps understandable why Lyell was unwilling to 
entertain concepts of evolution.     
Lyell rejected concepts of the “Progressive development of organic life” in his 
Principles of Geology (1830-1833).81 He made reference specifically to the 
incomplete nature of evidence-how despite the discovery of new evidence, we 
have yet to have achieved enough knowledge to infer such a thing as the 
progression of species. 
                                                          
78 Jean-Baptiste Lamark, Philosophie Zoologique, Editions Flammarion:1994 
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Our knowledge, therefore, of the living creation of any given period of 
the past may be said to depend in a great degree on what we 
commonly call chance, and the casual discovery of some new 
localities rich in peculiar fossils may modify or entirely overthrow all 
our previous generalizations. (146) 
Lyell further argues that just because we do not have evidence of a certain 
species being alive within a certain era, does not mean that they were not. He 
explains that the acquisition of evidence is purely a matter of chance, and we 
have no way to infer certain generalisations when we are also missing much 
more evidence that may or may not be in existence: “Time so enormous as that 
contemplated by the geologist may multiply exceptional cases till they seem to 
constitute the rule, and so impose on the imagination as to lead us to infer the 
non-existence of creatures of which no monuments happen to remain.” (146) 
Lyell suggests that many creatures may have existed previously without us 
having any remaining evidence of their presence. Lyell therefore relies on our 
ignorance as a species to justify arguing against principles of evolution. This 
movement against the idea by a man so well aware of the evidence demonstrates 
the aversion felt by many when faced with the concept of evolution. By rejecting 
the progressive development of species, Lyell subscribed to popular belief, 
whilst also demonstrating his own insecurities about evolutionary theory. 
Lyell summarises his position, by demonstrating that though adaptability of the 
earth is evident, adaptability of life cannot be proven. According to Lyell, 
inorganic changes are certain and evident, but adaptation of life is far from likely: 
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From the earliest period at which plants and animals can be proved 
to have existed, there has been a continual change going on in the 
position of land and sea, accompanied by great fluctuations of climate. 
To these ever-varying geographical and climatal conditions the state 
of the animate world has been unceasingly adapted. No satisfactory 
proof has yet been discovered of the gradual passage of the earth 
from a chaotic to a more habitable state, nor of any law of progressive 
development governing the extinction and renovation of species, and 
causing the fauna and flora to pass from an embryonic to a more 
perfect condition, from a simple to a more complex organization. 
(146) 
After justifying his inability to cohere with concepts of evolution, Lyell then 
tackles how this translates to concepts of the origins of human life: 
If, then, the popular theory of the successive development of the 
animal and vegetable world, from the simplest to the most perfect 
forms, rests on a very insecure foundation; it may be asked, whether 
the recent origin of man lends any support to the same doctrine, or 
how far the influence of man may be considered as such a deviation 
from the analogy of the order of things previously established, as to 
weaken our confidence in the uniformity of the course of nature. 
(147) 
Lyell rejected the idea that humanity was relatively new, and derived from other 
animal species. He established this by arguing that species may have outlived the 
land on which their fossils are found: “Terrestrial species, therefore, might be 
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older than the continents which they inhabit, and aquatic species of higher 
antiquity than the lakes and seas which they now people.” (148) The explanation 
given by such an intelligent, well informed scientist seems absurd now, that 
species can be more permanent than the land on which they live. Yet, in a time 
when evolution seemed so unlikely, and scientists had been schooled in the 
Christian faith, it perhaps appeared the more likely possibility. Lyell further 
concludes: 
If this be admitted, it would not follow, even if there were sufficient 
geological evidence in favor of the theory of progressive 
development, that the creation of man was the last link in the same 
chain. For the sudden passage from an irrational to a rational animal, 
is a phenomenon of a distinct kind from the passage from the more 
simple to the more perfect forms of animal organization and instinct. 
To pretend that such a step, or rather leap, can be part of a regular 
series of changes in the animal world, is to strain analogy beyond all 
reasonable bounds .(148) 
These remarks were made in the ninth edition of Principles of Geology. 
Throughout the first nine editions printed of the book, he remained loyal to his 
initial evaluations pertaining to evolution, despite being in regular conversation 
with Darwin. It was not until his tenth edition, that he finally made an allowance 
for evolution. 
It has been noted that Darwin’s concept of evolution was not the first. Étienne 
Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire’s “heterogenesis” approached concepts of evolution from 
an environmental effects perspective. Jean-Baptiste Lamarck’s evolution 
Tabitha Kan 118 
 
similarly considered the transmutation of species an effect of the animal’s 
environment-as discussed previously within this section, Lamark’s theories 
were considered farfetched and ridiculous. However Robert Chambers’ theory 
came closest to those of Darwin before Alfred Russel Wallace’s. Primarily, 
Vestiges of Natural Creation (1844) was published anonymously, and it was only 
after his death that the writer’s identity was revealed82. Richard Yeo describes 
the importance of his work, regarding adaptation of species, and furthermore 
how it applies to man: “In spite of his criticism of Jean Baptiste Lamarck, 
Chambers' work revived the prospect of a connection between science and 
materialism, an association which had political implications in the aftermath of 
the French Revolution.”83 Furthermore, Yeo notes how crucial it was for the 
scientific community to reject Chambers’ ideas to preserve the sanctity of the 
relationship between religion and science:  
But by associating science with controversial materialist ideas in a 
work of popular circulation, Chambers threatened the rationale of 
this strategy and the harmony of science and religion it represented. 
In order to restore this alliance, and to preserve the religious and 
social respectability of science, it was crucial to show not only that the 
theories in the book were false and dangerous, but that the work itself 
could not be classified as "scientific." (11) 
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The book was a best seller, and reached a wide readership, but despite an 
excellent layman’s knowledge of the sciences, Chambers work was not 
recognised by the scientific community. Nevertheless, within his book, he does 
outline a theory which demonstrates uncanny similarities to Darwinism:  
It has been already intimated, as a general fact, that there is an 
obvious gradation amongst the families of both the vegetable and 
animal kingdoms, from the simple lichen and animalcule respectively 
up to the highest order of dicotyledonous trees and the mammalia. 
Confining our attention, in the meantime, to the animal kingdom-it 
does not appear that this gradation passes along one line, on which 
every form of animal life can be, as it were, strung; there may be 
branching or double lines at some places; or the whole may be in a 
circle composed of minor circles, as has been recently suggested. But 
still it is incontestable that there are general appearances of a scale 
beginning the simple and advancing to the complicated. (192) 
Similarly to Darwin, Chambers notices that species are developed, but more 
particularly that their development is not linear, using the image of a branch 
instead to explain his hypothesis. The concept of a branch further lends itself to 
the illustration of the entangled bank that Darwin discusses at the end of On the 
Origin of Species. In this manner, Chambers anticipates Darwinian theory, and 
demonstrates how concepts of evolution had already been surfacing and 
developing. By discussing adaptation, Chambers identified the incremental 
adaptation of species as a slow process,: 
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Starting from the primeval germ, which, as we have seen, is 
the representative of a particular order of full-grown animals, we find 
all others to be merely advances from that type, with the extension of 
endowments and modification of forms which are required in each 
particular case; each form, also, retaining a strong affinity to that 
which precedes it, and tending to impress its own features on that 
which succeeds. (192-193) 
Chambers theories were dismissed as unscientific, as Richard Yeo notes: “The 
Vestiges, as it came to be called, met with a deluge of criticism. The charges 
brought against the author were serious ones lack of practical research, second-
hand knowledge, and disregard of proper scientific methods.” (5) This is perhaps 
because, as Yeo further discusses: 
Men of science were not differentiated from other educated groups 
by formal training, and the status of science was not secured by an 
institutionalized career structure such as that which characterized 
the legal, medical, and clerical professions. This situation supported a 
general discussion of science but it also meant that men of science 
were compelled to defend the claims of science in a public forum 
against powerful opponents such as the clergy. (9) 
As Yeo further writes: “Scientists had to establish the domain of natural 
knowledge as their own, and monitor the boundaries between science and 
religion”. (9) There was a form of anarchy within the scientific community; any 
man could become a man of science, and yet because of this, their authority 
would always be questioned. Robert Chambers’s work was highly controversial, 
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therefore any weakness in evidence would have been taken advantage of, which 
is why Darwin took so long to publish On the Origin of Species.  Being fully aware 
of the scrutiny that his work would be subjected to, Darwin knew that the 
evidence he needed to provide should be infallible. Darwin recognised that 
Chambers did much to ready people for his forthcoming theories, and after his 
death in 1871, he wrote to his daughter Annie Dowie explaining how:  
Several years ago I perceived that I had not done full justice to a 
scientific work which I believed and still believe he was intimately 
connected with, and few things have struck me with more admiration 
than the perfect temper and liberality with which he treated my 
conduct.84  
Perhaps, therefore, Chambers’ work was vital for the acceptance of Darwinism. 
It is important to note that, like Chambers, Melville was a layman with a marked 
interest in science. Chambers, as a layman with a particular interest, 
demonstrates how the general public was able to assimilate the science of the 
time.  Similarly to Chambers, Melville, as an active thinker and participant in the 
scholarly atmosphere can be considered an exemplary well-educated recipient 
of Darwin’s early writings.  
William Howarth illustrates the parallels in life choices made by Melville and 
Darwin, who were equally charged characters forced to reflect on man’s place in 
nature through their individual experiences.85 Howarth identifies similarities 
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between Darwin and Melville’s shipping voyages that took them both to the 
Galapagos: 
Charles Darwin called at the Galapagos in 1835 and Herman Melville 
arrived in 1841. Both men were in their twenties, on global voyages 
with similar agendas. Their principle work was to forage: Darwin 
remained a month to gather specimens and notes for the HMS Beagle, 
a ship outfitted for research but also secretly inspecting Spanish 
colonial defences. Melville’s went ashore briefly to glean food and fuel 
for the Acushnel, a New Bedford whaler. (99) 
Considering these similarities it is evident why Melville was attracted to 
Darwin’s publication The Voyage of the Beagle. His own observations of the 
Galapagos as he took a similar journey would have engaged Melville on a 
personal level when family misfortune left him questioning philosophically 
many life truths that he had taken for granted86. Howarth divulges a number of 
similarities between the two men, whose querying self-reflection was fed by 
their contingent experiences: “Both young men faced disapproving fathers, and 
both rebelled by running away to sea. There they found second lives, gaining new 
visions to replace paternal values. Darwin’s call lay in rocks plants and animals; 
a new way to see Creation. Melville discovered the indigenous people of the 
Pacific” (107). However, as Howarth further argues, the similarity ends when 
considering how the two men processed their new information and experiences: 
“Darwin seized science and moved toward it. Melville rebelled against Scripture, 
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yet never escaped it. He was stuck in an old narrative, the creationist story of 
Genesis and man’s first disobedience.” (111). In this manner, similarities 
between Melville and Lyell can be drawn, through their reluctance to accept 
evolutionary concepts. Lyell’s reaction proves that no matter how informed and 
intelligent a thinker might be, it was difficult for any individual of the time to 
attest to the concepts of evolution, which inherently linked humanity to animal. 
Though both Darwin and Melville had similar experiences at sea, their differing 
personalities led them to pursue varying thesis on the matter of life and 
humanity’s place in existence. Darwin after time and consideration coined a 
theory that consolidated his findings in the Galapagos, whereas Melville used 
creative means as catharsis to explore his doubts. According to Howarth, whilst 
using the clinical scientific method Darwin creates something new, whereas 
hindered by doctrine Melville only found divergence: 
Although Darwin often notes in The Voyage of the Beagle that birds 
roost or nest to sustain feeding habits, Melville sees this special order 
as a malevolent hierarchy. In his islands, birds dive upon fish or infant 
turtles, sea lions battle for mates, species constantly prey on others 
or compete against their own. Darwin eventually calls such behaviour 
natural selection, but in Moby-Dick Melville sees it as “horrible 
vulturism of the earth”; a destructive voracity that holds all creatures 
in thrall, even the mighty whale. (107) 
Nevertheless, Darwin’s findings from the Galapagos had their own unique effect 
on Melville, whose own personal tragedies and hardships had given him a less 
than rose tinted view on life.  
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In the novel, Melville often writes like a naturalist, perhaps imitating Darwin and 
his contemporaries, for example, the beginning of the chapter “Cetology”:  
Now the various species of whales need some sort of popular 
comprehensive classification, if only an easy outline one for the 
present, hereafter to be filled in all its departments by subsequent 
laborers. As no better man advances to take this matter in hand, I 
hereupon off my own poor endeavors. (117)  
The extensive section on the “science” of the whale is written in a style almost 
like a textbook, which is relevant considering the Ishmael’s past as a 
schoolteacher, mirroring that of Melville himself. It is apparent that Melville 
considers the whaling ship a place for amateur observation scientifically: “For 
many years past the whale-ship has been the pioneer in ferreting out the 
remotest and least known parts of the earth. She has explored seas and 
archipelagos which had no chart, where no Cook or Vancouver had ever sailed.” 
(97) Melville here announces through the voice of Ishmael the element of 
exploration which he attributes to whaling. It could be argued that Ishmael in the 
novel mirrors the position of the “thinker” aboard the ship, putting individuals 
like the fictional Ishmael and his creator, Melville, in the same category as Darwin 
on his voyage with The Beagle. Although a layman, and not an expert of science 
of cetology, the desire for knowledge and philosophical pursuits would make 
Melville feel an affiliation to a sea born naturalist.  
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David C. Leonard suggests that Melville adhered to Cartesian ideas about the 
vortex suggested in his unprinted book The World87.  These ideas tainted his view 
on the world with a nihilistic scepticism which would have had a profound effect 
on his reading of Darwin: “As a result of his knowledge of Cartesianism, Melville 
views nature as an impersonal mechanism that runs without human or divine 
intervention. Therefore Melville’s affinity with Cartesianism alienated him from 
the main currents of nineteenth-century transcendental thought” (109). Unlike 
Mary Shelley, who drew on Descartes fairly conservative views on dualism, 
Melville, according to Leonard, was inspired by Descartes dissenting concepts. In 
accordance with Leonard’s work, Melville's understanding of Descartes 
problematized certain ideas such as concepts of Christianity and God. It also 
undermines the concept of the Great Chain of Being, a prevalent and accepted 
idea that dates from Plato and Aristotle that was about to be overturned by On 
the Origin of Species. The concept was developed during the Renaissance by a 
variety of philosophers, but specifically by Leibniz, explored by Arthur Lovejoy88. 
The implication of “The Great Chain of Being” is that there is a definite all-
encompassing hierarchy for everything within a continuous chain linking the 
lowest common denominator to God. The notion was threatened by the idea of 
extinction, which suggested that species are not continuous, further insinuating 
that there must therefore be a breaking of the chain. Catastrophism, however, 
was seen as a way of perhaps consolidating this idea with Christian doctrine, 
suggesting that the reason for extinction was a catastrophe like the Flood, or 
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multiple catastrophes that wiped out certain species. Yet it was not until On the 
Origin of Species that this theory of existence was scientifically toppled, although 
the work that was being forwarded by other scientists did start to show cracks 
in this Great Chain. The breaking of the chain, according to Wilson in particular, 
was influential on Melville, and within his writing of Moby-Dick. 
Tyrus Hillway is scathing of Melville’s treatment of science, claiming it to be 
amateurish.89 He states that “…his education in science was haphazard rather 
than systematic or thorough.” (411). Hillway is somewhat dismissive of 
Melville’s use of science, querying why Darwin’s Journals did not feature more 
prominently in his novel, whilst highlighting Melville’s use of Oliver Goldsmith’s 
A History of the Earth and Animated Nature (1774)90 and his incorrect ideas of 
science, for example, the refusal to accept Linnaean concepts that establish the 
whale as a mammal. Yet this approach, if it is amateurish, only adds to my insight. 
The absorption and understanding of evolutionary theory by the layman is not 
always perfect, and many misconceptions are common, even today. It 
demonstrates, even if mistaken, one way that scientific evidence was absorbed 
by the writer in the nineteenth century. In many cases, there would be widely 
shared misunderstanding of theories. If it is true that Melville’s scientific 
education was indeed incomplete, it is not necessarily harmful for this study, as 
I am still able to glean understanding of the perception of science at the time. 
Contrary to Hillway, Eric Wilson discusses instead how acute and subtle 
Melville’s grasp on Darwinian theory was, despite perhaps not having the most 
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impressive grasp of contemporary science: “Although Melville was not deeply 
read in evolutionary science, Moby-Dick (1851) prophetically details the great 
scientific upheaval of 1859: the publication of Charles’ Darwin’s On the Origin of 
Species.”(131) Wilson argues that the contrast between Ahab and Ishmael 
exemplifies the outdated ideas of the Great Chain of Being, and the new science 
that more accurately described the universe. He further argues that Melville pre-
empted many of the ideas Darwin communicated in On the Origin of Species 
within the novel. Wilson’s hypothesis is potentially a little far-fetched, although 
an important argument. Melville’s pre-emption of Darwinian Theory is 
improbable as his grasp of science was unlikely to be so astute; nevertheless, the 
argument Wilson proffers highlights some interesting and uncanny moments of 
relevance to Darwinian Theory. 
I have clarified that though Melville’s knowledge may not have been perfect, 
scientific matters were within the forefront of his mind, and definitely influenced 
his writing. The zeitgeist in which Melville was writing was one of academic 
tension, as recent scientific work was building to the Darwinian climax. Now I 
shall consider how his absorption of ideas affected his writing within Moby-Dick, 
specifically focusing on his portrayal of humanity, symbolic use of the whale, and 
characterization of Ahab, to explore how his writing of Moby-Dick can be read as 
a contemplation of man’s place in the world.  
Whaling and the Objectification of the Animal Body 
One of the most marked aspects of Moby-Dick is the presentation of the whale. 
Before any other consideration of life, God, and humanity’s place in the world, 
Moby-Dick is a novel about the practice of whaling, a profession that inherently 
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links the human with the animal body. From the resources harvested from 
whaling, humanity was furthered throughout the industrial revolution. It is a 
discipline that profits from the mutilation and disassembly of an animal body to 
drive human endeavours; a fact that might have been foremost in Melville’s 
thought whilst he wrote. Humanity, throughout the industrial revolution of the 
nineteenth century, was accelerating faster than ever, yet much of the success of 
man was reliant on the use of natural resources, like the whale. Therefore, within 
the novel there is an inherent undertone throughout that marks humanity’s 
reliance on the natural world. The whale’s body, as a tool, is disassembled and 
integrated into society. The whale is part of humanities development, and in this 
way it contributes to any advancements. Philip Armstrong discusses how the 
industrial revolution problematized the relationship between the animal and the 
human:  
That the animal, dead or alive, should figure at the center of these 
historical and economic shifts is no surprise. Over its two-hundred- 
year history, industrialization has produced, among its other effects- 
urbanization, degradation of the economic status of women, 
redefinition of labor structures, environmental depredation-a 
radically altered relationship between humans and other animals. 91 
This radical alteration of the relationship between animals and humanity is vital 
to consider within my study. Armstrong argues that modern farming techniques 
have succeeded in creating distance between humans and animals. In this 
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manner, the gap between humans and animals has widened. No longer do we 
nurture or kill the animal ourselves. As Armstrong continues: “geo- graphical and 
psychological gaps have widened between an increasingly urbanized human 
populace and other species.” (1040) 
The novel is written with a number of distractions from the primary narrative 
that focuses on the body of the whale as a specimen. Laura Barratt explores 
Melville’s narrative detours in her assessment of the abject within the novel: 
“Moby-Dick exults in descriptions of bodies-of a variety of species-and bodily 
fluids, but those bodies are more often mutilated than not.”92 Barratt speaks of 
human and animal bodies and the emphasis on their physicality through morbid 
description. However, Barratt’s argument can be furthered to demonstrate an 
objectification and dissection of the whale’s body representative of the animal 
body. Armstrong further focuses on the whaler; how he functioned as a figure in 
nineteenth century society: “His experience routinely alternated between 
dangerous encounters with the vast materiality of the living animal and its 
reduction to dead and partial resources, a commodity to be measured by the 
barrel, reified by the factory ship's technological procedures and its 
specialization of labor.” (1040) The “vast materiality” is especially important in 
this context. By focusing his attentions in this manner, the whale’s body becomes 
abject with relation to Kristeva’s theory identified in The Powers of Horror.  
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Similarly Melville includes chapters that explore the process of dissembling the 
whale. After observing the biology of the animal we are invited to observe the 
process of harvesting its natural resources. In the chapter “Cutting In” Ishmael 
describes how the blubber “envelopes the whale precisely as the rind does an 
orange, so it is stripped off from the body precisely as an orange is sometimes 
stripped by spiralizing it.”(273) Ishmael again likens the animal to an object that 
can be dismantled. The process of deblubbering may seem grotesque to the 
audience, yet it is written in a factual, emphatic way. Ishmael’s description 
therefore adds to the concept that the animal is an automaton.  
Another of these chapters includes “The Whale as a Dish”. The animal is depicted 
as a food source, and as Oliver argues “animals reassure us that if we can eat 
them, we are human and not animals. That is, they die like animals so that we can 
live as humans.” (296) Yet when the whale is finally ingested by the human 
consumer it stops being an object and instead becomes the abject; neither part 
of the human body nor outside of it, making it a liminal feature that Ishmael 
actively addresses when he notes: “That mortal man should feed upon the 
creature that feeds his lamp, and, like Stubb, eat him by his own light, as you may 
say; this seems so outlandish a thing that one must needs go a little into the 
history and philosophy of it.” (269) Melville refers to the unsettling, morbid 
concept that the animal you are eating is also lighting your meal. The whale’s 
body is particularly abject, as it becomes part of the subject who consumes it, 
whilst also being an object in the same room used by the same man. The horror 
of the consumption of the whale’s body is exemplified through the behaviour of 
the sharks at the time of Stubb’s meal, as Melville writes: “Nor was Stubb the only 
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banqueter on the whale’s flesh that night. Mingling their mumblings with his own 
mastications, thousands on thousands of sharks, swarming round the dead 
leviathan, smackingly feasted on its fatness.” (263)  Melville’s gory 
representation of the sharks both demonstrates the abject nature of the 
carnivore whilst also aligning Stubb with the sharks that similarly dine on the 
whale carcass. The relationship between Stubb and the sharks at this time is 
evident also in the private musings of the cook, who says that he: “Wish, by gor! 
Whale eat him. ‘stead of him eat whale. I’m bressed if he ain’t more shark dan 
Massa Shark hisself.” (268) The cook here draws attention to the relationship 
between Stubb and the whale. Stubb demonstrates his mastery over the whale 
by consuming it, yet the reader is also alerted to the fact that the whale could also 
just as easily eat Stubb; this is poignant as the whale is ultimately Stubb’s demise. 
Therefore Stubb is aligned with the whale as well as its consumer, and the 
boundaries between man and beast are blurred, making them both temporarily 
abyssal residents. To emphasise this Stubb is related to as ‘more shark dan Massa 
Shark himself.’ The cook give the shark a title; “Massa Shark”, which is similar to 
the way he would refer to Stubb himself. The fish is anthropomorphised through 
the cook’s mutterings and the human is zoomorphic, making both parties abject. 
Barrett’s focus on the mutilation of animal bodies within Moby-Dick is clear when 
Melville describes the sharks’ reactions to being attacked by the crew of the 
Pequod. The viciousness of animality is demonstrated; a pure hunger that leads 
the creatures to cannibalism and even self-consumption when Melville writes: 
“They viciously snapped, not only at each other’s disembowelments, but like 
flexible bows bent round, and bit their own; till those entrails seemed swallowed 
over and over again by the same mouth, to be oppositely voided by the same 
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wound” (272). The barbarity of this moment is stressed through Melville’s 
surreal description. The sharks are representative of Uruboros, the self-
consuming serpent; a symbol of chaos. An inherently animal image it represents 
the barbarity of the animal kingdom; a stark contrast between the sharks in the 
water and the humans on deck. Man is in a place of safety; elevated above the 
sharks on the Pequod. Their position of safety, however, does not last as Moby-
Dick destroys the man-made boundary between human and animal. The ship’s 
crew in this way become victims of the abyss. 
The attempt to reduce the animal body is thwarted by the symbolic significance 
of Moby-Dick, therefore demonstrating how humanity fails to widen the abyss 
through the objectification of the animal body. The irony of this particular 
section is that Melville demonstrates how by objectifying the whale to elevate 
humanity we become intrinsically linked with the animal. The further use of 
Moby-Dick as a symbolic force which transcends humankinds use of the animal 
body demonstrates that whilst humanity uses natural resources such as the 
whale’s body, it is not a greater power than nature itself. 
Moby-Dick becomes a symbolic presence within the novel, transcending the 
reduction of the animal. This is because, primarily he is symbolic of the abject; 
the unknown-as Kristeva argues: “The writer is a phobic who succeeds in 
metaphorizing in order to keep from being frightened to death; instead he comes 
to life again in signs.” (38) Melville uses the whale to create a signifier which 
channels his reaction of abjection towards Darwinian theory. The symbol of the 
whale becomes the axis mundi around which the narrative revolves. R.E. Watten 
writes on the whale’s symbolic potency, considering the significance of the whale 
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to be ambiguous and multi-faceted, rather similarly to how Sherwin argued that 
Frankenstein’s monster is a liminal signifier: “Might it not have been Melville’s 
own intention to invest his great symbolic leviathan with a plurality of 
meanings?”93 The mysterious quality of the whale lends it symbolic potency: “As 
yet, however, the sperm whale, scientific or poetic, lives not complete in any 
literature. Far above all other hunted whales, his is an unwritten life.” (117) A 
creature that is “an unwritten life” is a plethora of unsourced material; the 
monstrousness of the creature is almost mythical. The whale was an animal of 
the unknown, whose history seemed unfathomable. It is natural that this element 
of the creature would create discomfort within the human doctrine of 
anthropocentricity. 
 The whale represents a variety of things; animalistic power, the brutal force of 
nature, and the uncontrollable wrath of God, as Ishmael states: “The white whale 
is their demigorgon” (150). The symbolic power of the whale is explicitly 
explored more by Ishmael within the novel. For example, the character Gabriel, 
a mad stowaway from the Jeraboam, became something of a prophet for the 
crew, imploring them not to chase the deified animal: “…Gabriel solemnly 
warned the captain against attacking the White Whale, in case the monster 
should be seen; in his gibbering insanity, pronounced the White Whale to be no 
less a being than the Shaker God incarnated…” (284). Gifted by rumour with 
immortality, Moby-Dick becomes something more than man through his ability 
to survive: “…some whalemen should go still further in their superstitions; 
declaring Moby-Dick not only ubiquitous, but immortal (for immortality is but 
                                                          
93 A.R. Lee, Herman Melville: Modern readings: Typee, Omoo, Mardi, Redburn, White-Jacket, 
Moby-Dick. 2001: Helm Information. 
Tabitha Kan 134 
 
ubiquity in time); that though groves of spears should be planted in his flanks, he 
would still swim away unharmed…” (163). The supremacy of Moby-Dick is 
emphasized in the first sighting. The eventual revelation of the whale only occurs 
at the end of the novel, rather like at the end of life, potentially placing emphasis 
of the whale’s godlike aspect: 
A gentle joyousness-a mighty mildness of repose in swiftness, 
invested the gliding whale. Not the white bull Jupiter swimming away 
with the ravished Europa clinging to his graceful horns, his lovely 
leering eyes sideways intent upon the maid, with smooth bewitching 
fleetness, rippling straight for the nuptial bower in Crete; not Jove, not 
that great majesty Supreme! Did surpass the glorified White Whale as 
he so divinely swan. (484) 
The deification of the whale is used to problematize the animal. On the one hand, 
as Starbuck continually asserts Moby-Dick is merely an animal, and is therefore 
below humanity according to the Great Chain of Being. It upsets the balance 
which keeps humanity on superior footing. Instead of a liminal creature, here we 
have one that sits astride of the human race, incorporating animality and divinity 
in a way that defies human rationality. Yet in this manner the whale embodies 
liminality that mirrors humanity, or specifically, captain Ahab himself. Ahab 
represents a liminality between animal and god, which therefore makes him an 
intriguing mirror to humanity. The whale’s problematic status can primarily be 
observed by its given name, Moby-Dick. A seemingly human name if the reader 
approaches the novel from a fresh perspective they may perhaps be surprised to 
find that the eponymous antagonist is an animal.  In appearance the whale seems 
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to represent European humanity, considering his white colouring and large 
forehead. The whale therefore, becomes anthropomorphised, and embodies the 
boundary figure of the abyss. I consider this further within the next section, when 
I discuss the Moby Dick’s human qualities, and Ahab’s animal qualities, that make 
them both products of boundary perversion. 
The Blurring of Boundaries and the Integration of Bodies 
When Ahab first encounters Moby-Dick, his leg is taken, and swallowed by the 
whale. A human part has been integrated into the animal body. Ahab replaces the 
leg with a part from the whale in an act of compensation. Yet despite Ahab’s 
reason for using the whalebone in this manner, it serves in the novel as a literary 
device to demonstrate an incorporation of animality within Ahab’s psyche. 
Moby-Dick incorporates a part of Ahab, and Ahab in attempted retribution 
incorporates a part of the whale. Because Moby-Dick took within himself a 
human part, there is a symbolic humanizing of the whales. As we know nothing 
specific of him previous to his encounter with Ahab, the literary device is useful 
to explore the human qualities that can be sought in animality. Similarly, the 
madness Ahab experiences after losing his leg becomes physically manifested in 
the whale bone leg that he has created for himself. In this manner he experiences 
a zoomorphic transformation which allows him to become partially animal 
himself, and therefore inherently abyssal.   
Within the course of the novel many characters attempt to logically separate the 
whale from themselves in order to put a comfortable distance between man and 
beast. During the Cetology section Ishmael pointedly separates the whale from a 
mammal: “Be it known that, waiving all argument, I take the good old fashioned 
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ground that the whale is a fish, and call upon holy Jonah to back me.” (119) 
Ishmael’s rejection of the Linnaean system of order is poignant, as it represents 
an attempt to widen the gap between animal and human. The disagreement with 
this ordering reveals much about the ambiguity within the novel as to whether 
the whale is a rational vengeful creature, or a mere dumb brute. Ishmael’s 
separation seems to suggest a human necessity to believe the whale a far 
removed entity, in a different category of existence to humanity. Yet whether 
Melville actually disagrees with the Linnaean system is questionable.  Although 
as Hecht argues Melville read Goldsmith extensively and used him a source 
material, it is not known whether he agreed with his assessment considering the 
whale. Armstrong instead, believes that Melville uses the whale to demonstrate 
the crossing of borders between animal and human: “I will argue that "leviathan," 
as understood by Melville and his contemporaries, also crosses back and forth 
between the human and the nonhuman domains in ways that demonstrate the 
inextricable interimplication of these apparently discrete and opposed 
dimensions.”(1041) So either Melville believes that the whale is a fish himself, 
revealing the difficulty he found considering the whale part of the same group as 
humanity. Or, Melville specifically used Ishmael’s perspective to explore this 
insecurity over our relationship with the whale. Either way, Ishmael’s 
declaration reflects disbelief at this attribution of the whale to ourselves.  
Similarly, Starbuck continuously attempts to argue against Ahab’s quest by 
placing emphasis on Moby-Dick’s status as a mere animal: “Vengeance on a dumb 
brute!’ cried Starbuck, ‘that simply smote thee from blindest instinct! Madness! 
To be enraged with a dumb thing, Captain Ahab, seems blasphemous” (145). 
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Starbuck attempts to forcibly create a gap between Ahab and the whale by 
emphasizing the animal’s lack of thought, but also by reminding Ahab of his own 
humanity. In places, it seems that Starbuck is correct in his belief that Moby-Dick 
is indeed, merely a whale. For example, when they finally encounter Moby-Dick 
he is depicted swimming away from the Pequod when he could have caused more 
damage, Starbuck emphasizes this to Captain Ahab: “Oh! Ahab,’ cried Starbuck, 
‘not too late is it, even now, the third day, to desist. See! Moby-Dick seeks thee 
not. It is thou, thou, that madly sleekest him!” (503). Moby-Dick’s indifference, 
however, disappears when the Pequod continues to pursue him. Ishmael, who is 
portrayed as an unbiased passive observer of the debate notices certain aspects 
of the whale when they attempt to capture it. 
But soon resuming his horizontal attitude, Moby Dick swam swiftly 
round and round the wrecked crew; sideways churning the water in 
his vengeful wake, as if, as if lashing himself up to still another and 
more deadly assault. The sight of the splintered boat seemed to 
madden him, as the blood of grapes and mulberries cast before 
Antiochus’s elephants in the book of Maccabees. (468) 
The swimming pattern of Moby Dick in this scene is indicative of a calculated 
manoeuvre. During the confrontation there are multiple incidences that 
demonstrate Moby-Dick’s ability to strategize: “Retribution, swift vengeance, 
eternal malice were in his whole aspect, and spite of all that mortal men could 
do, the solid white buttress of his forehead smote the ship’s starboard bow, till 
men and timbers reeled” (506). Here we see Moby-Dick at his most terrifying; 
the uncanny otherness of the white forehead teamed with the pure malevolence 
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of his countenance. It is at this moment that it is certain that the Pequod and its 
crew are doomed. 
It therefore seems, from Ishmael’s account, that Moby-Dick is not merely a whale, 
but instead thinking, reasoning being, which means that he becomes a symbol of 
the destruction of the Great Chain of Being. Man was given his place near the top 
of the chain due to his faculty for reason. The presence of a reasoning beast 
undermines this chain. The reason Ahab pursues the beast is vengeance for his 
taken leg. But whilst the animal seems to have achieved reason, Ahab lacks this 
faculty. It therefore seems evident that Ahab not only wants justice for his stolen 
leg, but also his stolen humanity, the reason that elevates him above the beast. 
Moby-Dick, in ingesting the leg, took within himself part of Ahab, and the sentient 
reason that is natural to Ahab as a man becomes part of the whale instead. It 
seems that Ahab, in his desire to thwart Moby-Dick, also endeavours to retrieve 
his reason. Thus, according to Ahab’s flawed reasoning, the death of Moby-Dick 
would symbolically return to Ahab that which he lost psychologically when he 
lost his leg.  
It follows that whilst Moby-Dick resembles humanity, Ahab’s actions somewhat 
mirror animality; Moby-Dick therefore can be considered the totem of Ahab’s 
self-loathing. What Moby-Dick gains in human reason, Ahab lacks in madness. 
Frequently Ahab is described as an animal, for example, when Starbuck thinks 
mutinously, he considers Ahab like an untamed beast, caged: “Say he were 
pinioned even; knotted all over with ropes and hawsers; chained down to ring-
bolts on this cabin floor; he would be more hideous than a caged tiger, then” 
(455). Ahab’s beast-like qualities are constantly referred to throughout by all 
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characters: “But you must jump when he gives an order. Step and growl; growl 
and go-that’s the word with Captain Ahab” (83). Furthermore Starbuck’s opinion 
of Ahab is clarified when he voices his opinions on the mission, simultaneously 
suggesting that Ahab resembles Prometheus whilst also being devoured by an 
animalistic force: “God help thee, old man, thy thoughts have created a creature 
in thee; and he whose intense thinking thus makes him a Prometheus; a vulture 
feeds upon that heart for ever; that vulture the very creature he creates” (181).  
Here there are discernable links to Ahab’s Promethean arrogance. Yet Starbuck 
also highlights how Ahab is plagued by an animalistic spectre that dominates his 
mind. The image is gruesome and parasitic, as if Ahab is allowing the beast within 
to feed from his human self. Physically, Moby-Dick’s already taken the leg from 
Ahab. Mentally, he still feeds on his mind, and consequently Ahab has retained 
some animalistic qualities. 
Ahab’s animality is contrived from his madness; a form of being attributed to a 
lack of reason:  
All that most maddens and torments; all that stirs up the lees of 
things; all truth with malice in it; all that cracks the sinews and cakes 
the brain; all the subtle demonisms of life and thought; all evil, to 
crazy Ahab, were visibly personified, and made practically assailable 
in Moby Dick. (164) 
Ahab’s madness is continually asserted throughout the text as the source of his 
inexplicable desire to kill Moby-Dick. It is an aspect of himself that he even 
recognizes: “But he drilled deep down, and blasted all my reason out of me!” 
(149) The attribution of reason to an animal is, ironically, seen as fundamentally 
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unreasonable; a concept that no rational man would adhere to. The two primary 
antagonists therefore become liminal symbols of the confusion between 
animality and humanity. Both cross borders into the empty liminal space 
separating the two states of being.  Melville uses this device to show how Ahab’s 
body becomes part of Moby-Dick, and the two therefore become one. Ahab’s use 
of the whalebone as a leg places emphasis on the intermingling of animality and 
humanity:  
It had previously come to me that this ivory leg had at sea been 
fashioned from the polished bone of the sperm whale’s jaw. How 
could one look at Ahab then, seated on that tripod of bones, without 
bethinking him of the royalty it symbolized? For a Khan of the plank, 
and king of the sea, and a great lord of Leviathans was Ahab. (113) 
However, the whalebone leg is merely an appendage to Ahab, a replacement for 
a true body part. Stubb demonstrates this when he relays his dream to Flask: 
“Why’ thinks I, ‘what’s the row? It’s not a real leg, only a false one,’ And there’s 
the mighty difference between a living thump and a dead thump.” (113). He 
further continues to declare that “what’s his leg now, but a cane-a whalebone 
cane…” (114). Here Melville highlights Ahab’s physical deficiency caused by the 
whale. The whalebone leg is merely an appendage, he takes none of the animal’s 
strength. The substitution is a weak addition.  
However, the integration of Ahab’s leg into Moby-Dick is different, and can be 
further experienced as part of Stubbs dream: “While I was battering away at the 
pyramid, a sort of badger-haired old merman, with a hump on his back, takes me 
by the shoulders and slews me round… why thunder alive, man, his stern was 
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stuck full of marlinspikes, with the points out.” (114) The merman, from his age, 
hump, and the fact that there are many marlinspikes embedded in his back, is an 
anthropomorphism of Moby-Dick. Within the dream, Stubb experiences the 
whale as a mythical speaking rational creature, whereas Ahab is a silent 
participant supported by a pyramid. Melville here demonstrates the distinction; 
Ahab is merely a crippled man; a human deprived of the whole. Moby-Dick 
instead has become an amalgamation of human and animal. When Moby-Dick 
takes Ahab’s leg, it’s a consummation. The part of the human becomes a part of 
Moby-Dick, and as a result human attributes become a part of the whale. The 
change to Ahab is instead diminutive. What makes Moby-Dick become more 
powerful weakens Ahab. Moby-Dick has gained something whilst Ahab has lost. 
Moby-Dick as the reasoning animal counteracts Ahab as the reasonless man. 
Ahab is not the only character in the novel to be crippled because of the whale. 
Captain Boomer of the Samuel Enderby lost his arm in a similar previous 
encounter with Moby-Dick: “With his ivory arm frankly thrust forth in welcome, 
the other captain advanced, and Ahab, sword-fish blades) cried out in the walrus 
way…” (391). Yet this is where the similarity between the captains ends; Captain 
Boomer is cheerful, and lacks resentment towards the whale. He does not share 
Ahab’s blood lust, and when he encountered Moby-Dick a second time after 
losing his arm, he did not attempt to capture him again: ‘‘But couldn’t fasten?’ 
‘Didn’t want to try to; ain’t one limb enough?’’ (394) There is a difference 
between the circumstances of the loss of limbs that separate Ahab from Boomer. 
Boomer’s limb, unlike Ahab’s, was not ingested. Instead, it was taken off, as it 
became septic from a gash caused by the attempt to capture the whale. The limb 
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was not taken by the whale, it was merely lost as a result of the attack on him: 
‘‘And he took that arm off, did he?’… ‘Aye, he was the cause of it, at least…’’ (391). 
The difference between the captains demonstrates the importance of the 
ingesting of the limb by Moby-Dick. Symbolically, Boomer lost something, but not 
to the animal appetite of the whale. Therefore his human part, his reason, is still 
intact. The fact that the whale ingested Ahab’s leg is the source of his madness. 
The concept of the integration of humanity into the animal is mentioned by 
Melville earlier in the novel, during Father Mapple’s sermon pertaining to the 
biblical story of Jonah and the whale. In the story Jonah attempts to separate 
himself from God, and is punished by being eaten whole by a whale: “Then Jonah 
prayed unto the Lord out of the fish’s belly. But observe his prayer, and learn a 
weighty lesson. For sinful as he is, Jonah does not weep and wail for direct 
deliverance. He feels that his dreadful punishment is just” (41). The primary sin 
that Jonah commits that Father Mapple highlights is pride. By attempting to 
separate himself from God, Jonah demonstrates Promethean arrogance. The 
separation is an attempt to find autonomy from God, and perhaps demonstrates 
an attempt to scale the Great Chain of Being. As punishment God commits Jonah 
to the belly of a fish. The act is meaningful, as instead of achieving a separation 
from God, Jonah is integrated into the animal; becomes part of the whale as 
punishment. Jonah effectively becomes part of the animal. However, as he 
becomes part of the animal he learns humility. He accepts his position and thanks 
God for allowing him the insight. Because of this, God does not allow the whale 
to digest Jonah, and the whale “vomited out Jonah upon the dry land” (42). 
According to the story, Jonah is allowed to be separated from the whale, but only 
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when he acknowledges his position beneath god: “And how pleasing to God was 
this conduct in Jonah, is shown in the eventual deliverance of him from the sea 
and the whale.” (41) The inclusion of this chapter is used to demonstrate the 
relationship between God and humanity, and animal and humanity. The 
integration of the man into the animal demonstrates the close relation humanity 
has to the animal, and this can only be redeemed through the humble acceptance 
of humanity’s roots rather than Promethean arrogance. 
Ahab acknowledges the animal fury with which he had been hunting the whale. 
This is his most lucid insight into his own life and flaws. Here he relieves himself 
of the arrogance and professes the madness of his pursuit: “Aye, I widowed that 
poor girl when I married her, Starbuck; and then, the madness, the frenzy, the 
boiling blood and the smoking brow, with which, for a thousand lowerings old 
Ahab has furiously, foamingly chased his prey-more a demon than a man!” (479) 
The claim that he is more like a demon than a man is meaningful. The 
amalgamation of animality into his person has turned him into a subhuman 
being. The use of the word “demon” suggests that this symbiotic conjoining of 
the animal and the man has created something monstrous; more monstrous 
perhaps than Moby-Dick himself. The use of this word is reminiscent of 
Frankenstein, in which the creature is referred to as “demon”. However, it is only 
in appearance that the creature is daemonic initially, though when he becomes 
morally corrupted the phrase is more meaningful. In the creature’s case, the 
phrase “demon” is used due to his hideous appearance, and then a lack of 
morality. The word is attributed to Ahab because of his lack of reason. The word 
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“demon” can therefore be attributed to a person who lacks some aspect of 
humanity. It is these demons that reside in the abyss.  
Schopenhauer and the struggle of Wills: Ahab’s contrary beasts 
Thus far, I have applied my focus to the role of the body in Moby-Dick, both animal 
and human. Like Shelley, Melville was driven to consider the corporeal elements 
of humanity, and how these reminds us what we have in common with the 
animal. Within this section, I move on to consider Arthur Schopenhauer’s theory 
of the Will, to demonstrate the potential difference between animal and human 
that Melville proffers94. I demonstrate how Melville represents rationality as a 
weak weapon when attempting to conquer animal instinct.  According to Eric 
Goldman95, Melville’s novella Billy Budd(1924)  written over thirty years after 
Moby-Dick was published explores the implications of Darwinian Theory more 
than any of Melville’s other fictional works.96 Goldman writes that “…the novel is 
more generally preoccupied with the philosophical implications of a Darwinian 
perspective of human being; in particular, Billy Budd broods over the shrinking 
possibility of free will in the apparently deterministic universe unveiled by 
Darwin” (431). Billy Budd is a post-Darwinian text that Melville started writing 
in 1888, six years after Darwin’s death. The novel, as a potential reaction to 
Darwin’s The Descent of Man, demonstrates, as Goldman argues, a dichotomy 
present within humanity of animal instinct and human free will. Billy condemns 
                                                          
94 Arthur Schopenhauer, Essays and Aphorisms, trans R.J. Hollindale, London: Penguin Classics, 
1976 Subsequent page references in text. 
95 Eric Goldman, ‘Bringing Out the Beast in Melville’s Billy Budd: The Dialogue of Darwinian and 
Holy Lexicon on Board the Bellipotent’, Studies in the Novel, Vol. 37, No. 4 (winter 2005), pp. 
430-442 Subsequent page references in text. 
96 Herman Melville, Billy Budd and Other Stories, Ware: Wordsworth Classics, 1998 Subsequent 
page references in text. 
 
Tabitha Kan 145 
 
himself to death because of his unescapable urge to hit Claggart that kills him. 
The action represents the brute instinct within Billy; silenced by his stutter, the 
only reaction that seems possible for him at that moment is to lash out violently. 
The absence of speech simultaneously represents animality alongside his act of 
aggression. However, as Goldman suggests, there is also the ambiguous 
possibility that at the end of his life, Billy’s human strength of will overcomes his 
animal instinct to twitch during his hanging: 
With Billy’s final, seemingly miraculous act of will power-his defiance 
of his autonomic reflexes themselves-Melville preserve the possibility 
of transcendent free will in a looming, deterministic universe where 
people seem guided less by ‘the force lodged in will power’ than by 
the ‘brute Force’ of their animal instincts.(431) 
Melville’s focus in the novella is on human nature overcoming animal instinct 
and the ambiguity as to whether this is actually possible: 
Yet in Moby-Dick, Melville exposes as Ahab’s madness his belief that 
the actions of a dumb brute attacking out of ‘blindest instinct’ are 
somehow evil. In Billy Budd, the ‘blindest instinct’ of the White Whale 
merges with human nature when characters such a Claggart suddenly 
reveal a core animal nature that they are helpless to resist. Such 
devolution, or what Darwin frequently referred to as ‘reversion’ to 
primitive forms, occurs time and again to both high and low 
characters in the novel. (436) 
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Goldman here argues that in Melville’s earlier novel he disembodies the ‘brute 
instinct’ that overtook Billy when he committed the murder of Claggart, and 
symbolically transposed it on the whale that Ahab seeks to destroy. Similarly, 
Steven Herrmann offers a psychoanalytic reading, suggesting that “Melville’s 
symbol of the White Whale, “Moby Dick” is an image of the Self that stresses the 
Self’s dark side in a way that most of the major religions of the globe have not” 
97. Herrmann argues that the Whale represents a more nefarious part of the 
human psyche, and describes it as “evil”. I endeavour to marry the two 
arguments of Herrmann and Goldman using Schopenhauer’s concept of the Will 
to demonstrate how Moby-Dick resembles the animal within humanity’s core. 
Symbolically Ahab seeks to assert human will power over the animal instinct in 
the emblematic killing of Moby-Dick. The difference in narrative devices that 
Melville used in both texts to explore the same concept is notable. In Moby-Dick, 
the symbolic war between instinct and human will on the surface is very distinct 
as it occurs between two separate bodies- the human and the whale. Until one 
begins to closely examine the zoomorphic/anthropomorphic devices in the 
novel, the whale and Ahab are opposing antagonists. In his later novel, Melville 
has disposed of this pretended separation, and demonstrates how the contention 
between animal and human is something that can be observed within man’s 
individual psyche. Billy Budd therefore draws out and exemplifies the central 
message of Moby-Dick that pertains to the difference between animal and man. 
                                                          
97 Steven B. Herrmann, Melville's Portrait of Same-Sex Marriage in Moby-Dick, Jung Journal: 
Culture & Psyche, Vol. 4, No. 3 (Summer 2010),  67 
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Goldman’s argument that I am to further extend and examine in relation to Moby-
Dick is inherently linked to Schopenhauer’s ideas of “the Will” as the governing 
force that presides over life. The difference must be distinguished between 
Schopenhauer’s concept of “the Will” that relates to the uncontrollable “will to 
live” and animal instinct, and what Goldman refers to as ‘the human will’, which 
is used to describe the human strength of mind over brute instinct. The word 
‘will’ can therefore be used to describe opposite concepts and must therefore be 
used with caution. For this reason when I discuss the “human will” it refers to 
human ability to overcome instinct through the use of thought, and when I 
discuss the “Will” I shall be referring to Schopenhauer’s uncontrollable force of 
nature. The Will is seen by Schopenhauer metaphysically as the driving force 
behind everything: 
Because everything in nature is at once appearance and thing in itself, 
or natura naturata and natura naruratans, it is consequently 
susceptible of a twofold explanation, a physical and a metaphysical. 
The physical explanation is always in terms of cause, the metaphysical 
in terms of will; for that which appears in cognitionless nature as 
natural force, and on a higher level as life force, receives in animal and 
man the name will. (56) 
Schopenhauer argues that the Will is a force that animals and humans share, and 
the only aspect that humans have over animals is the intellect: “It is indeed 
remarkable how, through the mere addition of thought, which the animal lacks, 
there should have been erected on the same narrow basis of pain and pleasure 
that the animal possesses so vast and lofty a structure of human happiness and 
Tabitha Kan 148 
 
misery…” (45) Schopenhauer argues that the magnitude of humanity do not 
philosophize on life: “The rest live their lives away in this dream not very 
different from the animals, from which they are in the end distinguished only by 
their ability to provide for a few years ahead.” (123) He emphatically declares: 
“How very paltry and limited the normal human intellect is, and how little 
lucidity there is in human consciousness…” (123). Ahab in his symbolic quest to 
quell animal instinct with his human intellect intends, in Schopenhauer’s terms, 
to overcome the Will by using his humanity to subdue the beast. It is Ahab’s 
mission to widen the gap between the human and the animal by asserting the 
dominance of his human will above the natural Will of the whale, demonstrating 
himself as part of a higher species that can usurp animal instinct.  
As Captain he considers himself to be the pinnacle of the humanity aboard the 
ship, and works doggedly to maintain his superiority through his incessant 
pursuit of Moby-Dick. Eric Wilson believes that this demonstrates Ahab’s desire 
to maintain the Great Chain of Being whilst scaling it simultaneously: 
On the one hand, he yearns for a static scale of nature, in which 
hierarchically grouped animals and men are utterly fated to be what 
they are, moving with the regularity of machines. On the other, he 
wishes for himself to progress, to evolve, to the very top of the chain, 
from which place he will hold the other species below him. From 
either position, he maintains, violently, the shared assumptions of 
both pre-Dawinian chains of being: anthropocentrism, hierarchy, 
design. (135) 
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 Wilson describes Ahab actively putting human intellect over the unstoppable 
force of the Will. As David C. Leonard argues, Ahab becomes a symbol of 
Promethean arrogance: 
A more significant basis for the challenge is provided when man feels 
within his own intellectual or moral nature a superiority to the gods 
as he has been taught to believe in them. The stories of Prometheus 
may show such development. Prometheus continued his defiance 
because he felt he was on solid moral ground, even though Zeus held 
the superior power. Eventually such challenges lead to a rejection of 
man’s lesser beliefs and a reformation of his theology. (33) 
Leonard claims that Ahab’s Promethean qualities demonstrate the plight of 
humanity to scale the Great Chain of Being: “Stand not by me, but stand under 
me, whoever you are that will now help Stubb; for Stubb, too, sticks here. I grin 
at thee, thou grinning whale!” (506) Here Ahab reveals his plight to elevate 
himself above humanity and look the whale in the eye. Leonard would perhaps 
argue that this is a direct challenge to God, that Ahab endeavours to look into the 
eyes of God as an equal.  
However, unlike Leonard I would argue instead that the Whale, rather than 
symbolizing God, represents nature as a force of power that usurps diminutive 
humanity. The Pequod’s failure to overcome Moby-Dick and final demise 
represents the helplessness of paltry human rationality against animal instinct. 
It demonstrates the power the unconscious, uncontrollable mind has over the 
comparatively weaker ego. It reveals Schopenhauer’s Will overcoming reason, 
and animality drowns human higher understanding. Humanity is forced to 
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acknowledge its humble place and is unable to stretch to the Godly heights that 
would allow it to usurp animality. The assessment can be explicitly seen 
mentioned in the novel:  
But as the mind does not exist unless leagued with the soul, therefore 
it must have been that, in Ahab’s case, yielding up all his thoughts and 
fancies to his one supreme purpose; that purpose, by its own sheer 
inveteracy of will, forced itself against gods and devils into a kind of 
self-assumed, independent being of its own. (181) 
Melville uses the word “will” to describe his human will as a separate entity. It 
describes Ahab’s attempt to detach his own ‘human will’ from the unconscious 
will shared by the animal; the Will to live. The plight of Ahab to govern the animal 
is fuelled by the pure resolve of his rage. It is not his intellect that drives his quest, 
but the determination to assert his human dominance over the whale.  
Yet in this way Ahab is a contradiction in himself; as previously discussed his 
animal instincts and insanity are fundamentally the reason for this desire to 
overcome the beast. It is Starbuck who uses reason to attempt to quell the power 
of Ahab’s animal Will that drives him against the whale. And at only one stage 
within the novel does Starbuck almost succeed. When this occurs, Ahab has one 
moment of lucidity, where he recognises the superior humanity in Starbuck; 
“Close! Stand close to me, Starbuck; let me look into a human eye; it is better than 
to gaze into sea or sky; better than to gaze upon God” (480). At this point Ahab is 
persuaded by the humanity of Starbuck’s feeling: “Come, my Captain, study our 
course, and let us away! See, see! The boy’s face from the window! The boy’s hand 
on the hill!” (480). Yet it is Ahab’s Will that drives him on; spurring him to defeat 
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the very part of himself that steers his course. Ahab seeks to conquer the animal, 
but it is the animal within himself that drives him to do so. Here he admits to this: 
What is it, what nameless, inscrutable, unearthly thing is it; what 
cozening, hidden lord and master, and cruel, remorseless emperor 
commands me; that against all natural lovings and longing, I so keep 
pushing and crowding, and jamming myself on all the time; recklessly 
making me ready to do what in my own proper, natural heart, I durst 
not so much as dare. (481) 
The nameless power that drives Ahab is his instinctual need to recapture his leg. 
His will to recapture the part of himself that the whale took overcomes the 
reasoning that tells him that the mission to overcome Moby-Dick will end in his 
death. Reason tells Ahab at this point that if he continues his course, he will die. 
Yet his Will to dominate the whale overcomes this, and his moment of insightful 
reflection is momentary. He mistakenly assumes that his undeterminable drive 
to kill the whale comes from God, and he uses it as justification: “…how then can 
this one small heart beat; this one small brain think thoughts; unless God does 
that beating, does that thinking, does that living, and not I?” (481) Starbuck’s 
protestations are weak against Ahab’s rage. Melville uses this to demonstrate the 
weakness of rationality against the potency of the Will, and it becomes apparent 
to Starbuck that the only way to quell Ahab’s Will is in an act of animality itself, 
to kill him. However he refrains, as it would undermine his own humanity, and 
thus sacrifices his life and the lives of the crew to preserve himself. In Starbuck 
the Will to live, Schopenhauer’s animalistic Will, is weaker than his humanity, yet 
because of that he perishes. 
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Wilson discusses how Ahab, through his attempt to usurp the animalistic Will, 
fails to reinforce the arrogance that humanity holds over the animal: 
A primary subtext of Melville’s novel is the passing of pre-Darwinian, 
anthropocentric thought, espoused by Ahab, and the inauguration of 
a version of Darwin’s more ecological evolution, proffered by Ishmael. 
With Ahab’s demise end the related pre-Darwinian beliefs that man, 
through his rational facilities, sits atop and controls the great chain of 
being; that civilized man is fundamentally different from the savage 
and the animal, one guided not by a linear plan but, to use Darwin’s 
famous phrase, by an inextricable web of affinities. (131) 
Ahab, as a crippled man represents human will, ironically considering his 
madness, and the whale represents the unstoppable animal Will, therefore 
undermining the Cartesian idea that rational thought can overcome animal 
instinct. Rationality only serves the Will, since it cannot combat it. For this reason 
perhaps Moby-Dick seems to be a rational creature. He could be symbolic of 
Schopenhauer’s Will within ourselves, aided by reason but driven by the will to 
live. 
Within Moby-Dick, Melville includes a narrative called “The Town Ho’s Story” 
which somewhat resembles that of Billy Budd. The framed narrative involves the 
inclusion of a character named Steelkit, who resembles Billy Budd, in that he is 
noble, yet also animalistic: “Steelkit was wild-ocean born, and wild-ocean 
nurtured” (220). Like Billy, Steelkit experiences unprovoked antagonism from a 
jealous mate, and like Billy Budd, Steelkit has to combat the Will within himself 
which inspires him to react violently: 
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But as he sat still for a moment, and as he steadfastly looked into the 
mate’s malignant eye and perceived the stacks of powder-casks 
heaped up in him and the slow-match silently burning along towards 
them; as he instinctively saw all this, that strange forbearance and 
unwillingness to stir up the deeper passionateness in any already 
ireful being- a repugnance most felt, when felt at all, by really valiant 
men even when aggrieved-this nameless phantom feeling, gentlemen, 
stole over Steelkit (223). 
Steelkit is riled by the mate, yet his human reason quells the instinctual need to 
retaliate. At this moment, Steelkit is heroic because he has the unusual ability to 
quell his Will. Steelkit momentarily is able to stave off his animal instincts using 
human temperance. Yet when Radney escalates, it is as if Steelkit is possessed. 
His next actions are described not as his own, but as an impersonal event: 
“Immediately the hammer touched the cheek; the next instant the lower jaw of 
the mate was stove in his head; he fell on the hatch spouting blood like a whale” 
(224). The event runs almost parallel to the altercation between Billy Budd and 
Claggart. Claggart unreasonably antagonizes Billy, like Radney did with Steelkit, 
and similarly to Billy Budd, Steelkit reacts violently. This causes mutinous 
trouble, and then violence on the ship. Radney reacts towards Steelkit, and 
Steelkit plots revenge on Radney. Yet revenge is not necessary, as the Town Ho 
encounters Moby-Dick, and Moby-Dick kills Radney. The death is symbolic; Moby 
Dick represents omnipotent Will, Steelkit’s animalistic Will overcoming Radney. 
The story fundamentally describes Moby-Dick’s power, yet it also displays the 
overwhelming strength of animal instincts. Steelkit’s vengeful hatred of Radney 
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is so powerful it manifests itself as Moby-Dick. Melville, through this story 
demonstrates the power of animal instinct over humanity. 
Through the use of Schopenhauer’s concept of the will in this section I have 
established a concept proffered by Melville that though humanity holds the 
power of reason that could potentially elevate them above animality, it is weak 
in comparison to animal instinct. For Melville, the abyss is worryingly small and 
easily traversed. Melville uses Ahab’s impossible plight to demonstrate his own 
doubts and insecurities about the superiority of humanity.  
The Noble Savage: the optimistic portrayal of human nature in Moby Dick 
Through readings of Schopenhauer and Kristeva, I have so far demonstrated a 
rather pessimistic reading of Moby-Dick, with regards the abyssal separation of 
animal and man. However, there is a Rousseauian element that also requires 
consideration. Yet unlike Shelley, Melville approaches the concept of “the noble 
savage’ in a more positive manner. Laura Otis, argues that before Darwin the 
“savage” was seen to be a step down towards animal from humanity on the Great 
Chain of Being: “According to a cultural tradition that preceded Darwin, the move 
from savage to beast was just one step down, a small slide along a continuum.” 
(487) This is, however, a position that Melville disagrees with, as he portrays the 
‘savage’ within the novel as highly misunderstood and a more noble form of 
humanity. When discussing the idea of “savages”, you are able to detect Melville’s 
own voice most poignantly. Howarth notes that during his time as a whaler he 
spent some time with the natives in the South Pacific before returning home, 
which is most likely where he received such a positive view on the indigenous 
population: “Five months later he reached the Marquesas, jumped ship to live 
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with natives, then rejoined the frigate United States for a homeward cruise in 
1843-44” (102). Therefore, throughout Moby-Dick Melville actively endeavoured 
to demonstrate a controversial, progressive opinion on the matter of so called 
“savages”. Melville’s respect for indigenous people is evident especially 
throughout the first part of the novel. Ishmael’s experience of Queequeg is used 
to challenge prejudices that were present in the nineteenth Century. Ishmael 
begins by portraying Queequeg as a threatening character, adhering to 
stereotype: “You shuddered as you gazed, and wondered what monstrous 
cannibal and savage could ever have gone a death-harvesting with such a 
hacking, horrifying implement” (10). Yet when Ishmael begins to talk to 
Queequeg, he explicitly rejects his former prejudices, recognizing the arrogance 
of European ideas of supremacy: “What’s all this fuss I have been making about, 
thought I to myself-the man’s a human being just as I am: he has just as much 
reason to fear me, as I have to be afraid of him. Better sleep with a sober cannibal 
than a drunken Christian.” (22) He finds Queequeg both a kindred spirit and a 
figure of mysterious power and wisdom: “But savages are strange beings; at 
times you do not know exactly how to take them. At first they are overawing; 
their calm self-collectedness of simplicity seems a Socratic wisdom” (45). The 
opinion of Ishmael’s, and indeed, Melville seems to represent Rousseau’s 
conception of ideal humanity, the noble savage. Melville implies that if you strip 
a man of his society he becomes a far better creature, and potentially closer to 
god: 
 Men may seem detestable as joint stock-companies and nations; 
knaves, fools and murderers there may be; men may have been mean 
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and meagre faces; but man, in the ideal, is so noble and so sparkling, 
such a grand and glowing creature, that over any ignominious 
blemish in him all his fellows should run to throw their costliest 
robes. (102) 
In this sense, Melville depicts humanity as a higher form of being, but only when 
stripped of those appendages that Rousseau suggests make humans higher than 
animals: “There he sat, his very indifference speaking a nature in which there 
lurked no civilized hypocrisies and bland deceits.” (45). At this stage, Melville 
seems to stray from Rousseau’s philosophies. Although he notices the value in 
concepts of “the noble savage”, it seems that he does not consider humanity’s 
progression as a symptom of society. Instead, he considers man naturally noble, 
in his more simplistic form.   
For this reason, slavery is problematic in the eyes of both Melville and Darwin. If 
the more fundamental, pure form of humanity is superior, then slavery entirely 
undermines humanity’s advantage over animality. Darwin, who came from a 
family of abolitionists, mentioned the effects of slavery on humanity in Voyage of 
the Beagle:  
While staying at this estate, I was very nearly being an eyewitness to 
one of those atrocious acts, which can only take place in a slave 
country…I shall never forget my feelings of surprise, disgust, and 
shame, at seeing a great powerful man afraid even to ward off a blow, 
directed, as he thought, at his face. This man had been trained to a 
degradation lower than the slavery of most helpless animals. (62-63) 
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Darwin’s insight into slavery offers a view on humanity within the slave trade. 
Darwin speaks of a strong man placed below animality in his degradation; 
considering Melville’s opinion of humanity this demonstrates a sacrilegious 
perversion. Slavery was implemented for the purpose of forwarding western and 
European concerns, by creating an unjust hierarchy between men. It therefore 
subverts the nobility in humanity underneath that of the animal by giving a man’s 
life a monetary value, an act that Melville mentions in the novel: “We can’t afford 
to lose whales by the likes of you; a whale would sell for thirty times what you 
would, Pip, in Alabama” (370). Stubb compares the cost of the young black cabin 
boy Pip to the cost of the whale, and suggests the whale to be worth more, 
demonstrating the subversion of Pip’s humanity. The implementation of Stubb’s 
threat, which left him alone in the ocean reveals the result of considering 
humanity something of fiscal worth. The subversion of Pip’s humanity causes a 
loss of his own humanity due to a lack of compassion from those who should 
have shown him mercy. Melville therefore establishes the slave trade as a system 
that undermines the nobility of humanity, both within the white masters, and the 
African slaves. We are invited to empathize with Pip; who, as a mere boy was 
exposed to the harsh realities of the world. You could perhaps argue, that the 
novella Benito Cerano contradicts my reading, as a work of fiction based on the 
slave mutiny of Tyrall in 180598. However, I would argue that Melville’s novella, 
in fact, supports this assessment. Within the novella, Delano, the protagonist, 
explicitly thinks “Ah, this slavery breeds ugly passions in man. Poor fellow!” 
(129). Here Melville highlights the reason for the mutiny; the ‘ugly passions’ that 
                                                          
98 Herman Melville, “Benito Cerano”, Billy Budd and Other Stories, Ware: Wordsworth Classics, 
1998 
Tabitha Kan 158 
 
slavery breeds in man. These are the very passions that sent Pip mad. Benito 
Cerano emphasizes the drastic measures that the desperate are forced into, 
regardless of how illogical their success may seem.  
Within Pip’s micro narrative Melville considers the consequence of undermining 
of a humanity that would otherwise exceed and flourish over other forms. The 
three harpooners, Queequeg, Tashtego and Dagoo represent the pinnacle of 
humanity; out of all the crew they are the characters that overpower the whale 
through their strength and their skill. The presence of the three harpooners may 
represent the holy trinity, demonstrating the association between pure, raw 
humanity and godliness. Pip, however, counteracts these characters in showing, 
as a child, what happens when human spirit is perverted by Western ideas of 
humanity’s worth.  
According to Philip Armstrong, Melville was writing at a pivotal time, concerning 
more than just science: “1850 and 1851, the years during which Melville wrote 
his novel, were the years of the doomed compromise between opponents and 
proponents of slavery.” (1034) Michael C. Berthold argues that in narrative style 
Moby-Dick resembles the American Slave narrative. Berthold argues that Moby-
Dick in narrative style resembles the works of Solomon Northrup and Frederick 
Douglas. He draws attention the whale symbolically used within the debate over 
slavery: “Before and during the Civil War, the whale itself was a popular symbol 
of slavery and its prophesized eradication.”99 (135) Given the significance of this 
symbol and the time in which the novel was written, Moby-Dick as a symbol of 
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the eradication of slavery cannot be ignored. His eventual triumph over the 
Pequod and Ahab demonstrates more than just a disruption of hierarchy of 
human over beast, but also of human over human. The whale functions here as a 
signifier of political unrest in America at the time. 
Conclusion 
There is a reason why the whale is considered symbolically both the embodiment 
of God and brute force. The omnipotence of animality over humanity is 
something that frightens Melville, and in their abilty to usurp humanities 
rationality in the form of sheer force, God and animality seem to be inherently 
linked and similar. In comparison human rationality seems to be a weak and 
pathetic. Melville regards human rationality as a factor that separates human 
from animal, but it is demonstrated to be comparatively weak. Unlike Descartes 
and similarly to Schopenhauer, Melville does not put reason on a pedestal above 
the animal as a superior force, but rather as a flimsy addition. 
Yet the novel is not entirely pessimistic in regards to humanity. By regarding 
characters like Queequeg, and the other harpooners, Melville demonstrates a 
respect, and deference towards humanity that is more untainted by civilisation. 
By doing this, he approaches a more spiritual, holistic interpretation of religion 
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Super or Superfluous Men; Dostoevsky’s spiritual approach to the 
animal/human divide in Crime and Punishment 
When discussing Fyodor Dostoevsky’s writing, Anna Schur Kaladiouk refers to 
Dostoevsky as a scientist himself, partaking in literary experiments, writing in 
ways that were new and exploratory: ‘It is not surprising, therefore, that for over 
a century now students of Dostoevsky continue to see him as something of a 
scientist himself and to draw a parallel between his novelistic method and 
experimental science of the time’.(421)100 Crime and Punishment101 (1866) is a 
primary example of this experimentation; hailed by many as the first 
psychological thriller, Dostoevsky uses the novels protagonist to explore 
concepts of criminality. Yet when science threatens the sanctity of religious 
discourse, Dostoevsky becomes inherently protective; it is this drive that 
inspired him to write his masterpieces.  
Within this chapter I discuss the influence of Darwinism on Fyodor Dostoevsky’s 
Crime and Punishment and how it altered his philosophy regarding the difference 
between animal and man. Similarly to previous chapters context is initially 
discussed. Contextual examination is particularly important within this chapter, 
as the novel was written soon after the publication of On the Origin of Species. 
The introduction of Darwin’s seminal work caused a storm within the scientific 
community, the effects of which affected the entirety of society. Following this I 
examine three elements of the novel. The first section is focused on “Svidrigailov” 
                                                          
100 Anna Schur Kaladiouk ‘On "Sticking to the Fact" and "Understanding Nothing": Dostoevsky 
and the Scientific Method’, The Russian Review, 65:3 (Jul., 2006), pp. 417-438 Subsequent page 
references in text. 
101 Fyodor Dostoevsky, Crime and Punishment, Trans. David McDuff, 1991: Penguin Classics 
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and pays particular attention to the role of the criminal within Dostoevsky’s 
novel. Following this, the “superfluous man” is discussed; an ineffectual idealist 
who becomes a social outcast. I argue that while the superfluous man’s goal is to 
transcend his own animality, he instead becomes a resident of the abyss. Finally, 
Dostoevsky’s “pocchnichestvo principles” are discussed, which are concerned 
with how man transcends the animal in Dostoevsky’s philosophy. 
Dostoevsky and the Effects of Darwinism 
When Dostoevsky published his psychological masterpiece Crime and 
Punishment, it had been seven years since the publication of Darwin’s On the 
Origin of Species (1859) in English but only two years since its publication in 
Russian (although Dostoevsky would have certainly read it in English). The ideas 
that were developing whilst Melville was writing had become scientifically 
plausible. The emergeance of Darwinism catalysed a new phase of Dostoevsky’s 
writing, in which he focused on the more universal message of his fiction tackling 
many concepts inherently linked with the emergence of Darwinian theory. The 
following section will be split into two parts: part one will consider the science 
relating to man and animals prevalent at the time, including the rise of 
Darwinism, and part two offers a brief examination of Dostoevsky’s personal life 
with reference to his philosophical ideas about humanity. 
Science at War: The Immediate consequences of On the Origin of Species 
In this first section I discuss scientific ideas of the 1860s and 1870s, and how the 
radical materialist movement in Russia was inspired by Darwinism. By 1866 the 
concept of Darwinism, with its focus on the “struggle for existence” and theory 
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of natural selection, was firmly within the public domain. The emergence of 
Darwinian theory almost exactly corresponds with the great change in 
Dostoevsky’s writing that Joseph Frank calls “The Miraculous Years”- given the 
magnitude of the response to the On the Origin of Species, it is unlikely that this 
development is coincidental102. The publication of On the Origin of Species itself 
was catalysed by a strong reaction from Darwin to a paper by Alfred Russel 
Wallace that treated evolutionary science similar to his own theory of species 
development. The threat of being beaten to publication shocked Darwin into 
action, leading both scientists to collaborate on a paper presented to the 
Linnaean Society on July 1st 1858103. The reception to the paper is marked as 
ironic, as Richard England observes: 
In 1858 Thomas Bell, president of the Linnean Society, uttered the 
words that would make him the fool of a hundred histories: the year, 
he said, "has not, indeed, been marked by any of those striking 
discoveries which at once revolutionize, so to speak, the department 
of science on which they bear.104 (267) 
Bell’s remark demonstrates the dramatically opposing reactions to Darwinian 
theory that led to a decade of academic conflict. Naturalists, as England argues, 
were generally conservative and “dismissed out of hand the idea that species 
                                                          
102 Joseph Frank Dostoevsky: A Writer in his Time, 2009: Princeton University Press Subsequent 
page references in text. 
103 Charles Darwin and Alfred Russel Wallace, ‘On the Tendency of Species to form Varieties; 
and on the Perpetuation of Varieties and Species by Natural Means of Selection’ (paper 
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Linnaean society by Lyell and Hooker, and presented by the secretary J.J. Bennett. 
104 Richard England, ‘Natural Selection before the Origin: Public Reactions of Some Naturalists 
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might transmute into other species. Their job, as they saw it, was to determine 
just what constituted a species” (269). The mechanisms of evolution were 
generally regarded as dubious and although Lamarck and Chambers had 
previously made attempts at proving something similar, the majority of the 
scientific community did not take it seriously. Darwin had succeeded in 
suggesting a theory of evolution that could be accepted by many scientists who 
had originally dismissed it. The repercussions for theology and philosophy are 
well known: evolution required a dramatic reassessment of ideas about what 
constitutes humanity, particularly when considering our relationship to animals 
and God.  
Yet the fact that Wallace and Darwin  reached similar conclusions around the 
same time exemplifies how important the mid-Victorian years were for the 
development of natural science. Darwin writes of the uncanny synchronicity: “I 
never saw a more striking coincidence. If Wallace had my M.S. sketch written out 
in 1842 he could not have made a better short extract! Even his terms now stand 
as Heads of my Chapters.”105 It therefore appears, that the theory was merely 
waiting for the right time, and the right scientists to be verified. The theory that 
he and Wallace proposed is described by David Hull as being as “competitive, 
individualistic and dog-eat-dog as Victorian society because of Darwin’s 
experience in Victorian England.”106. Society in the mid nineteenth century was 
often seen as callous and rationalistic exemplified by some of the seminal literary 
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works of the decade like Dicken’s Hard Times (1854)107. Perhaps this is the 
reason that a theory as brutal as Darwinism could be more readily accepted.  
By the late 1850s the concept of evolution was gaining momentum. As discussed 
in the previous chapter, Robert Chamber’s Vestiges of the Natural History of 
Creationism (1844)108 although not scientifically respectable gained ideas of 
evolution popularity, and Charles Lyell’s defence of Uniformitarianism in 
Principles of Geology (1830-1833)109 was widely accepted and acclaimed in 
scientific circles like the Linnaean Society. According to Hull, external factors 
including the social mood of the time affected the acceptance of Darwinian 
Theory.  Malthusian theory of economics was being applied to anthropology of 
England, as Hull writes: “When Darwin returned from his voyage, two million 
people lived in London and its immediate environs. Before Darwin died, the 
population had grown to four million.” (138) The dramatic change that Hull 
highlights shows the acceleration of society during the years in which Darwin 
was working. In turn, it led to new and radical ideological thinking about 
population management, with a divergence from existing religious and moral 
ideas. Malthusian theory was popularly characterized by a dismissal of moral 
sympathy; the principle he argues in “An Essay on the Principles of Population” 
(1834) suggests that disease and death are natural controls on population 
growth.110 In this way, it was perceived that Malthusian theory applied the way 
we treat animals to humanity. Similarly, the implications of social Darwinism 
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were taken to imply a need for utility over morality, evident through the 
introduction of “poor laws” which Hull describes as “so harsh that one might 
suspect that they were devised to make poor people strive even harder to free 
themselves from poverty.” (142) Ingrained on society was the concept of 
“survival of the fittest” already; Darwinism was a logical progression in science 
that seemed to reflect the zeitgeist. 
The environment was prime for Darwinism to gain a strong following, as James 
Moore asserts: “Converts were won, alliances formed, and within a few years 
Darwinism became notorious as much for the friends it kept as for its political 
enemies”111 (365). Moore acknowledges the most influential of the Darwinian 
converts as being central to the theories kudos: 
Charles Lyell, a geologist, was his father-superior in science; Joseph 
Hooker, a botanist, was his oldest and closest friend outside the 
extended family; Thomas Huxley, a zoologist, was chief among the 
"young and rising naturalists" whom Darwin was determined to get 
on "our side of the question of the mutability of species." (366)  
Considering the publicity of Darwinism Moore writes: “It was Huxley alone who 
occupied the limelight for several years, baiting bishops, settling old scores with 
scientific bigwigs like Richard Owen, and generally using Darwin's book as an 
ideological weapon” (369). In 1860 Thomas Henry Huxley, also known as 
“Darwin’s Bulldog” entered into his historic debate with Albert Wilberforce112. 
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Edward J. Larson observes that whereas Darwin preferred to shun publicity, 
Huxley became a spokesman for Darwinism. In effect, he was the public face of 
evolution, engaging in public discourse and founding the evolutionist journal the 
Natural History Review. The debate with Wilberforce was characterized by 
Huxley’s application of clear, evidential science compared to Wilberforce’s 
dogmatic and poorly rationalized perspective. Supposedly, according to J.R. 
Lucas when Wilberforce joked: “Is it on your grandfather's or your 
grandmother's side that you claim descent from a monkey,” Huxley retorted that 
he would rather be descended from a monkey than from a bishop that obscured 
the truth113.The debate did much to raise the profile of the theological problem: 
were humans created especially by God or did we descend, like everything else 
from animals? If Darwin was the author of evolutionary science, Huxley was his 
publicist.  
Huxley also engaged in a dispute with Robert Owen in which they discussed the 
anatomical differences between humans and animals. Owen was one of the 
primary biological scientists of the nineteenth century, having helped found the 
British Museum of Natural History and superintending the Royal Society. 
However in his Anglican philosophies and resistance to evolution, he was 
unswerving, especially considering the question of the human/animal divide.114 
Owen argued that the main difference between humans and animals was the 
presence of the hippocampus minor, a part of the brain that according to Owen 
is unique to the human; he concluded that because of this humans cannot have 
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descended from apes.115 After extensive research, Huxley dissected Owen’s claim 
in a lecture of his own to the Royal Institute116. Other scientists that rallied to 
Darwin’s cause include Charles Kingsley, Asa Grey and Sir Joseph Dalton Hooker, 
who in 1964 first formed what they called the “X Club”; a group dedicated to the 
promotion and defence of Darwinism (376). The group collaborated in 1869 to 
found the journal Nature, one of the most prominent scientific journals today 
which “unabashedly promoted Darwinism in its pages” (108). Edward Caudill 
emphasises Joseph Dalton Hooker’s great impact on the acceptance of 
Darwinism: “Huxley was the publicist who wrote reviews and debated clergy; 
Hooker was the politician who operated in the circles of power, a little less visible 
and much less vociferous than Huxley but just as important.”117 (453) Although 
Hooker was not as publicly vocal in his support of Darwinism he was a constant 
source of support of the theory; it was, for example, within a letter to Hooker that 
Darwin revealed his new scientific leanings. Between them, Caudill refers to both 
Huxley and Hooker as Darwin’s greatest support, and this lead to what he 
considers the victory of Darwinism: “By the end of the 1860s, the Darwinians had 
won. The victory was not absolute, but it did not need to be. Hooker became 
president of the British Association for the Advancement of Science in 1868, 
followed by Huxley's ascendancy to the same office in 1870” (454-455) When 
Caudill refers to a “victory” he is referring to scientific and public acceptance of 
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the theory. The fact that it took a whole decade for the theory to be accepted 
demonstrates how controversial it was, and how much resistance there was. 
Darwin did not mention humanity’s origins until he published The Descent of 
Man in 1872. However, the implications for human evolution were evident in On 
the Origin of Species.  The popular media exploited public uneasiness over the 
possibility that humans might be related to animals. Darwinian science was 
ridiculed in popular publications like the American Harper’s Weekly118 and the 
British Punch119. Some cartoons explicitly highlighted how strange the idea of 
human-animal connectedness seemed by questioning it. For example, this 
cartoon of a gorilla from the May 1861 edition of Punch depicts an ape wearing a 







The cartoon explicitly refers to Josiah Wedgewood’s abolitionist slogan to 
emphasize the blurring of boundaries between humanity and animality. Within 
1860s in the United States the question of who was human and who was animal 
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was being fought within the civil war. The question of slavery considered 
whether slaves were property or deserved basic human rights. Considering the 
questions inspired by Darwinism concerning the relationship of all humanity to 
animals this is particularly poignant. The abolitionists strove to raise the slave to 
an equal position within humanity. Evolutionist humbled humanity by 
demonstrating its animal origins.  
This attribution of man to animal was furthered to Darwin, so as to apply what 
they believed to be the implications of his theory to the scientist himself. The 
image below from The Hornet120 in March 1871 is particularly typical of these 







In these images the human is lowered to the status of a beast so as to satirize this 
blurring of boundaries, thus within the publication of these magazines the abyss 
is excavated theoretically in the form of humour to demonstrate the presence of 
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specific separations of the species. This boundary blurring is also ridiculed when 







The cartoon from Punch entitled “The Lion of the Season” published in May 1861 
demonstrates the use of anthropomorphism as a weapon against Darwinian 
Theory. Similarly to the cartoons ridiculing Darwin, the blurring of boundaries 
accentuates the ridiculousness of evolutionary theory as perceived by much of 
the Victorian population. A similar method used to ridicule the theory was 
cyclical caricatures, for example this one by Charles H. Bennett of a barrel and a 
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Janet Browne examines this mentioning that “The shift towards these circular 
images of evolutionary progression is interesting when compared with Darwin's 
more linear branching tree. In On the Origin of Species Darwin took pains to 
emphasise that evolution was neither progressive nor circular.” Browne uses 
these images to demonstrate the level of misunderstanding in society of Darwin’s 
ideas, and a misconception that is applied even today. By many Darwinian 
Theory was severely misunderstood, a crucial fact when considering literary 
attitudes toward evolution. 
This excessive development in society within Western Europe affected the 
Russian consciousness. M. Gordin and D. Hall argue that “The generation of the 
1860s transformed “intelligentsia” into a central notion of Russian popular 
discourse, cementing its association with revolutionary politics— and with 
natural science”121. Gordin and Hall argue that the intelligentsia of Russia in the 
1860s amalgamated natural sciences and politics. Darwinism infected 
philosophy and politics in Russia soon after the publication of On the Origin of 
Species. Daniel P. Todes draws attention to the immense popularity of Darwin in 
Russia: “For the great majority of Russian intellectuals he became a highly 
prestigious figure-the embodiment of modern natural science, the author of a 
powerful argument for evolutionism, and the discoverer of an important factor 
in evolution, natural selection”122. However, he also argues that the primary 
problem the intelligentsia found with Darwinian theory was the concept of a 
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general “struggle for existence” (537). The phrase is primarily Malthusian and 
was troubling when applied to Christian ideas about morality. Todes allows that 
“These thinkers generally admired Darwin, and very few thought that this flaw 
justified total rejection of his theory” (538). Yet the association with Malthus was 
a problem, mainly because it did not prove itself in the great expanse of Russia, 
but also because of its dubious morality. Even Nikolai Chernyshevsky, thinker, 
evolutionist and author of the contentious What is to be Done (1863) took offence 
at  this alignment with Malthus.123  
Aside from the Malthusian problem, however, radical thinkers like 
Chernyshevsky accepted evolutionary theory with enthusiasm. The association 
with radicalism became detrimental to Darwinism according to James Allen 
Rogers: “Following the assassination attempt of Dmitri Karakozov against 
Alexander II in 1866, the Tsarist government revealed its belief that there was a 
close connection between revolutionary thought and Darwinism”124(487). The 
conflation of revolution and evolution led to a temporary ban of On the Origin of 
Species and an association with violence. The book was therefore highly 
contentious; to many it represented an accumulation of Western ideas which 
some were open to more than others.  
Dostoevsky: Life, Inspirations and the Miraculous Years 
Having considered the wider contextual landscape in the 1860s pertaining to the 
acceptance of Darwinism I now discuss Dostoevsky, and how his experiences 
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effected his writing thematically. It is vital to consider the traumatic experiences 
of his life; these experiences inspired his need to preserve the sanctity of man 
through religious fervour. Freud considered Dostoevsky a genius, writing of him 
in his essay “Dostoevsky and Parricide”:  
Dostoevsky's place is not far behind Shakespeare. The Brothers 
Karamazov is the most magnificent novel ever written; the episode of 
the Grand Inquisitor, one of the peaks in the literature of the world, 
can hardly be valued too highly. Before the problem of the creative 
artist analysis must, alas, lay down its arms.125  
Freud was deferential to Dostoevsky as a writer, but was also interested in the 
psychology behind his writings. To understand the motivation behind his 
literature it was important for Freud to understand Dostoevsky’s personal life. 
The study of Dostoevsky’s childhood and struggles of adulthood are vital because 
within his literature these influences are easily recognised. It is therefore 
necessary to consider these early stimuli. I primarily use Joseph Frank’s detailed 
and extensive biography, which represents arguably the most recent and 
thorough consideration of Dostoevsky’s life. 
As well as a creative genius, Freud recognized Dostoevsky as a flawed moralist: 
“The moralist in Dostoevsky is the most readily assailable. If we seek to rank him 
high as a moralist on the plea that only a man who has gone through the depths 
of sin can reach the highest summit of morality, we are neglecting a doubt that 
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arises.” (176) Dostoevsky’s father, instead of becoming a clergyman like his own 
father, became a medical practitioner. Although his professional career 
privileged science over spirituality, his personal life was still greatly affected by 
his religious faith. Frank outlines: “But in his very darkest moments, when no 
earthly succour seemed available he took refuge in the conviction of his virtue 
and rectitude, and in the belief that God was on his side against a hostile and 
indifferent world.”(11) Dostoevsky’s father saw truth in the cruelty of nature 
that can be garnered from the ideas Darwin was later to proffer, yet assuaged 
this cruelty he saw within nature and mortality with religion. It was in this 
religious environment that Dostoevsky developed his deeply complex 
relationship with religion. 
In his childhood Dostoevsky’s family purchased a property outside of Moscow as 
a country retreat. There Dostoevsky developed his respect for the rural people 
and peasants. It is likely that it was his time in the country that inspired his 
support of the “pochvennichestvo principles”, according to Frank: “This 
untroubled boyhood relation with the peasants certainly contributed to shaping 
Dostoevsky’s later social ideas; one may say that he aimed to bring about, on a 
national scale, the same harmonious unity between the educated classes and the 
peasantry that he remembered having known as a child.” (16) These principles, 
which I  later discuss in depth, consider the nature of humanity and how higher 
thought must be united with a purer way of living. In this stage of his life, 
Dostoevsky integrated with a simpler form of life.  
Frank argues that “The most important event in Dostoevsky’s life during his 
years at the academy was the death (or the murder) of his father.” (45). Although 
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Dostoevsky’s father was a strict man, he was undoubtedly loved and respected 
by his children. Freud cites the murder of Dostoevsky’s father as the cause of a 
neurotic trigger for psychosomatic epilepsy: “The most probable assumption is 
that the attacks went back far into his childhood, that their place was taken to 
begin with by milder symptoms and that they did not assume an epileptic form 
until after the shattering experience of his eighteenth year—the murder of 
his father.” (180) However, as Frank asserts, Freud’s evidence for this 
insinuation is weak: “The “facts” that Freud adduces can be shown to be 
extremely dubious at best, and at worst simply mistakes; the case history Freud 
constructed in the effort to “explain” him in psychoanalytic terms is purely 
ficticious” (45). Nevertheless, the violent death of Dostoevsky’s father certainly 
had an effect on him.. He increasingly clung to the religion that comforted his 
father. 
Dostoevsky’s life after his exile and incarceration was extremely troubled; due to 
a financial crisis he became involved with a circle of utopian socialists, and 
following that with the Petrashevsky circle. Dostoevsky’s main contention was 
that he was faithful enough to maintain his belief in God, but intelligent enough 
to question it nevertheless. The Petrashevsky circle was denounced and 
Dostoevsky was accused of reading heretical banned works. The members were 
sentenced to death, but for Dostoevsky the punishment was waived just before 
the execution. Instead he was sent into exile in Siberia for eight years, a sentence 
that was halved eventually. His time in Siberia inspired the semi-
autobiographical House of the Dead126. The years following this did not show 
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much improvement in Dostoevsky’s fortunes. Some of Dostoevsky’s troubles, 
like his gambling, were self-inflicted. Others were just bad luck. Frank’s concise 
summary of this time in Dostoevsky’s life exemplifies the misfortune he suffered: 
Beset by debts and creditors and importunate relatives, in chronic 
bad health in spite of his robust constitution, a victim of frequent and 
debilitating epileptic attacks and a gambling obsession…his fortunes 
reached their lowest ebb in 1864 (the year of publication of Notes 
from Underground) with the death of his brother and business 
partner Mikhail, the death of his closest literary collaborator, the 
brilliant and eccentric Apollon Grigoryev, and the inopportune 
closure by the government of his main source of income, the journal 
Time-a series of catastrophes eminently worthy of a novel by Sue. (7) 
Yet out of all this pain and misfortune Dostoevsky was able to create some of his 
most important works, perhaps because he clung to his faith through a period of 
difficulty. Although he was aware of the weaknesses in his faith, it served as 
comfort in a time when Dostoevsky could find little elsewhere. Works like 
Darwin’s On the Origin of Species, along with many other seminal philosophical 
endeavours felt like an attack on this faith and he found it imperative to defend 
it. Anna Schur Kaladiouk summarises Dostoeksy’s stance: “As a person of deep 
religious conviction, Dostoevsky mistrusted the claims of science and doubts the 
power of human reason that arrogates to itself the right and the ability to solve 
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the "ultimate" question”127. Religion was, for Dostoevsky, an aspect of his life that 
was ever present throughout every hardship in his life. Darwin’s seeming attack 
on religion, by suggesting that man was nothing more than an animal, was 
automatically abhorrent for Dostoevsky. He took comfort in man’s relationship 
to God, the destruction of this would decimate his own sanity.  
Freud’s personal opinion of Dostoevsky’s spiritual and political conformity is 
negative; he suggests that although as a writer Dostoevsky excelled, he could 
have had a more profound political and philosophical input. Freud believed him 
to be  crippled by his need to conform to Russian ideas about spirituality: 
After the most violent struggles to reconcile the instinctual demands 
of the individual with the claims of the community, he landed in the 
retrograde position of submission both to temporal and 
spiritual authority, of veneration both for the Tsar and for the God of 
the Christians, and of a narrow Russian nationalism—
a position which lesser minds have reached with smaller effort. This 
is the weak point in that great personality. Dostoevsky threw away 
the chance of becoming a teacher and liberator of humanity and made 
himself one with their gaolers. (177) 
Whether or not Freud’s disappointment has any foundation is questionable. 
Dostoevsky is considered one of the world’s most important novelists, and his 
works address great and important problems. Yet one may conjecture what 
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would have happened if Dostoevsky had a less religious upbringing, if his father 
had not been so brutally murdered, if he hadn’t been incarcerated in Siberia for 
radical thinking.  
According to Ladislav Kovac, when considering his attitude towards Darwin, 
Dostoevsky was willing to allow that humanity had evolved from the ape.128 
However, he also was unable to consider man a ‘mere ape’, writing in a letter to 
V. A. Alekseev sent 7th June 1876: 
By the way: Recall the current theories of Darwin and others about 
man’s descent from the ape. Without entering into any theories, 
Christ announces straight out that in addition to an animal world, 
there is also a spiritual world in man as well. Well, and difference does 
it make where man came from(it’s not at all explained in the Bible 
how God sculpted him from clay, took it from the earth), but on the 
other hand God breathed into him the breath of life…’129 
Larson mentions that this was the way many of the intelligentsia dealt with 
concepts of evolution; by amalgamating them with their faith (221). 
Dostoevsky’s explanation therefore of the difference between man and animal is 
spirituality. Furthermore in this letter to Alekseev he mentions the difference 
between human and animal: “The Devil’s idea could only apply to an animal 
mankind, but Christ knew that you can’t renew man with bread alone.” (285) For 
Dostoevsky, you cannot merely appeal to people material needs as you can with 
animals. You must apply to their inherent spirituality primarily, for then they can 
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overcome all hardships, like Sonja in Crime and Punishment. Although he was 
willing to admit some truths in the theory Dostoevsky was regularly scathing of 
Darwin because of the link between his theories and materialism, in particular 
within his non-fictional The Diary of a Writer (1873-1881). In his diary he writes: 
“Please note, gentlemen, that all these high European teachers, our light and our 
hope-all those Mills, Darwins and Strausses-sometimes consider the moral 
obligations of modern man in a most astonishing manner”130. Ronald D. LeBlanc 
also argues that Dostoevsky’s scathing attitudes towards Darwinism are 
inherent in his novels: “In Crime and Punishment, for instance, Darwin’s theories 
are implicit in Raskolnikov’s ambition to prove to himself that he is an 
“extraordinary” man who belongs to a superior race of Napoleons.”131  
Dostoevsky’s problem with Darwinism therefore is not with the theory itself, but 
the implications when considering religion and morality, which shall be 
discussed within the remaining part of this chapter.  
Svidrigailov: The Human Beast 
Within the last section I established the context in which Crime and Punishment 
was written. Having considered the scientific and personal elements that 
contributed to the themes of this novel, I can now focus on the novel itself. In this 
section Dostoevsky’s philosophy on the criminal is discussed with particular 
focus on the character Svidrigailov who embodies the criminal drive through the 
novel as that of wanton hedonism and a disregard for morality. 
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In her critique on the relationship between the law and the individual Colin 
Dayan writes on the metamorphoses of a person into a spirit/animal/object in 
The Law is a White Dog132(2011). She considers in particular Guantanamo Bay 
and the exiling from personhood that occurs, writing: 
In the long history of what I call ‘negative personhood’, I focus on 
slaves, animals, criminals and detainees who are disabled by the law. 
Legal thought relied on a set of fictions that rendered the meaning of 
persons shifting and tentative: whether I” creating slaves as persons 
in law and criminals as dead in law, or in the perpetual re-creation of 
the rightless entity. (xii) 
Dayan discusses the “deprival of personhood” that occurs in the eyes of the law 
to a criminal; the “creation of a species of depersonalised persons.” (32) The 
criminal is placed in a state of liminality where they are a human physically yet 
not socially. There is a special category developed for the criminal, outside of 
regular human society but not entirely excluded; controlled bodily like an object 
rather than a subject, and therefore “othered”. Dayan’s concept of 
“depersonhood” demonstrates how a person can be placed in the abyssal space 
between human and animal through rejection of a conventional social contract. 
Dayan’s theory can be inherently inked to Agamben’s “ Homo Sacer”, who exists 
both inside and outside of bios, or political life. Agamben uses Pompeius Festus’s 
definition to discuss him: “The sacred man is the one whom the people have 
judged on account of a crime. It is not permitted to sacrifice this man, yet he who 
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kills him will not be condemned for homicide…”(47) Similarly to Dayan’s 
depersonalised persons, the “Homo Sacer” is a man when considered an 
organism, but not in terms of his political being, as he is effectively stripped of 
his human rights. This idea of the criminal can also be considered with reference 
to Kristeva’s concept of the abject.  Kristeva’s approach to crime adheres with 
Agamben and Dayan’s theory, as she applies her theory of abjection to crime: 
“…Any crime, because it draws attention to the fragility of the law, is abject, but 
premeditated crime, cunning murder, hypocritical revenge are even more so 
because they heighten the display of such fragility.”(4) The abjection of crime 
that Kristeva discusses must further be applied to the criminal; he or she 
becomes a liminal being, a monstrous ‘it’ found in the gap between human and 
animal. Considering the treatment of Dostoevsky as a criminal before the 
publication of his seminal novels these theories are useful when discussing 
criminality as a transformative process which changes the criminal from human 
to subhuman abyssal resident. Dostoevsky’s exile and death sentence imbues 
him with a unique view of the treatment of the criminal, having inspired him to 
write House of the Dead on the subject, he experienced this process of 
depersonhood himself. It is therefore possible that Dostoevsky had first hand 
experienced the abyss himself prior to writing Crime and Punishment. 
I argue that the criminal is stripped of part of his identity due to a lack of morality, 
or spiritual sense, adhering to Dostoevsky’s opinions of what makes humanity. 
The criminal, in his rejection of morality is deprived of his humanity and 
becomes a form of sub-humanity, demonstrated particularly in the use of the 
name “Svidrigailov”, a character who in his treatment of Dunya and others shows 
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himself to be almost entirely void of moral feeling throughout the novel with only 
occasional moments where his conscious reanimates. The name is used to 
represent the criminal and the subversive within the novel. Svidrigailov becomes 
more than a name to represent an individual character and instead signifies the 
sordid criminal mind, established primarily when Raskolnikov attempts to chase 
a man with nefarious intentions away from a girl who is intoxicated: “Hey you! 
Svidrigailov! What do you want here?” (59) Although the sexual predator is not 
actually Svidrigailov, the use of his name in this context implies an application of 
his identity on all subversive characters within the novel. Raskolnikov, by using 
his name in this manner has taken Svidrigailov’s identity from him and 
manipulated it to become a uniform term to describe all criminals. It is this loss 
of identity that is dehumanizing, and lowers the criminal from a status as an 
individual to an abyssal resident.  
Svidrigailov is a gauge of criminality as he is the character who can most be 
described as ‘evil’, yet he is also the one who, unlike many of the others like 
Raskolnikov and Marmaladov, refers to himself as “human”: “…I am a human 
being, et nihil humanum…in a word, that I am capable of being attracted or falling 
in love…” (336) This declaration of humanity contrasts greatly with the claims of 
animality by Marmalodov, who frequently refers to himself as a “louse” or a 
“swine”: “…But no, I must put it more strongly, more figuratively: not can you, 
but dare you, as you look upon me in this hour, say beyond all shadow of a doubt 
that I am not a swine?” (19). Ironically the most base character is the one who 
claims ownership of humanity, and he does this by referring to the more 
animalistic aspects of humanity; lust. In many senses, Svidrigailov’s greatest 
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crime is a lack of guilt that is maintained through most of the novel. He reasons 
that instead of being a criminal he is merely a sufferer of the human condition: 
“…am I a monster or am I myself a victim?” (336) This claim loses meaning 
considering the crime we learn that he commits; driving a young girl to suicide 
after sexual assault:  
She had a distant relative-a niece, I think it was- living with her; this 
girl was a girl of about fifteen, or possibly even only fourteen, a deaf 
mute… One day the girl was found hanging in the attic. Her death was 
adjudged to be suicide. After the usual legal proceedings the matter 
was dropped, but later on someone made a statement to the police 
that the child had been…brutally raped by Svidraigalov.’ (356) 
It is Svidrigailov’s inability to recognise himself as a wrongdoer that makes him 
so nefarious and therefore the archetypal criminal and abyssal dweller. It is 
frustrating for the reader that Svidrigailov throughout the narrative entirely 
evades the reach of the law and therefore retains his identity as a human within 
society; perhaps this is the reason for his vehement claims of humanity. Yet it is 
the nature of his crimes that makes Svidrigailov stand out as the animalistic 
criminal. In Svidrigailov’s final scene he relinquishes humanity through suicide; 
where the law has not taken his personhood from him, he instead relinquishes it 
himself. Dostoevsky uses Svidrigailov’s suicide to demonstrate that the only 
alternative outcome of criminality to incarceration is self-destruction. The self 
must be relinquished to the social contract, otherwise eradicated altogether. 
Dostoevsky insinuates that this is also the decision Raskolnikov will eventually 
have to make; the choice between suicide and submission to the law. According 
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to R.E.Richardson: “Porfirii Petrovich is the police magistrate who in 
Raskol’nikov’s mind represents the way of confession, punishment, and 
expiation. Porfirii is the path to a return to conservative law and order and 
normal social contact with ordinary humanity.”133 Richardson argues that 
Raskolnikov can either face the effects of the law or be driven to madness and 
consequentially death. Dostoevsky insinuates that it is impossible to live as a 
human without the appropriate moral sense. Humanity cannot function with the 
guilt. Therefore a sacrifice must be made, and Richardson clarifies that 
Raskolnikov can either submit to Porfiry, or transform into a creature 
resembling Svidrigailov. 
Richardson believes that Svidrigailov is a victim of some form of mythmaking; 
although nefarious he argues that his crimes have been extremely exaggerated 
by the members of the rural Russian countryside. He argues that we cannot draw 
a distinction between Raskolnikov and Svidrigalov, claiming that Raskolnikov is 
a hypocrite, equally indulging in his animalistic qualities through his own crime: 
“At any rate he apparently begins at this point to believe the stories and accuses 
Svidrigailov of indulging his sensual appetites and of behaving monstrously. The 
obvious irony here is that Raskol'nikov's appetites are, while purely intellectual, 
even more monstrous. How dare Raskol'nikov accuse anyone of self-indulgence.” 
(547) In many ways, Richardson is right; Raskolnikov admits himself to Sonja 
that his reasons for murdering Lizaveta were purely selfish: 
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I simply killed; I killed for my own sake, for no one but myself, and the 
question of whether I’d become someone’s benefactor or spend all my 
life like a spider, drawing people into my web and sucking the vital 
juices from them, was a matter of complete indifference to me at that 
moment… (500)  
His confession demonstrates that Raskolnikov shares many similarities with 
Svidrigailov in his criminal drives. He is therefore not the Napoleonic 
“ubermensch” that he hoped to be, and is instead a more base, animalistic form 
of humanity. The rejection of moral sense for their more bestial urges places 
them in the abyss that separates man from animal. Raskolnikov also identifies 
with Svidrigailov, demonstrating the unwanted link the characters have: 
“Raskolnikov gave him a gloomy look. “Actually, I think you’re probably very far 
from being a boor,” he said. “I even think that you may be a man of very good 
society, or at any rate you can on occasion behave like a decent human being.” 
(339). Gary Cox, who discusses the relationship of tyrant and victim in 
Dostoevsky’s work, demonstrates how Raskolnikov can be considered an 
example of the Dostoevskian psychopath similar to Svidrigailov:  
The Dostoevskian psychopath begins where the where the dreamer 
does, alienated from the society of men because, in his insecurity 
about his personal identity, he dares not define himself as part of that 
society. Cut off from others, he becomes absorbed completely in his 
own internal reality. Like a philosophical solipsist, who denies the 
reality of the world outside his mind… The dreamer, feeling rejected 
by society, or, more precisely, having rejected himself on behalf of 
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society, responds only passively, but the psychopath character 
responds aggressively!134  
Cox’s assessment of the “Dostoevskian Psychopath” defines Raskolnikov as the 
same kind of creature as Svidrigailov, lending credence to Richardson’s 
argument. Raskolnikov is unable to look past his own mind, and his inability to 
function in society leads him to his immoral actions.  
However, despite this argument I cannot entirely agree with Richardson. 
Svidrigailov, unlike Raskolnikov delights in his monstrosity, joking about how he 
allows himself to follow is base animalistic urges. Raskolnikov uses rationality to 
explain his actions as a morally greater act, interacting with utilitarian ideas. In 
my opinion, this places Raskolnikov in the similar, but more problematic 
category of “superfluous man”, which will be discussed in the next section. And 
despite his principles Raskolnikov feels the effects of his moral transgression 
immediately. Svidrigailov stands for nothing, he allows himself complete 
devotion to his primal instincts: “Reason is, after all, the servant of passion… ” 
(336) He lacks guilt until the end, and his final actions can be arguably conceived 
as immoral considering the Dostoevsky’s Orthodox Christianity. Although he is 
portrayed as a “gentleman” he is the character that is most animal, 
demonstrating how the criminal can be conceived as a liminal creature between 
animal and humanity.  
The concern Raskolnikov has about his criminality and how it affects his 
personhood is described by Svidrigailov: 
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I understand the kind of problems that are currently on your mind: 
they’re moral ones, aren’t they? Problems to do with man as a citizen? 
Oh, put them to one side; why should you bother with them now? Hee 
hee! Because you’re still a man and a citizen? Well, if that’s so, then 
you shouldn’t have poked your nose into all that in the first place; it’s 
no good if you don’t know your own job. Well, you’ll just have to shoot 
yourself; but perhaps you don’t feel inclined to? (578-579) 
Svidrigailov here refers to Raskolnikov’s moral sense. He suggests that by having 
such a sense, he finds himself questioning his place as a man and as a part of 
society. Dayan’s theory of man in society as a criminal is applicable here. 
Raskolnikov is torn by his moral sense. He has not yet been convicted, and 
therefore in the eyes of the law is still a man with all the respective rights, as 
opposed to Agamben’s “Homo Sacer”. However, his actions make him a criminal, 
just one that has not yet been identified by the law. Dostoevsky therefore 
demonstrates that this relationship between humanity and criminality 
transcends the power of the law. He establishes here that humanity lies 
intrinsically within man’s sense of morality. Therefore even if the criminal is not 
caught, as a human he feels the weight of his actions nevertheless, leading him to 
two options; confession or self-destruction. Dostoevsky therefore emphasizes 
that what defines a criminal as human is the inability to live with their actions. 
They are self-motivated to either commit themselves to the mercy of the law, and 
thus lose their civil rights for a brief time. Or they must destroy themselves. 
Considering the concept of the “depersonalised person” Svidrigailov takes on 
some inhuman qualities in the novel, becoming a caricature and a madman. 
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Svidrigailov’s hedonism and lack of humanity is demonstrated in a variety of 
ways, allowing him a more Dionysian presence within the novel. His appearance, 
Raskolnikov notes, is disturbingly unnatural:  
For about a minute he studied Svidrigailov’s face, which even on 
earlier occasions he had always found startling. It was a strange face, 
and almost resembled a mask: white and rubicund, with rubicund, 
scarlet lips, a light-blond beard and blond hair that was still quite 
thick. His eyes were somehow excessively blue, their gaze excessively 
heavy and immobile. There was something terribly unpleasant about 
this handsome and – if years were anything to go by-face. (558) 
He is eerily inhuman in appearance, and with his red lips and extreme youth 
seems vampiric. The “extreme blue” of his eyes is particularly notable, as blue is 
representative of purity and innocence in Russia, which is why Sonja’s eyes are 
also this colour. So although Crime and Punishment is not a supernatural novel, 
there is something superhuman about Svidrigailov. The attribution to the 
supernatural is also notable when he claims to see and converse with Marfa 
Petrovna’s ghost: “Well, she’s been to see my three times now. The first time I 
saw her was on the very day of her funeral, an hour after we’d put her in the 
ground.” (342) The connection Svidrigailov claims to have with the dead is 
double edged. On the one hand his claimed abilities represent a place of 
liminality; the ability to talk to the liminal exemplifies his own boundary crossing 
facets: “Ghosts are, so to speak, shreds and fragments of other worlds, their 
source and origin.” (345) This extenuates the supernatural quality of his 
appearance and makes him more “other”. It also highlights his madness, which 
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Michel Foucault also attributes to animality, an aspect which will be discussed in 
more depth in the next section.135 Additionally he is constantly giving sinister 
looks and speaks in a nefarious way “…consequently I decided you must have a 
great influence on her; that’s not too little by way of explanation is it? Hee-hee-
hee!” (559). Primarily, however, it is the delight he seems to take in his lechery 
that emphasizes his base criminality. These features leave the reader as well as 
Raskolnikov repulsed: “His suspicions of Svidrigailov had been confirmed: he 
saw him as the most empty and worthless villain in all the world.” (563) Despite 
Vladimir Nabokov’s distain for Dostoevsky’s work, I would argue that 
Svidrigailov resembles and perhaps inspired his most villainous character 
Humbert Humbert in Lolita (1955). Nabokov’s paedophilic character is also 
charming and seductive. Both authors use their characters fascination with the 
nymphet to excavate the depths of human depravity, making them quintessential 
creatures of the abyss. 
Ergenia Cherkasova remarks that “Dostoevsky himself never attempted to define 
humanity because he deeply appreciated the immense complexity of a quest to 
comprehend human nature and the human condition.”136 (44) Nevertheless in 
her comparison between Dostoevsky and Kant’s moral ideals, she demonstrates 
how, in agreement with Kant, Dostoevsky believed in a “catagorical imperative”: 
“Like Kant, Dostoevsky wants to believe that no “zero point” exists in ethics and 
that the innate sense of good never disappears without leaving a trace.” (44) 
Cherkasova’s assessment of Dostoevsky’s ethics and affiliation with Kant 
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encourages investigation into the place of the criminal within his theory of 
ethics; a dismissal of this “moral sense” or “sensus moralis” would thus lower the 
status of the criminal’s humanity.  
Cherkasova’s assessment is evident in Dostoevsky’s important distinctions 
between “criminals”. On one end of the spectrum Dostoevsky places Sonja. 
Although she is not considered a criminal lawfully as prostitution was legalised 
at the time in Russia, she is still shunned and rejected from society, proven by 
the treatment of her when Luzhin attempts to frame her for stealing: “Gott der 
Barmherzige! I always knew she was stealing!” (471). Although she is not 
refuting the law, she is still seen socially as a criminal and evicted from society 
to some extent. Yet when confronted with Raskolnikov’s crime she presses him 
to turn himself in. Sonja may be seen as subhuman by society within the novel, 
but because of her sensus moralis Dostoevsky presents her as most human. Sonja, 
therefore, could perhaps represent an alternative reading of the “Homo Sacer”. 
Not officially condemned but socially shunned she signifies the taboo, rejected 
figure from Roman law. Yet she also remains an entirely sympathetic character. 
On the other end of the spectrum, Dostoevsky places Svidrigailov, a man who 
seems to have little sensus moralis if any at all. During the novel Raskolnikov 
moves between these extremes, finally falling to Sonja’s side when he confesses 
and bows to her. As a result both Sonja and Raskolnikov are exiled from Russia 
into Siberia; a temporary rejection from society and symbolic of their residence 
within the abyss. Yet Dostoevsky presents this as a requirement; a chance to 
cleanse and regain their humanity. Svidrigailov’s unholy death instead portrays 
a permanent decent into a very different abyss.  
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Dostoevsky’s other novels from this period similarly deal with the relationship 
between criminality and animal sensuality. In The Idiot (1869)137 the corrupt 
sensualist Rogozhin, similarly to Svidrigailov is driven by his more animalistic 
urges which leads him to the seduction and eventual murder of Nastasya 
Filippovna, an outcome that Myshkin predicts. Myshkin perhaps expects this 
outcome as he observes the animalistic tendencies of Rogozhin. However, 
Rozoghin, like Raskolnikov, is allowed to atone for his actions when he is sent to 
Siberia. However, in The Brothers Karamazov (1880)138 there is a departure from 
this characterization. Dmitri is characterised in a similar way as Svidrigailov and 
Rogozhin; he is sensual and volatile, having suggested previously that he would 
murder his father over his love of Grushenka. However, it is revealed that 
Smerdyakov, who is the illegitimate child of Fyodor Karamazov, is in fact the 
murderer. Although he is merely a servant he is more characteristic of the 
superfluous man as opposed to the sensual criminal. He is inspired by Ivan’s 
rationalism to murder his father. His adherence with atheism allows him to reject 
his moral sense and murder Fyodor. Therefore, although Dostoevsky considers 
the animal urges of humanity to represent criminality, he also considers the 
higher forms such as reason and ideology to result in it also. It is, therefore, the 
abandonment of spirituality and religious feeling that results in criminality. The 
animalistic facet of the human is present in great sensuality and great rationality 
when it usurps moral feeling within the soul of a man. The man is therefore 
robbed of his humanity in one of the two ways discussed; either through the law 
or by his own hand. Dmitri, innocent of the crime yet guilty in the eyes of the law 
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is sent to Siberia; he is exiled temporarily from humanity through this 
banishment. However, because he never did actually commit the murder he is 
rescued and repents, thus regaining the humanity he was temporarily deprived 
of. Smerdyakov, however takes Svidrigailov’s option and commits suicide. N. 
Norman Shneidman asserts that “The suicide of Smerdiakov is for Dostoevski not 
only an artistic necessity, it is also an expression of Dostoevski’s ethics and of his 
understanding of the nature of man.”139 (26) I agree with Shneidnam’s 
assessment; the suicide encapsulates Dostoevsky’s philosophy on the nature of 
man. Accorning to Dostoevsky, a man cannot commit a crime and continue living 
as a validated human; the act is animal, and therefore the punishment must 
therefore involve committment to the abyss. Either the criminal surrenders 
himself to the law, or commits an act of self-destruction. To Dostoevsky, 
humanity is hinged on morality, without it the criminal shares the same rights as 
an animal. This, many would agree, is an extremely harsh assessment. But 
considering his terrible experiences in Siberia that shaped his work, I could 
perhaps suggest that such an uncompromising attitude towards the criminal 
comes from a place of self-loathing created by years of mistreatment. 
Faithful to Dayan’s assessment on humanity in the eyes of the law, the criminal 
must surrender to the law and experience a form of depersonhood to atone for 
their actions. Yet further to this, considering Cherkasova’s analysis of Kantian 
morality within Dostoevsky, the problem with depersonhood and the criminal 
reaches further than this. Myshkin within The Idiot asserts that “Compassion was 
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the chief and perhaps only law of human existence.” (208) Therefore to 
Dostoevsky what makes a human is his sense of morality and his ability to be 
kind towards others. One that lacks this, therefore, is subhuman, and if they do 
not find their humanity through submission to the law they are bound to self-
destruction. 
The Superfluous Man: Humanity Without Purpose 
In the previous section criminality was considered as a form of subhumanity, 
with particular reference to Svidrigailov. I consider a complex character 
archetype unique to Russian literature in this next part; the “superfluous man”; 
a character who simultaneously considers himself the pinnacle of humanity 
whilst also partly exiling himself. Furthermore, I discuss how Raskolnikov can be 
considered the superfluous man and how Dostoevsky uses this archetype to 
explore the boundaries dividing human and animal.  
It is difficult to find an exact definition of the “superfluous man”, as Jahanne M 
Gheith explains: 
It is perhaps even detrimental to attempt a strict definition of this 
motif as it represents a moment, an attitude, a fluctuating mode in 
Russian literature and culture. Superfluous men represented, among 
other things, varying forms of opposition, but the specific contours of 
this opposition shifted with the times and changing political 
developments.140  
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The superfluous man, as Gheith suggests, has been used in a variety of ways by a 
variety of authors. Alexander Pushkin used it to demonstrate the futility of the 
outcast in Evgenii Onegin141, whereas Doctor Zhivago in Boris Pasternak’s 
eponymous novel is celebrated for his superfluity142. Gheith does, however, 
furnish us with a generalised description of the character: “…superfluous men 
share a radical alienation from society and an inability to take personally 
meaningful or socially useful action. These characters also usually demonstrate 
talent or promise that remains eternally potential; finally, central to all 
superfluous-man texts is a romantic relationship and separation.” (230) Ellen 
Chances offers a similar but also differing assessment of the superfluous man as: 
“an ineffectual aristocrat at odds with society…”dreamy, useless”…an 
‘intellectual incapable of action’, and ‘ineffective idealist’, a ‘hero who is sensitive 
to social and ethical problems, but who fails to act, partly because of personal 
weakness, partly because of political and social restrains on his freedom of 
action.”143 (112) Chances, I would argue offers a more negative definition of the 
superfluous man, focusing on his inability to act. The superfluous man therefore 
resembles Hamlet as an intellectual figure whose ability to reason is a hindrance 
more than a help. Similar features can, however, be determined from both 
Chances’ and Geith’s assessments on the superfluous man; he is an intellectual 
outsider who holds many opinions of the world but rarely acts upon them. He 
could be considered the pinnacle of humanity according to materialists, as he 
often appears as the extreme rationalist. However, he is exempt from the social 
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order; according to Rousseau’s concepts attaining to the social contract and 
Russian Orthodox beliefs on community this makes him more animalistic. 
Dostoevsky’s most archetypal superfluous man is the “Underground Man”; the 
unnamed narrator of his novella Notes from the Underground (1864). The 
“Underground Man” is evidentially a superfluous man from the first half of the 
novella, in which no action happens. Instead the narrator explains his internal 
conflicts and thoughts, demonstrating the character to be an intellectual, who 
holds many opinions on the world and yet does not act upon them. This aspect 
of the character is exemplified when he describes how he comforts himself with 
feelings of superiority: 
That was my ruin, for when I was in the mud I comforted myself with 
the thought that at other times I was a hero, and the hero was a cloak 
for the mud: for an ordinary man it was shameful to defile himself, 
but a hero was too lofty to be utterly defiled, and so he might defile 
himself. (39) 
Here Dostoevsky presents the beginnings of the character he extends and 
explores in Crime and Punishment with Raskolnikov. The Underground man 
demonstrates a belief that certain nobler men, or ‘heroes’ cannot be defiled 
because they are greater than common man. The character separates and 
isolates himself from normal men, demonstrated particularly in the description 
of a meeting with his old school friends. The scene is painful to read; it is evident 
that these other characters wish to distance themselves from the Underground 
Man, and with his erratic behaviour it is clear why. The Underground Man 
embarrasses himself and is depicted as a social outcast. The character is 
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contradictory. He sees himself as above the common man, condescending him as 
“stupid, you know, phenomenally stupid”, and yet also “not at all stupid” (19). He 
also defines himself as a creature lower than man: “I want now to tell you, 
gentlemen, whether you care to hear it or not, why I could not even become an 
insect. I tell you solemnly, that I have many times tried to become an insect. But 
I was not equal even to that.” (3). Therefore the superfluous man thinks himself 
higher than man, and yet somehow finds himself beneath him simultaneously. 
The animality of the character is evident, and also inherently links to Raskolnikov 
of Crime and Punishment.  
Dostoevsky’s own perception of the superfluous man archetype is clear; he is 
depicted as a negative insidious character that hurts those around him almost as 
much as he hurts himself. Louis C. Midgley describes Dostoevsky’s view of the 
superfluous man.  
The Russian wanderer, in spite of his original high mindedness, and 
in spite of his lofty idealism, was somehow forced to adopt an extreme 
position from which he frequently was willing to crush the people in 
the name of the people. The wanderer after having first imbibed 
intoxicating Western ideologies at last becomes a demon desiring 
only terror and destruction. (57) 
The terms in which the superfluous man or the “wanderer” as described by 
Midgley are extreme, yet when he describes him as a “demon” it is reminiscent 
of Shelley’s depictions of Frankenstein’s monster. Therefore the characters are 
inherently linked; like the creature the superfluous man is a morally corrupted 
social outcast. Similarly in Raskolnikov’s case also, their twisted philosophies on 
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man drive them to murder. The monster and the superfluous man are both above 
humanity and yet beneath it, the Underground Man’s inability to speak with his 
peers demonstrating equal solitude to that of the creature. Shelley’s creature and 
the superfluous man are therefore in many ways similarly outcast from 
humanity. 
Chances definition could allow the supposition that Raskolnikov cannot be 
counted as a superfluous man because he does take action; he murders Alyona 
and Lizaveta. However, this would be insuffient evidence against Raskolnikov’s 
place in the Russian cannon as the superfluous man. He is ineffectual; as an ex-
student he lives of the money his mother and sister send him, resides in a hovel 
and dresses in rags. From the first chapter it is made clear that he adheres to the 
archetype; the opening section is written in the third person as Raskolnikov’s 
stream of consciousness:  
That’s why I never do anything-because I ramble on to myself like 
that. Or perhaps it’s the other way round; I ramble because I never do 
anything. It’s during this past month that I’ve picked up this habit of 
rambling, lying on my back for whole days and nights on end in my 
room and thinking…about Cloud-cuckoo land. (6) 
In this section Raskolnikov resembles Ivan Gonchorov’s Oblomov (1859), who as 
an archetypal superfluous man remains in bed for a third of the book. He is 
presented as being so lost in his own thoughts that he lives more inside his head 
than in the outside world. Additionally, although it is true that Raskolnikov is 
active in that he commits the murder, he is inactive as to his purpose. Instead of 
using the money he stole for a greater good, he hides it making both the purse 
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and the action superfluous. The reliance on thinking and rationalising is not 
practical; it leads to the creation of inactive men who are of no use to society. 
Considering Rousseau’s conception of humanity within his Discourse on the 
Origin of Inequality, a man who does not fit into human society does not therefore 
elevate himself above animality, thus the rationalism that many materialists 
prized as elevating the human instead meant they became outcast from human 
society, and therefore residents of the abyss. Chances writes that “In Russian 
Orthodoxy, human beings are viewed more as an integral part of a larger 
community rather than as individuals.” (112) A human being must maintain his 
part in society according to Russian Orthodox view. Therefore, whilst the 
criminal is rejected by the law from humanity as Dayan argues, the superfluous 
man, instead leaves human society of his own accord. His idealism leads him to 
the abyss.  
Within Raskolnikov’s theories and similarly to the Underground Man, a figure 
from Nietzsche’s philosophy resides, one that has been spoken of previously and 
regularly drawn upon within this thesis. The “Ubermensch” again finds relevance 
within the protagonist’s ideals, and similarly to Ahab, he also strives for 
superiority over the common man. There is no evidence of Dostoevsky’s 
awareness of Nietzsche’s existence, and it was not until later in the century that 
the latter philosopher began publishing his most important work. However, the 
ideas Nietzsche was to write about especially considering morality were 
prevalent. According to Dirk Robert Johnson in terms of his adherence to 
Evolutionary Theory, Nietzsche ended life with an adversion to Darwinism, 
although much of Darwin’s influence can be found in his work including Thus 
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Spake Zarathustra: “To use a metaphor, I believe that the many branching 
tributaries of Nietzsche's middle period philosophy can best be understood if 
one recognizes that Darwin stands as a mighty river behind them.”144(658) 
Therefore, despite Nietzsche’s concerns over Darwinism, the theories are 
inherently linked and Nietzsche’s ideas. It is Nietzsche’s concept of the 
“ubermensch” that Dostoevsky draws upon; in his paper Raskolnikov suggest 
that there is a certain type of higher man who has the ability to thwart the law 
and moral codes in the quest for greatness. Raskolnikov desires to be a 
revolutionary; a Napoleon. Yet similarly to Ahab in this pursuit of greatness 
Raskolnikov reaches a lower form of being. Raskolnikov acted in accordance to 
Nietzsche’s ideals on morality, and this was supposed to elevate him in humanity 
to the “ubermensch” Instead of scaling the evolutionary ladder, however, 
Raskolnikov experiences a period of animalistic madness. 
Because of his criminal act, Raskolnikov’s inner animal is triggered, and he 
descends into a madness that Michel Foucault inherently attributes to animality 
when considering how insanity is treated from the Renaissance onwards: 
But at the beginning of the Renaissance, the relations with animality 
are reversed; the beast is set free; it escapes the world of legend and 
moral illustration to acquire a fantastic nature of its own. And by an 
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astonishing reversal, it is now the animal that will stalk man, capture 
him, and reveal him to his own truth.145 (66) 
The animal which Foucault refers to that stalks man is his own, and it is his inner 
animal that reveals him to himself, just as Raskolnikov’s inner animal hunts him 
mentally. Foucault’s theories of animality and madness during the Classical 
period highlight the process that Raskolnikov experiences: “Animality has 
escaped domestication by human symbols and values; and it is animality that 
reveals the dark rage, the sterile madness that lie in men’s hearts.” (67) Foucault 
explains the attitude towards madness during the seventeenth and eighteenth 
century: “Madness borrowed its face from the mask of the beast. Those chained 
to the cell walls were no longer men whose minds had wandered, but beasts 
preyed upon by a natural frenzy…” (68). The criminal act, caused by his excess 
use of reason and western ideology ironically strips him of the faculty that led 
him to commit the atrocity. 
His animalistic phase has already started at the beginning of the novel when he 
attempts to quantify the crime he is about to commit: “Could I really ever have 
contemplated such a monstrous act? It shows what filth my heart is capable of, 
though! Yes, that’s what it is; filthy, mean, vile, vile!” (12-13) Raskolnikov is 
aware that the act would be base, but he still commits the crime because he 
wishes to become a superman. Dostoevsky writes Raskolnikov’s thoughts at this 
juncture to create an image of him standing on a precipice. In Raskolnikov’s 
philosophy he believes that to become superior to man one must descend into 
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the abyss so as to emerge the other side. He expects his descent to create more 
of a man of him. In this instance he shows similarities to Frankenstein who also 
attempts the journey across the abyss. However, the products of their extreme 
rationality are very different. Frankenstein creates a monster whilst Raskolnikov 
become the monster himself. Raskolnikov in his plight to become one of the few 
exceptional individuals who can ignore the laws of morality attempts to straddle 
the abyss that separates animal and man. He believes that by compromising his 
morality, he will prove himself greater than the ordinary man. He strives to 
demonstrate that human reason can allow a man to commit a crime without 
consequence:  
Little by little he had arrived at certain diverse and interesting 
conclusions and, in his opinion, the principle cause was to be found 
less in the criminal’s lack of ability to conceal the material evidence of 
his crime than it was in the criminal himself; if he was the criminal 
himself who, in almost every case, became subject at the moment of 
his crime to a kind of failure of will and reason, which were replaced 
by a childish and phenomenal frivolity, and this right at the very 
moment when the things that were needed most of all were reason 
and caution. (87) 
The passage ascertains that Raskolnikov considers criminal activity an exercise 
of human reason, and he is willing to dismiss morality to prove his thesis. His 
philosophy suggests that a madness occurs in the criminal before the crime is 
committed which undermines their reason and therefore their ability to avoid 
punishment. It is therefore only the man who can overcome his conscience who 
Tabitha Kan 203 
 
can commit a crime successfully without arrest. Here Raskolnikov theorizes that 
criminal brain loses its senses: “According to the way he saw it, this eclipse of 
reason and failure of will attacked human beings like an illness, developing 
slowly and reaching their crisis not long before the enactment of the crime.” (87) 
Raskolnikov believes murder to be a philosophical exercise that proves human 
rationality can usurp morality. Furthermore to return to Cherkasova assessment 
of Dostoevsky’s work Raskolnikov desires to demonstrate that the hypothetical 
imperative which is based on logic can transcend Kant’s categorical imperative 
introduced in Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals (1785). The categorical 
imperative states that to be morally correct you must treat a human like an end 
in itself rather than a means to an end; a critique of the utilitarian mode of 
thinking. Kant is proven right, however, and the compromise of Raskolnikov’s 
morality leads to the descent into fervour, as if the disregard for the categorical 
imperative undermined and usurped his humanity. 
The descent into animality begins when Raskolnikov decided to commit the 
crime, demonstrated by Dostoevsky use of bestial language and imagery to 
highlight Raskolnikov’s state of mind before the murder: “He wanted to jeer at 
himself with malicious spite… A slow-witted, animal rage seethed up inside of 
him.” (88) Yet when the murder is committed this process speeds up 
exponentially: “A certainty that everything, even his memory, even the simple 
faculty of reason, was deserting him had begun to torment him unendurably.” 
(111) Dostoevsky does consider reason a primary human faculty, but one that is 
reliant on morality. Once morality has been compromised reason soon follows. 
Accordingly Raskolnikov slips into a state of wild and rabid animality. He begins 
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to question everything in a bout of Cartesian doubt once he realizes that his 
reason has been compromised: “A strange thought suddenly came into his head: 
what if all his clothes were covered in blood, what if there were man stains, only 
he could not see them, could not find out where they were, because his reason 
had grown feeble, broken apart…his mind grown darkened.” (111) The 
animalistic loss of reason is primarily a troubling experience, but Dostoevsky 
also describes a kick of exhilaration due to the adrenalin that Raskolnikov 
experiences when he realizes that he has not been called into the police station 
about the murder. The moment is described in a particularly animalistic way, as 
if he is a fox that has escaped the hunt: 
 An exultant sense of self-preservation, of having escaped from the 
danger that had been crushing him-that was what filled the whole of 
his being at that moment, and it contained no predictions, no analysis, 
no plans or guesses about the future, no doubts and no questions-It 
was a moment of total, spontaneous, pure animal joy. (120) 
He experiences animal urges towards those he meets, and is driven by emotional 
irrational drives as opposed to the reason he prized: “He found all the people he 
met repulsive-their faces, their manner of walking, their movements were 
repulsive to him. He reflected that if anyone had said anything to him he would 
quite simply have spat at that person or bitten him… (135). It is whilst he 
wanders the streets in this animal state that something turns him to Razumitkhin 
for help. Razumitkhin notices this animalistic change in his friend, and takes care 
of the physical ailment that is paired with it: “For we must make a proper human 
being of you.” (156) Whilst he means this in a cheerful and light hearted way, 
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when Razumitkhin speaks to Raskolnikov’s mother and sister his concern is 
palpable, especially considering his lack of moral fibre and feeling: “But 
sometimes it’s not hypochondria at all that he’s suffering from, he’s simply cold 
and unfeeling to the point of inhumanity…” (257) There is something that is 
lacking about Raskolnikov that scares Razumitkhin: 
But the workings of some strange, almost animal cunning suddenly 
prompted him to conceal his strength until the right moment, to lie 
low, pretend to be not yet quite conscious, if need be, while all the 
while listening and pricking up his ears to find out what was going on. 
(148) 
Raskolnikov is aware that his reaction to the murder is irrational and bestial. The 
self-hatred that Raskolnikov feels because he did not manage to prove his thesis 
acurate causes him to condemn himself as a base creature: 
If you really did that with all your wits about you and not like some 
fool in a trance, if you really had a firm and definite goal before you, 
then how is it you still haven’t even looked in the purse to see what 
you’ve got, the prize for which you’ve taken all those torments upon 
yourself and intentionally done such a base, vile, loathsome thing? 
(134) 
His madness, in his opinion proves that he is a mere “louse”, and not a “Napoleon” 
like he had hoped. Yet in his desperation he attempts to reach out to Sonya, who 
he imagines has committed a similar immoral act through her use of prostitution 
to support her family. His reaction demonstrates a hope that together they can 
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live an animal and base life separate from the usual human existence: “You’ve 
done the same thing, after all haven’t you? You’ve also stepped across…found it 
in yourself to step across. You’ve committed moral suicide, you’ve wrecked a 
life…you’re own (it’s all the same!)” (392) Yet Sonya, as will be further explored 
later, maintains her humanity and cannot be compared to Raskolnikov in this 
way; although she acted in what could be considered a morally degenerate way 
she does it for noble reasons, and retains her humanity despite the levels she had 
to sink to. Here Dostoevsky demonstrates the difference between an immoral act 
and an act of desperation.  
Within this section I have demonstrated how Dostoevsky portrayed the criminal 
act as a catalyst for becoming animal, showing how the abandonment of morality 
causes humanity to move closer towards animality. The criminal act is shown to 
be a traversing of the abyss, and the character Raskolnikov is used as a 
demonstration of this.  Dostoevsky also demonstrates how morality is fluid and 
more dependent on the individual and their reasons for subversion. 
Raskolnikov’s act is committed purely for selfish reason; it is an exercise of 
rationality over morality, and for that reason he is humbled to experience his 
own animality. 
Dostoevsky and the ‘Pochvennichestvo’ Principles 
Within this section, I highlight how Dostoevsky’s “pochvennichestvo” principles 
can be discovered within the novel through characterization and how they are 
used to reflect on the human condition. In Madness and Civilization Michel 
Foucault argues that: 
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The animality that rages in madness dispossesses man of what is 
specifically human in him; not in order to deliver him over to other 
powers, but simply to establish him at the zero degree of his own 
nature. For classicism, madness in its ultimate form is man in 
immediate relation to his animality, without other reference, without 
any recourse. (69) 
Foucault outlines how during the Classical period (the seventeenth and 
eighteenth century) madness was automatically associated with animality. As 
madness requires an escape from reason Foucault exemplifies how it was an 
accepted principle that the animal mind is inherently linked with the absence of 
reason. Foucault highlights the popular notion that without reason, there is no 
difference between human and animal. Foucault writes that in the Classical 
period this was believed so adamantly that people who were conceived as mad 
were treated as animals because they were believed to be more resiliant than the 
reasoning human: “It was common knowledge until the end of the eighteenth 
century that the insane could support the miseries of existence indefinitely. 
There was no need to protect them; they had no need to be covered or warmed.” 
(69) This, however, is a view that Dostoevsky does not share, as he demonstrates 
within Crime and Punishment. Within Notes from the Underground Dostoevsky 
develops a metaphor that was consequentially used by religious philosopher V.S. 
Solov’ev.146 Vladimir Wozniuk explains that it was an image which demonstrated 
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the failings of both capitalism and socialism in the emphasis on the importance 
of rationality:  
He would exert considerable effort explaining how this true unity 
differed from the false unity of what Dostoevsky had called the 
‘anthill’, a metaphor that referred to a European civilization 
increasingly based on the principles of materialism justified by 
autonomous human reason in the name of progress ( 622).  
What Solov’ev develops from Dostoevsky’s original idea is an argument that 
contrary to the belief of many philosophers, writers and scientists since Peter 
the Great and the Enlightenment there has been too much emphasis put on man’s 
rationality; a misguided distraction from what Dostoevsky really believes 
separates man from animal, which is spirituality. Dostoevsky explains his 
reasoning in Notes from the Underground: “It may be the law of logic but not the 
law of humanity.” (34) Dostoevsky demonstrates that whilst Western philosophy 
of civilization and materialist principles may adhere to logic, this does not mean 
that it can be applied wholly to humanity, which transcends logic. Dostoevsky 
further argues in the anthill analogy that man loves to create, but does not love 
to achieve; that he enjoys the journey rather than the finished product, unlike the 
sensible ant, who builds to construct a finished product. He reasons that 
economists from both the socialist and capitalist perspectives consider man a 
progressive ant, with greater brain power but driven by the same inherent 
principles. In Dostoevsky’s argument, man is not like the ant: 
With the ant-heap the respectable race of ants began and with the ant-
heap they will probably end, which does the greatest credit to their 
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perseverance and good sense. But man is a frivolous and incongruous 
creature, and perhaps, like a chess player, lovers the process of the 
game, not the end of it. (36)  
Dostoevsky acknowledges here that man is fallible, and therefore more complex 
than the ant. The ant works to produce and then dies. It is an animal of sense and 
logic. We are not. We build the anthill but we question why and are troubled by 
the inevitability of the finished product because we would lack further purpose. 
As previously discussed it is a fundamental belief in philosophy that man is a 
reasoning animal. Dostoevsky inverts this idea and uses it instead as an 
argument for spirituality. The animal is the rational creature, the human is not. 
It is the element of ourselves that transcends reason that makes us human; the 
morality and the spirituality.  In Dostoevsky’s opinion although man should 
embrace his great powers of reason his spirituality must not be denied, as this is 
what separates man from beast.  
Ellen Chances explores this in a wider sense by focusing on Dostoevsky’s 
pochvennichestvo ideology, or the “concept of the soil.” Chances explains how 
Dostoevsky worried that the ‘intelligentsia’ were becoming to separate from the 
“narod”, or the people, and that harmony needed to be struck to solve Russia’s 
problems. It is a belief which links to Dostoevsky’s anthill, and focuses on 
humanity’s loss of spirituality that brings us closer to the animal. Rather than 
being elevated by reason, we are animalized by moral degeneration: “The 
beginning of the human being’s humanity, therefore, is not through the 
appearance of reason. Man has lost a basic spiritual power precisely because of 
the turn towards rationality” (164). In this way Dostoevsky believes that 
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somehow without losing the benefits Russia had gained from Western influence, 
the Russian people had to return to the soil, and become reacquainted with their 
mother country.  
The “pochvennichestvo” principles are most evident through the character 
Sonya, a simple but good young woman: “Sonya has received no education” (22). 
Because of her father’s vices she was forced into prostitution to support her 
impoverished family. Yet though fundamentally morally she has degraded 
herself, Dostoevsky emphasizes that although her body might be corrupted, her 
soul remains untainted: “she’s as meek as a lamb, and has such a gentle little 
voice…” (23). She consequentially becomes the beacon of morality for 
Raskonikov throughout the course of the novel, beginning with his inability to 
fathom why, in such a state of destitution, Sonya hasn’t resorted to suicide: “What 
preserved her? Not lust, surely? It was quite evident that all this turpitude 
affected her only mechanically; not one drop of genuine lust had yet penetrated 
her heart: he could see this; she stood before him exposed in her reality…” (384). 
Raskolnikov shows concern for Sonya; unable to understand why she can 
maintain her purity of spirit he questions it thinking: “Can it really be that this 
creature, who still retains her purity of spirit, will at last be consciously drawn 
into that loathsome stinking pit?” (385) Yet when he asks her what she will do if 
her family are forced to beg after the death of her step mother she simple 
answers: “No…God won’t let it happen.” (381) The effect Dostoevsky creates 
through the medium of Raskolnikov is a sense of wonderment that even though 
this girl has suffered such hardship her faith remains intact. Raskolnikov has 
been corrupted by science and new political ideology, yet Sonya’s purity of spirit 
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and immunity to doubt make her a spiritual role model and an exemplification 
of humanities triumph over the bestial. Raskolnikov is so astonished by Sonya’s 
almost superhuman perseverance that he gets to his knees and attempts to kiss 
her feet: “It wasn’t you I was bowing to, but the whole of human suffering.” (383) 
For Raskolnikov, Sonya is a symbol. She represents humanity, its suffering, but 
also its salvation, which is why in this biblical display of reverence Sonya is 
treated like a Christ figure. She suffers for the sake of others, and demonstrates 
what can potentially make humanity greater than the animal. In this way, she 
serves as an alternative to Nietzsche’s “ubermensch”. She transcends humanity 
and according to Christian principles creeps further towards divinity. 
Yet whether or not God actually exists or not at this point seems inconsequential. 
The focus here is on Sonya’s faith; her undying hope that whatever terrible things 
befall them God will help them struggle through. It is her belief that lends Sonya 
her superhuman resilience that allows her to suffer the trials of life whilst 
retaining her inherent goodness. It is not the actual existence of God, but the 
ability to have faith. Through the character of Sonya, Dostoevsky demonstrates 
how faith is the way to achieve true humanity. 
Sonya experiences a moment of crisis caused by the mercenary Luzhin; a test to 
demonstrate whether she will suffer condemnation for her meekness. Having 
been accused of stealing a one hundred rouble note Sonya is mistreated. Yet it is 
her goodness that protects her, demonstrated by the reputation she has 
garnered from those who know her: 
Why, you don’t know, you don’t know what a heart this girl has, what 
sort of girl this is! She take the money, she? Why, she’d take off her 
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last dress and sell it, go barefoot and give you the money if you needed 
it, that’s the sort of girl she is! She took the yellow card because my 
children were dying of hunger, she sold herself for our sake! (473) 
Although this is spoken by a mad Katerina Ivanovna the character analysis is 
accurate. It is because of Sonya’s faith that she is virtuous, and her goodness 
shields her. Although she has suffered greatly Dostoevsky does not allow her to 
remain tarnished in this way. Her defence is merely her innocence, a contrast to 
Raskolnikov who continues to evade arrest. Dostoevsky allows an element of 
justice into Sonya’s story; the truth is unearthed and Luzhin is thwarted. Yet the 
only weapon Sonya has is her faith; a possible way of Dostoevsky incorporating 
divine justice into his novel. By surviving Luzhin’s accusations Sonya proves that 
to overcome human inadequacies one must be merely faithful and good, and 
deny the animal temptations of corruption. 
It is not coincidental that immediately following this scene Raskolnikov 
confesses to Sonya. Dostoevsky writes this scene as if Sonya momentarily 
infected Raskolnikov with her innocence and he suddenly feels the necessity to 
confess: ‘‘Look, Sonya, all I killed was a louse-a loathsome, useless, harmful 
louse!’ ‘But that louse was a human being.’’ (497) With that final statement Soyna 
undermines the ideas Raskolnikov holds about Darwinism, Utilitarianism and 
the “Ubermensch” that separates humanity into two categories; the base and the 
intellectual superiors. By merely stating that Lizaveta was human Sonya 
undermines the argument that he put forth as a means of explanation: “It was 
something else I needed to find out; it was something else that was forcing my 
hand: what I needed to know, and know quickly, was whether I was a louse, like 
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everyone else, or a man. Whether I could take the step across or whether I 
couldn’t.” (500) Through his theory of superior humanity Raskolnikov 
summarizes potential conclusions that could be drawn from thinkers including 
Darwin, Nietzsche and Malthus. His philosophical stand point represents the 
conclusions many were afraid could be drawn from contemporary materialism, 
driving him to want “to become a Napoleon.” (495). Yet Raskolnikov’s argument 
is proven weak by Sonya’s declaration ‘But that louse was a human being.’ It’s a 
simple statement, and contradictory, but also poignant in its juxtaposition. 
Raskolnikov killed a human being; no matter what metaphysical philosophical 
theory can be applied. What makes Lizaveta a person is emphasized when Sonya 
mentioned how they exchanged crosses, highlighting the spirituality of Lizaveta 
and why she is more than a mere beast:  
Well, here you are, take this one; it’s made of cypress wood. I have 
another one, made of copper, it belonged to Lizaveta. Lizaveta and I 
swapped crucifixes, shegave me hers and I gave her mine, the one 
with the little icon on it. I shall wear Lizaveta’s from now on, and this 
one’s for you. (503-504). 
Dostoevsky stresses that Lizaveta was a believer, and in many ways akin to Sonya 
- humble and pious. They are icons of the “pochvennichestvo”, and by 
accidentally murdering Lizavetta Raskolnikov showed a disregard for the part of 
man that makes him human.  
The “pochvennichestvo” principles are also highlighted in the character 
Razumitkhin. Within Sonya and Raskolnikov’s interchange Sonya functions as 
the corresponding other part to Raskolnikov’s psyche. Thoroughly focused on 
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reason and intellect Raskolnikov is so much the superfluous man that he lacks 
spirituality. When he meets Sonya who is entirely spiritual and moral she makes 
Raskolnikov a whole; she is literally his “other half”. However, Razumitkhin 
represents a character within which the two elements of humanity, mind and 
heart, are harmoniously joined to demonstrate how one can still maintain 
rationality but still be “of the soil”; Dostoevsky uses this character to 
demonstrate that one can still be moral without sacrificing his intelligence. 
Arguably Razumitkhin is the most likeable character in the novel, being both 
academically able, yet also kind. He, like Raskolnikov, is an ex-student who 
during the novel survives from translating essays. Yet when Raskolnikov visits 
him in turmoil he is quick to aid his friend even though he has been neglected by 
him for so long, and is primary in his recovery. His philanthropy is so great that 
Raskolnikov questions the logic behind it: “And what is this desire of yours to do 
good deeds for people who…spit upon them?” (201)  He is also an emotional man, 
falling swiftly in love with Dunya who he aids without expectation throughout 
the novel alongside her mother. He admits to having impure thoughts, and doing 
improper things, although we never find out what they are: “Everyone ought to 
be a decent human being, and a clean one, too, and…and even so (this he 
remembered) in his time he had done some nasty things… not exactly dishonest 
ones, but all the same…And the thoughts he had had!” (253) He rationalizes that 
he is not a perfect human and reflects on his flaws, yet he has high standards for 
humanity morally. He is able to reflect upon his moral digressions, and approach 
them with guilt, yet also understanding. It is his ability to empathise and reflect 
spiritually that characterises him as a truly human character; the difference 
between human and animal. It is through Razumitkhin that Dostoevsky explores 
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the meaning of humanity as a spiritual creature, with heightened abilities to 
reason, yet defined by his morality. He is demonstrated to be imperfect, an 
inherent trait of humanity, but unlike Luzhin he recognises this aspect of himself, 
and reflects on how to improve. Dostoevsky therefore uses Razumitkhin to 
represent a truly human character.  
Conclusion 
It is clear that within Dostoevsky’s seminal works, he writes to preserve religious 
authority and the meaning of spiritual discourse. When considering his approach 
to spirituality and science within The Brothers Karamazov, Kaladiouk 
summarises previous readings of the novel: “In this conflict, as the argument 
goes, Dostoevsky firmly comes out on the side of faith and gives his sympathies 
to those of his characters who possess it.” (417) It is clear, that Dostoevsky falls 
on the side of religion when the two concepts are pitted against each other, and 
this is noticeable within Crime and Punishment. Dostoevsky writes with the 
distinct purpose to preserve religious meaning, by drawing on the moral 
obligations of humanity. He relies on religion for moral purpose, and it is this 
morality that he uses to separate man from beast. His creatures of the abyss 
including Raskolvikov and Svidrigailov are demonstrated to be less than human 
because of their moral transgressions. The only escape is repentance; an 
acceptance of guilt. Raskolnikov, by admitting his guilt, and allowing the 
influence of Sonja’s spiritualism, is banished from the human race only 
temporarily. Svidrigailov, however, is unable to truly repent, and he is thus 
abjected forever.  
Tabitha Kan 216 
 
However, as Ladislav Kovac explains recent scientific research into genetics 
suggest the belief of God is an evolutionary fact in itself. Kovac highlights 
“Dostoevsky’s views on the human soul might be closer to those of Alfred Russell 
Wallace, who believed that an unknown force directed evolution towards an 
advanced organization.” (815). Kovac insinuates that Dostoevsky’s beliefs, in 
fact, adhered to other evolutionary theorists who were more resistant to atheist 
ideologies. Although the soul is a matter of belief, there is scientific evidence that 
evolution has allowed us to develop a “god gene”, which would function in an 
evolutionary context proven by the various ways that the church and religion has 
benefitted social organization and progress over the years. Kovac reiterates 
Dostoevsky’s view saying: “In addition, “the mystery of the human being does not 
only rest in the desire to live, but in the problem: for what purpose should one 
live at all?” We might say that these faculties make Homo Sapians a religious 
species.” (815) Kovac argues that the main function of religion is to give 
humanity something to strive for, and thus aiding evolution itself. Indeed, Kovac 
further argues for scientific evidence of a “god module” in the brain: “These areas 
represent a new stratum of evolutionary complexity, an emergence specific to 
the human species.” (815). Richard Dawkin’s explores a similar idea in his 
seminal book The Selfish Gene (1976), which discloses the concept of selflessness 
as an evolutionary aspect, an adaptation that aids preservation.147 Therefore, 
perhaps evolution begets morality, as it begets religion. It is therefore possible, 
by considering these theories, that Dostoevsky’s religious ideology is driven and 
created by evolution. If humanity developed an inherent necessity to believe in a 
                                                          
147 Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene, London: Oxford University Press, 1976 
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divine presence, Dostoevsky is therefore a victim of the evolutionary process. 
Perhaps, in this case, what separates human from animal is our belief in an 
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“They may once have been animals. But never before did I see an animal 
trying to think” Evolution, Regression, and Mutable Humanity in The 
Island of Doctor Moreau 
After considering Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein (1818), H.G. Wells’s The Island of 
Doctor Moreau (1896) represents a return to many underlying concepts. Both 
are defining works of science fiction, written by authors deemed progenitors of 
the genre.  Both apply a framed narrative to relay the story of a man found at sea 
through the account of an objective outsider. Both stories contain gifted 
overreaching scientist whose Promethean arrogance eventually causes their 
downfall. Finally, both approach the theme of playing God and creating a new 
species of man. Steven Lehman emphasises the unnatural desire of Moreau and 
Frankenstein to stray into the territory of womanhood to create life:  
The theme was reworked in one more very effective version before 
the end of the 19th century. H.G. Wells's The Island of Doctor Moreau 
inspired the same outrage upon publication as had Frankenstein, and 
for very similar reasons. Both depict the takeover of natural female 
function by crazed male science.148 
 Lehman’s argument draws upon the Promethean elements of both scientists and 
the consequences of tampering with the principles of human life. The result is 
monstrous in both cases, and farcical in Moreau’s. Roger Bozzatto summarises 
the relationship between the two books in his discussion on tragi-farcical 
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elements of the later novel: “Like Dr Frankenstein, Moreau plays sorcerer's 
apprentice.”149 (37) Bozzatto’s allusion to the sorcerer’s apprentice refers to 
super human abilities paired with the weakness of human judgement, a classic 
image for the Promethean scientist who features eponymously within both 
novels.  
Yet Wells possesses very different insight to Shelley; within the seventy-eight 
years dividing the publication of both novels the scientific field had changed 
dramatically. The earth had been confirmed within the scientific community as 
much older than previously considered, and man’s place within “natural 
selection” was generally accepted. Although Wells was inspired by Shelley’s 
novella, he was informed by a greater wealth of knowledge. The archetype was 
not only used by Wells; for example, Robert Louis Stevenson also reimagined the 
Promethean scientist in The Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde. In his novella, 
Stevenson portrays how a respected scientist attempts to separate his animal 
self with the intellectual, causing a descent into abyssal animality eventually 
instigating his death.  Both Stevenson and Wells used aspects of Frankenstein’s 
tragedy to reimagine the story of the overreaching scientist in the drastically 
changed world of the late nineteenth century.  
Wells uses Shelley’s pessimistic concerns about the implications of human 
evolution, yet strays from her romantic vision favouring the outcome of the 
“struggle for existence”. Anne Stiles, who discusses the significance of the “mad 
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scientist” in Wells’s work, asserts that the similarities to Shelley were purposeful, 
and emphasises that previous drafts of the novel contained subtle references to 
the older work, which were removed in the published version150. Despite this 
removal, Wells endeavoured to situate his work within the genre and align 
himself with other science fiction authors, as Stiles continues: “The first draft of 
Moreau, with its deleted references to Frankenstein and its structural 
resemblance to Jekyll and Hyde, suggests that Wells self-consciously situated his 
novella within this emergent tradition of mad scientist fiction.” (323) Primarily, 
Stiles argues that Wells provides disturbing caricatures of the scientists of the 
age, like Galton and Haeckel, yet Wells himself was an emphatic, self-confirmed 
Darwinist. Further to Stiles’s arguments, Faye J Ringel emphasises the 
importance of interspecies amalgamations within The Island of Doctor Moreau: 
“Unlike Frankenstein, who reanimated dead matter, these mad scientists 
concentrate on hybridizing life, blurring and crossing the boundaries between 
animal and human, in the process exalting the animal and dehumanizing the 
human being.”151(64) Ringel identifies an important departure for Wells from 
comparisons with Shelley’s novella; she highlights that Wells further blurred the 
boundaries between animal and human through hybridization. In this final 
chapter, I shall discuss how Wells’s acceptance of Darwinism affected his attitude 
towards the separation of animal and human, and how his scientific background 
led to the creation of fresh reimaginings of the abyss. 
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151 Faye J. Ringel, ‘Genetic Experimentation: Mad Scientists and The Beast’, Journal of the 
Fantastic in the Arts, 2:1 (5) (Spring 1989), pp. 64-75 Subsequent page references in text. 
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Roger Bozzetto asserts that “this text occupies a distinct place in the Wellsian 
oeuvre by reason of the way that it "reflect[s] upon" the human scene.” (34) It is 
written, as Bozzetto notes with a conscientiously pessimistic approach to the 
human condition, reflecting the evolutionary origins that interested Wells. 
Therefore, it is an ideal novella to discuss concerning literary contents of the 
abyss.  Within this chapter, The Island of Doctor Moreau is considered primarily, 
although I also be making frequent and extensive references to Wells’s earlier 
novel The Time Machine (1895)152. The latter novella written at a similar time 
deals with many parallel and relevant themes, and can be used to enhance the 
reading of The Island of Doctor Moreau.  The argument is split into five parts; the 
first, as with the other chapters, is focused on context. The contextual section is 
particularly concerned with Wells’s scientific education under Huxley, and how 
this affected his interaction with scientists of the era who were furthering 
Darwinian theory for controversial social endeavours, like Ernst Haeckel and 
Francis Galton. Following the context section, the novel becomes the central 
focus; the first part of this argument considers the abyss as a metaphorical device 
used to explore the space between animal and human in The Island of Doctor 
Moreau and The Time Machine. Following this I discuss Wells’s use of the animal 
voice in defiance of the theory that language is a symptom of the separation 
between human and animal. The next aspect discussed is Wells’s concept of 
humanity in flux, defying the conceived rigid difference between human and 
animal. This argument is developed into a conversation of de-evolution; a 
pessimistic concept that conceived a regression into animality as opposed to a 
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steady progression to the Ubermensch; particularly relevant considering the 
implications of Darwin’s branch of evolution which describes a more 
randomised progression of characteristics rather than a steady and logical 
development to a superior species. These elements have been chosen for 
discussion specifically because they are aspects actively targeted by Wells to 
conceive the difference between animal and man, which he believed to be 
mutable. The conclusion will consider how Wells is able to justify his moral 
values within his adherence to Darwinian theory. 
A Darwinian Zealot: Huxley’s Influence over Wells 
Of the authors studied in this thesis, Wells is by far the most positive on the 
subject of evolution. Wells was so impressed by Darwinian theory that, as Brian 
Stableford asserts: 
Wells adopted the Darwinian faith with the fervour of a religious 
convert, and it permeated everything that he wrote. Wells took up the 
task that had been left frustratingly undone, and began to work out 
the logical consequences of Darwinian theory in a series of literary 
thought-experiments. His stories carried great conviction, and were 
constructed with an imaginative power that was hitherto 
unparalleled 153 
Stableford argues that, in the manner of a scientific trial, Wells used his 
knowledge of science to complete a literary thought experiment with his 
writings. In this manner, his writing shows similarities to Dostoevsky’s work; 
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both authors use the medium of literature to engage in a form of hypothetical 
thought experiment. Wells begins his novels with a hypothesis and follows it to 
its logical conclusion imaginatively. His approach to literature is evident in some 
of his titles, for example his autobiographical short story “A Slip Under the 
Microscope”154 or his actual autobiography, Experiment in Autobiography (1934) 
155. Adhering to Stableford’s argument, not only does Wells react to science, but 
he applies scientific methodology to his writing, demonstrating a form of literary 
hypothetical science. Within his early works he explores potential outcomes of 
Natural Selection and uses this to create his science fiction. Within her focus on 
the mad scientist, Stiles agrees with Stableford’s assessment, as she comments 
on his active use of biology within his novels and short stories: “Wells absorbed 
Huxley's pessimistic take on late Victorian evolutionary theory, particularly his 
emphasis on the inherent brutality of natural selection.” (319) Wells uses the 
consequences of evolutionary theory to scientifically evaluate man’s relationship 
with animal as a consequence of evolution, yet he chooses fiction to explore this 
relationship. 
Wells was brought up in a culture of Darwinism, at a time when it was widely 
discussed and accepted. However, it was not until he began university that he 
became particularly knowledgeable pertaining to the theory, as Michael R. Page 
notes in his discussion on the effect of evolution on the literary imagination: 
In 1884, the eighteen-year old Wells attended Huxley’s lecture course 
on biology and that course was to change his life. Huxley’s lectures on 
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evolution were a revelation to the young student and it was the 
Huxleyan vision of the cosmos and humanity’s place in it that was to 
drive his imagination during the period of the scientific romances and 
beyond.156 
Wells was emphatic about the effect that Darwinism had on him, and was 
particularly impressed by Huxley, who he studied under at the Royal College of 
Science, describing him in Experiment in Autobiography as: “the acutest observer, 
the ablest generalizer, the great teacher, the most lucid and valiant of 
controversialists.”(199) The theory was well established, but “the fact of 
evolution as such was still not universally conceded,” (200), and there were 
many finer details that Wells cites which left the field open still to gross 
generalizations. Yet despite that, or maybe because of that, Wells describes his 
year with Huxley as: “the most educational year of my life.” (201) Peter Kemp, in 
H.G. Wells and the Culminating Ape (1982) examines the particular affect that 
Huxley had on the young Wells: “This veteran campaigner for evolutionary 
theory and scientific education influenced his student in two ways. His career 
showed Wells what could be achieved, despite a disadvantaged background, by 
conviction and pugnacity. His course in biology…mapped out what Wells would 
try to establish and convey throughout a prolific writing-life.”157 He mentions 
how Darwin himself used to appear at some of Huxley’s lecture through the 
curtains at the back of the lecture theatre. However, as Wells attended these a 
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year after Darwin’s death he missed the opportunity to see him. This must have 
disappointed Wells as he describes how “These two were very great men. They 
thought boldly, carefully and simply, they spoke and wrote fearlessly and plainly, 
they lived modestly and decently; they were mighty intellectual liberators.”(202)  
Wells depicted these two scientists as almost legendary figures, writing that: 
“They put the fact of organic evolution upon an impregnable base of proof and 
demonstration so that even the Roman Catholic controversialists at last ceased 
to vociferate, after the fashion of Bishop Wilberforce…” (203) The admiration 
Wells felt for the fathers of evolution transcended respect, and they both appear 
as inspirations for his early novellas. For example he shares the experience of 
being taught by Huxley with his protagonist Prendick in The Island of Doctor 
Moreau. Wells perhaps uses Prendick’s character as a lens through which to 
dissect the theories he learnt at university. Whilst Wells undertook an 
imaginative exploration of the concepts of evolution, Prendick embarked on a 
physical exploration of Moreau’s Island. 
John Glendening argues that despite Wells fascination and acceptance of 
Darwinian Theory, he did not entertain optimistic opinions on the consequences 
of the theory. Despite his fierce approval of Darwin and Huxley, he was not 
confident on the future it, as Glendening writes: 
The Island of Doctor Moreau picks up on the negative implications of 
natural selection that the entangled bank disguises. In Wells's text 
entanglement means disorder, not order or harmony: it entails the 
commingling of objects, processes, and qualities that strike the 
human mind as incompatible or antagonistic in Wells's text 
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entanglement means disorder, not order or harmony: it entails the 
commingling of objects, processes, and qualities that strike the 
human mind as incompatible or antagonistic because they upset 
boundaries and categories; and it points to the limits of knowledge, 
since the mind, caught in the very processes it tries to understand, is 
continually confounded by contingencies, like those governing the 
course of Darwinian evolution, too complex to be anticipated or fully 
comprehended. 158  
Wells coined his own readings of theories of evolution, which he relayed in many 
of his works of nonfiction. Patrick A McCarthy observes Wells’s use of Huxley’s 
work: “Wells adapted Huxley's ideas to his own purposes in such essays as 
"Human Evolution, an Artificial Process" (1896) and "Morals and Civilisation" 
(1897), as well as in The Time Machine, The Island of Dr. Moreau, and The War of 
the Worlds.”159 In his paper “Man Becomes a Different Animal”160 Wells refers to 
the illusion of human fixity, and claims that at the times he was writing, human 
life was changing more than it ever had before: 
Perhaps never in the whole history of life before the present time, has 
there been a living species subjected to so fiercely urgent, many-
sided, and comprehensive a process of change as ours to-day. None at 
least that has survived. Transformation or extinction have been 
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nature’s invariable alternatives. Ours is a species in an intense phase 
of transition. (3) 
He refers to evolution currently occurring at the time he was writing as a 
“biological revolution.”(5) When Wells speaks of humans, he is very clear that he 
thinks we are animals, referring to humans in a scientifically as another category 
of animal: “Very few of us realize the enormous distortions that are now going 
on in the life cycle of the human animal.”(5) When discussing the sexual drive of 
his generation he describes: “man was almost as sexual as a cat with its ever 
recurring kittens.”(7) His terminology is biological, scientific, the same kind of 
descriptions including that of a “life cycle” that would be used to discuss any 
other creature, yet he also uses metaphor alikening us to other animals. This 
suggests that Wells’s opinion of the abyss would be opposed to that of Heidegger, 
who ascertains a great difference between man and animal, describing man as 
“world forming”, and animals as “poor in world.”161 He instead more closely 
aligns with Derrida’s conception of the abyss, admitting a difference between 
humanity and other animals, whilst also acknowledging the human as an animal. 
Furthermore, Wells adheres to Derridean thought by cohering to a mutable 
difference between human and animal; a boundary in flux, with little sustainable 
fixity. It is through Derrida’s philosophical lens that we can especially 
understand Wells’s attitude towards human animality. 
However, despite this adherence to the concept of fluid humanity, Wells also sees 
the potential for humanity to move beyond traditional values, writing that “Man 
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was a family animal. Now this is no longer the case. Now family life becomes 
merely a phase in an ampler experience. Human life escapes beyond it.” (7) Here 
Wells mentions hope for humanity to move in an upward trajectory of 
development. Within “A Human Adventure”, as part of An Englishman Looks at 
the World, Wells writes of man: 
 Alone among all the living things this globe has borne, man reckons 
with destiny. All other living things obey the forces that created them; 
and when the mood of the power changes, submit themselves 
passively to extinction Man only looks upon those forces in the face, 
anticipates the exhaustion of Nature's kindliness, seeks weapons to 
defend himself.162  
He further includes an argument with a classically Cartesian element pertaining 
to human reason: “All this has come as a necessary consequence of the first 
obscure gleaming of deliberate thought and reason through the veil of his animal 
being.” (5) In this passage, Wells seems to defy his philosophy of man’s animal 
truth.  Despite his opinion of humanity in flux, he does not wholly seem able to 
separate himself from the concept of the abyss that separates human from 
animal. Freud’s theory on humanity’s need to separate itself from other animals 
may be pertinent here-perhaps Wells is unable to conceive himself as wholly 
animal, so slips into Cartesian discourse. However, it is more likely that he writes 
to promote the potential of education and science, which identifies more with his 
socio-political beliefs. Despite the pessimistic outlook of The Time Machine, this 
later writing demonstrates Wells’s socialist hope that man can move past his 
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trappings: “He has changed these cardinal points in his biological process in the 
last hundred years almost unawares. So far he is already a different sort of animal 
from his ancestors, or, indeed, from any species of vertebrated creature that has 
ever lived upon earth.” (8) These beliefs, in man’s ability to progress are, 
however, entirely based on a faith in education inherently linked to his socialist 
political stance, rather than a belief in progressive evolution. Despite full 
acceptance and interest in evolutionary theory, this was not where Wells’s hopes 
for humanities future lay. 
Beginning with this fascination with evolutionary theory, as Richard Pearson 
writes, Wells became part of a movement which engaged with this focus: 
In the mid- to late 1890s, as part of a group of writers and thinkers 
that included Grant Allen, Edward Clodd, and George Gissing, and 
through correspondence with the emerging novelist Joseph Conrad, 
Wells found himself drawn into debates that embraced new thinking 
around the origins of man, prehistory, primitivism and savagery, 
ritual and cultural survivals, and the new evolution of man, which 
itself established a scientific opposition to the Church.163  
During the time in which Wells was writing evolutionary theory was affecting 
anthropology on a wide scale. Darwin by this time had published his Descent of 
Man (1871), and the link between human and animal were well known and 
accepted throughout the scientific community, made clear when he writes: 
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We must, however, acknowledge, as it seems to me, that man with all 
his noble qualities, with sympathy which feels for the most debased, 
with benevolence which extends not only to other men but to the 
humblest living creature, with his god-like intellect which has 
penetrated into the movements and constitution of the solar system-
with all these exalted powers-Man still bears in his bodily frame the 
indelible stamp of his lowly origin. 164 
Whereas Darwin avoided discussing “social Darwinism”, and any particular 
moral implications of his theory, other scientist followed the rational of his 
theory to more sinister conclusions. A primary example of this is Francis Galton, 
who is considered the father of eugenics. Galton and Darwin had a close familial 
bond, yet whereas Darwin was a cautious thinker, Galton was more of a 
maverick. Edward Larson explains Galton’s theory: 
 As a Darwinist, he believed that humanity had risen to its present 
level through an evolutionary process driven by the natural selection 
of persons with beneficial inborn traits. Galton’s scheme involved 
identifying the traits that advance humanity and then artificially 
selecting persons with them to dominate in reproducing the next 
generation. 
Galton’s viewed eugenics as a logical way to progress the human race, and 
considered peoples moral concerns irrational, writing in “Inquiries into Human 
Faculty’ (1883): ‘There exists a sentiment, for the most part quite unreasonable, 
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against the gradual extinction of an inferior race…”165 According to current 
standards this statement is racist and absurd. Yet considering the mind-set of the 
typical Victorian combined with the lack of taboo caused by the atrocities of the 
Holocaust, it was not quite as outlandish as it seems in today’s society. As he 
further explains: “what Nature does blindly, slowly and ruthlessly, man may do 
providently, quickly, and kindly.”166 This was not a position that Darwin 
disagreed with, writing in The Descent of Man: 
At the present day civilised nations are everywhere supplanting 
barbarous nations, excepting where the climate opposes a deadly 
barrier; and they succeed mainly, though not exclusively, through 
their arts, which are the products of the intellect. It is, therefore, 
highly probable that with mankind the intellectual faculties have 
been mainly and gradually perfected through natural selection; and 
this conclusion is sufficient for our purpose. (153-154) 
What Galton proposed was a kind of “positive” eugenics, which supported the 
encouragement of men and women with what was considered “superior” 
heredity fitness to marry, thus encouraging the development of humanity. When 
considering later works of science fiction, like George Orwell’s 1984(1948)167, 
the radical dystopian consequences of this philosophy are disturbing, and a 
modern day supporter of Darwinian theory may understand why there was so 
much fear over the implications of evolution. Wells describes how “The 
mechanism of evolution remained therefore a field for almost irresponsible 
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speculation.” (200)  When considering the “irresponsisible speculation”, he 
could have been considering the studies of scientists like Galton. Treating 
humanity as another species of animal rather than a separate entity necessitated 
a reengagement with moral principles assumed by humanities individuality and 
Biblical teachings on ethics.  
Although Galton’s version of eugenics is extreme, it was not as dangerous as that 
of his German counterpart Ernest Haeckel, a friend of Darwin’s and champion of 
“recapitulation” theory. Haeckel, in his History of Creation (1968) writes: 
“Passion and selfishness, conscious or unconscious, is everywhere the motive 
force of life…Man in this respect is no exception to the rest of the animal 
world.”168 According to Richard Weikart, Haeckel: “condoned the extermination 
of ‘primitive’ races which were losing the struggle for existence.”169 Haeckel’s 
statement demonstrates the animal aspect of humanity, and also the amoral 
implications linked with it. Wells perhaps used his separated human species, the 
Eloi and the Morlocks, to demonstrate how eugenics would affect society long 
term. Through the features of the Eloi and the Morlocks, he demonstrates the 
possible negative effects of classism, in consideration of Galton’s avocation of 
breeding between people 
This is possibly, as Ann Stiles discusses, one of the reason why Wells 
incorporated focus on the mad scientist within his literature, partially in a 
deferential way, in remembrance of the brilliant Huxley, but also in a cautionary 
way whilst considering Galton and Haeckel: 
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Wells's malevolent mad scientists and extra-terrestrials owe an 
intellectual debt not only to Huxley, but also to discussions of genius 
and insanity in late- Victorian issues of Mind (1876-present).4 The 
now-familiar trope of the mad scientist in fact traces its roots to the 
clinical association between genius and insanity that developed in the 
mid-nineteenth century. Authors like Scottish journalist and 
materialist philosopher John Ferguson Nisbet, English eugenicist 
Francis Galton, and Austrian Jewish physician Max Nordau - all of 
whose works were reviewed in Mind - argued that mankind had 
evolved larger brains at the expense of muscular strength, 
reproductive capacity, and moral sensibility.(319) 
According to Richard Hofstadter in Social Darwinism and American Thought 
(1944) Darwinian concepts of the struggle for existence were used to justify a 
competitive and brutal political ideology.170 Social Darwinism was the initial 
trigger for the Totalitarian ideology of the Nazi’s, leading to the atrocities of the 
Holocaust. Agamben’s theory of the anthropological machine describes the 
effects of treating humans as animals; the Jews, along with the other groups 
vilified by the Nazi’s were perceived socially as animals; they were expelled into 
the abyss and therefore deprived of human rights. These atrocities occurred 
within Wells’s lifetime, but years after the publication of his most seminal works, 
and within his life he remained fervently opposed to fascism.  
Applications of Darwinism in other spheres of study were not, however, entirely 
harmful. Huxley, for example, was keen to preserve moral integrity within his 
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perception of evolution, writing in "The Struggle for Existence in Human 
Society"(1888) that the civilised man: “devotes his best energies to the object of 
setting limits to the struggle.”171 He differentiates the “civilised” human from the 
animal through the moral faculty, in a way reminiscent of Dostoevsky’s approach 
to the abyss, though without the focus on religion. Furthermore, he argues that 
the individualism of the age is “a misapplication of the stoical injunction to follow 
nature” (82). McCarthy argues that: “One of the impulses behind Huxley's 
Romanes Lecture was the attempt to demonstrate that while man was 
biologically related to the other animals, human society required an ethical sense 
that has no counterpart in animal society.” (46) Therefore, according to Huxley, 
the difference between animal and man is one developed by evolution in a 
society which allows humanity to transcend “survival of the fittest”.  Huxley’s 
particular attitude towards evolution found practical applications in society, for 
example, with William Booth’s foundation the Salvation Army, which Laura Otis 
describes: “In the formulaic tales of Salvation Army founder William Booth, 
degraded workers recovered their humanity when they were dragged back 
across a boundary between animal and human.”172 Huxley was scathing of 
Booths application of the theory. However, by focusing charity on the physical 
needs of the poor, Booth demonstrates a realisation of the corporeal, animal 
needs of lives, believing that by healing the body the soul may thrive.  
Wells, according to John S. Partington, followed Huxley’s particular form of 
ethical evolution: “Wells followed Huxley’s lead during the late Victorian and 
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Edwardian period, devising social policy based on the “minimum standard.”173 
Furthermore, as Kemp argues: “he came to believe that science was-as he 
affirmed in his college’s old school bulletin-‘the light and redemption of the 
world.”(1) Despite this, according to Partington, although Wells was ahead of his 
time in ethical matters involving race, class and gender, he did conceive of a place 
for eugenics, albeit a version that contrasted with that of Galton: “However, Wells 
did not reject eugenics outright but considered it of possible use in improving 
the survival chance of the human species and preventing the occurrence of 
unwanted births.”(74) Wells considered eugenics a possible solution not only for 
the species but also in consideration of living conditions for the poor, a matter 
that actively engaged him. His advocacy, as Partington writes, was more focused 
on his “social policy concerns such as improved housing, better education and 
universal healthcare.” (74) Theoretically, Wells may have believed that negative 
eugenics was possible, for benevolent reasons as well as evolutionary ones. Yet 
he maintained that it was not possible in practice at the time he was writing. 
Instead, he spent the latter part of his life advocating educational reform, a 
measure he though would be more effective in promoting the success of 
humanity as a species. Furthermore, Martin Danahay cites Wells’s writings of the 
1890’s as evidence that Wells contradicted Galton’s eugenic theories: “Wells's 
writings of the 1890s mount a critique of the use of the breeding of animals as a 
model for this deliberate manipulation of the human population”174. Works like 
War of the Worlds (1897) demonstrate the effects of a superior race dominating 
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what they believe to be an inferior race. His conflicting beliefs in human rights 
and the potential of eugenics led him to write his Rights of Man in 1939, initially 
as a letter in a newspaper but later as pamphlets and chapters in written works. 
175 From this, his moral sense and political ideas conflicted with many of the 
possibilities that evolution suggested for the advancement of the race. As 
Partington continues: “He considered negative eugenics as an enquiring biologist 
was perhaps bound to do, only to ultimately (though after many years of 
considering its value) dismiss it as a breach of human rights.” (79) He later wrote 
in his doctoral thesis “Galton had the mental disposition of a Fascist and was all 
for fuehrers and duces.” (79) The struggle that Wells had, however, with the 
theory demonstrates how through fluctuating concepts of the human/animal 
divide through the world of science and politics into a moral confusion over 
human rights. Wells held a particularly astute view of eugenics at the end of his 
life, having experienced it both in theory and as a historical event, and though he 
adhered to Huxley’s concepts of ethical evolution, it was difficult for him to 
differentiate what was moral. In hindsight he was able to condemn the theory, 
yet it was only after application by the Nazi’s that he come to realize the moral 
implications. Although he considered man an animal, he believed that humanity 
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Wells’s Abyssal Space 
Now that I have considered the context of the novel I shall move on to discuss 
the contents.  Out of all the novels examined so far Wells’s work is the most self-
evidently Darwinian. One particular element of Wells’s writing that can be 
noticed with regards to this argument is his use of the abyssal space to explore 
his extrapolations of Darwin’s theories. Despite no intentional relation to the 
abyss as a philosophical concept, Wells’s writing perhaps demonstrates the 
symbolic importance of the abyss within humanist thought.  
In both The Island of Doctor Moreau and The Time Machine Wells actively creates 
an abyssal space for the protagonist. In The Island of Doctor Moreau Prendick 
becomes lost in the Pacific Ocean for eleven months, a deliberate tactic to 
alienate his protagonist from human society. The ocean is symbolic of a primeval 
space, believed by both Charles and Erasmus Darwin to be the birthplace of life. 
It is therefore fitting that the abyssal space resembles the place where life and 
humanity originated from. It is not coincidental therefore that three of the four 
novels explored in this study have used the ocean as the setting for their 
narratives. When describing his uncle’s disappearance the narrator declares that 
“….my uncle passed out of human knowledge about latitude 5°S. and longitude 
105°W., and reappeared in the same part of the ocean after a space of eleven 
months.” (6) The evocative part of this section is the use of the concept “human 
knowledge”; the statement has multiple meanings, the first basic connotation is 
that humanity lost all knowledge of him. The second reading is more significant; 
he passed out of human knowledge, meaning that he was separated from human 
knowledge himself. He was in a space absent of humanity. In Freudian 
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psychoanalysis this could mean that he moves from a world dominated by ego to 
the realm of the id. As the truth of Prendick’s story is questioned, there is a 
definite hint of madness, or a separation from reason.  In philosophy, however, 
it means the movement into a more animalistic state. He is drawn unwillingly 
into the abyss literally just as Raskolnikov was psychologically. 
Abyssal spaces serve as important motifs within a variety of literary visions, 
representing a descent into chaos and a transformation of state. John Milton’s 
Paradise Lost (1667) provides an example of the abyssal space, as Satan must 
traverse the abyss to reach Earth:  
Chance Governs all. Into this wild abyss, 
The womb of Nature, and perhaps her grave, 
Of neither sea, nor shore, nor air, nor fire, 
But all these in their pregnant causes mixed 
Confus’dly, and which thus must ever fight.176 
Satan, the Promethean character who challenges God, traverses the abyss to 
tempt Eve to eat from the Tree of Knowledge. Considering the links between 
humanity, rebellion against God, and knowledge, Satan’s journey resembles that 
of Moreau, who defies law and morality to create his own images of humanity. 
The abyssal space is used to represent a perversion of boundaries. As Satan 
transgresses the boundary separating Hell from Earth, Moreau perverts the 
boundary of animal and human.  The concept of literary abyssal spaces can be 
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particularly noted in much eighteenth and nineteenth century adventure fiction, 
which is often focused on the island as a limited space outside European societal 
control, and thus a microcosmic landscape for humanity to be pushed to its 
limitations. Wells draws on much of this prior literature in his conception of his 
own abyssal space. Within this category are various works of adventure fiction, 
including Robert Stevenson’s Treasure Island177(1883) and Daniel Defoe’s 
Robinson Crusoe178(1719). Robinson Crusoe especially shares Moreau’s focus on 
a “them and us” divide between versions of humanity, a division that Moreau 
further problematizes. The division between Crusoe and the cannibals 
demonstrates the ability of humanity to separate itself psychologically from its 
more primal self. Like Crusoe, Prendick seems an isolated higher form of 
humanity in comparison with the Beast People he is stranded with. Furthermore, 
within the society of the Beast People there are the more docile members, for 
example the St Bernard creature resembles Friday, and there are more savage 
creature; in this manner the Cannibals take form as the Leopard Man and the 
Hyena Swine. Wells was also, as Roger Bozzetto notes, inspired by Jonathan 
Swift’s Gulliver’s Travels179 (1726), and drew on this prior fiction to write his 
novella. Bozzetto, in his focus of the “tragi-farcical” elements of the novel, 
observes that the space is used specifically as the grounds for a symbolic 
demonstration of human nature: “The island on which it centers at first appears 
as a terrain for adventures; but these, while remaining anchored in the reality of 
the represented world and sharing its solidity and coherence, take on an 
allegorical coloration as they put to work the elements of various myths.”(34-35) 
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The Island is purposefully emblematic, used as a space for exploration, of both 
space and identity. The island itself is a mystery, and previously uninhabited 
prior to Moreau’s experimentation, therefore emphasising the unknowable, 
demonstrative of an abyssal space.  However, as Bozzetto further claims, the 
island can be placed in the same area as the Galapagos Islands:  
It is somewhere in the Pacific Ocean between Chile, to which 
Montgomery is returning, and Hawaii, towards which the 
Ipecacuanha is headed, or between Apia, Samoa's capital, and San 
Francisco, according to the route followed by the ship that picks up 
Prendick at the end. In short, the island is in the vicinity of the 
Galapagos Islands, where Charles Darwin conceived of The Origin of 
Species. (35) 
Bozzetto concludes that Moreau’s Island is not as abstract as many other literary 
islands, including the island of More’s Utopia (1516) or Swift’s nations in 
Gulliver’s Travels. Yet it takes some attention to the details of the novel to place it 
as Bozzetto does. Furthermore, the association with Darwin’s discoveries, and 
the situation of the island inherently tie it to the Darwinian abyss.  
Glendening argues that in this space Prendick faces his own animality, as well as 
the horrors of the island: “…physical suffering, fear and the instinct for self-
preservation cause him to confront a violent, animalistic part of himself, a 
dimension he will encounter repeatedly before he escapes the island.”(576)  
Further to Glendening’s argument, I argue that this created space is designed 
specifically by Wells so that his protagonist can confront the abject horror of his 
primal being. Montgomery also notices the abject qualities of the Island, having 
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turned to alcohol to sustain his continued existence: “Why am I here now – an 
outcast from civilization- instead of being a happy man enjoying all the pleasures 
of London?” (19) Yet readers are aware that Montgomery has been placed on 
Doctor Moreau’s island due to an immoral act during his time studying medicine. 
Similarly Moreau was hounded from society due to his questionable 
experiments. It can be deduced that the two scientists have been rejected from 
human society due to criminal impulses, which, as was established within the 
last chapter, can be inherently linked to animality. Prendick may also find himself 
stranded in the abyss due to his desperate acquiescence to cannibalism. Because 
he was driven to such measures, and does not, in the end, commit them, he is 
allowed to leave the abyss and re-join human society. Yet becoming a part of the 
abyss means that he will never again be able to enjoy human company. For 
Prendick, the boundary between human and animal has been blurred 
permanently, and he can no longer ascertain the distinction between man and 
animal.  
Pearson also observes the symbolic relevance of Wells’s created space: “When 
the Time Traveller ventures into the future, he enters a symbolic realm, much 
like Moreau's island, or the atoll of the Aepyornis, or, indeed, the primitive 
landscape of prehistoric Britain.” (73) Pearson finds the similarities in both 
imaginary spaces in the primitive qualities that Wells evokes. Primitivity or 
human prehistory, is crucial to the philosophy of the abyss where space and time 
is concerned; before recorded history, but after the separation from animal, and 
it is within the mysterious primitive history of man that the missing link within 
the abyss can be found. Differing from the space created in the Island, the Time 
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Traveller is displaced in time; the abyss is found within the distant future, a space 
that becomes abyssal because it is absent of humanity, and is instead inhabited 
by creatures who resemble elements of man but are so far removed that these 
are uncanny and abject. It is unique, because when considering the abyssal 
contents scientists and philosophers tend to think back to the origins of 
humanity. Wells instead looks ahead to the possible reunion between human and 
beast. The futurity of this landscape perhaps makes it more terrifying than 
Moreau’s Island, as it is situated closer to home.  
The creatures that reside in the Time Travellers abyss are polar opposites; the 
Eloi and the Morlocks, who will later be discussed in relation to regression and 
de-evolution. These creatures represent two conflicting elements of humanity. 
Logically, if these two species were combined, you could consider them a 
pessimistic view of humanity-the pathetic and the vicious. However I would 
argue that Moreau’s Beast People resemble a conglomeration of the Eloi and the 
Morlocks. The more benign Beast People become dependent on Prendick, as 
Weena becomes dependant on the Time Traveller. Yet the more carnivorous 
creatures like the Hyena Swine and the Leopard Man resemble the Morlocks in 
their savagery. However none of the creatures could entirely be mistaken for 
humans. The Beast People are Wells’s primary abyssal residents. They are 
curiously mismatched, originating from a variety of different animals, 
symbolising the numerous different sources of common ancestry. The Beast 
People are bound by a particular experience; they have all been through the same 
initial process that Moreau put them through to make them more human. Some 
are harmless, and almost endearing, like the little slothman. Others are merely 
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irritating like the ape-man considering his “big thinks” and pretensions to 
humanity. Yet other creatures on the Island are threatening and dangerous like 
the leopard-man. The spectrum of the Beast Folk included on the island 
represents Derrida’s concept of the animot; the animals cannot be generalised 
into a certain variety of savagery. All the animals show signs of animality that 
represent the beasts they were before Moreau tampered with them, 
demonstrating that animality is not one inherent trait shared among animals. 
Mirroring humanity, this also demonstrates that humanity cannot be reduced to 
one single quality.  
 E. E. Snyder agrees that the Beast Folk are the abyssal monsters of the island, 
clearly situated between human and animal: “The Beast Men are the novel's 
evident monsters, at least to start with. They are Moreau's creations, not human 
yet no longer animal after what he has done to them. The Beast Men represent a 
confusion between human and animal, a blurring of boundaries.”180 Snyder’s 
reading of the Beast Creatures is evident within the novel by Prendick’s contrary 
reaction towards them: “That these man-like creatures were in truth only 
beastial monsters, mere grotesque travesties of men…” (80) Although Prendick 
develops relationships with some of the Beast Folk, he is primarily pleased to be 
separated from them: “It is strange, but I felt no desire to return to mankind. I 
was only glad to be quit of the foulness of the Beast Monsters.” (129) Prendick’s 
desire to remove himself from the Beast Folk reflects the psychological need of 
humanity to separate itself from its own inherent animal. However, although the 
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Beast Folk are the most obvious abyssal residents of the Island, each human 
character can also be considered as traversing the space between animal and 
man. Prendick driven by hunger and thirst turns to his more fundamental bodily 
instincts to survive. Montgomery, an alcoholic is no longer fully in possession of 
his human faculties, and Moreau’s genius extends itself to madness, his 
rationality crossing into irrationality as his morality is detached from his 
humanity. Moreau may have elevated the creatures temporarily, so they become 
contents of the abyss, yet the humans of the novel had to descend into the abyss 
from the opposing edge. The humanity of the men who reside on the Island is 
tested within the novel, and the hierarchy they tried to maintain fails, meaning 
there is only one human escapee. Yet although Prendick escaped the Island, he 
remained part of it psychologically.  
Principally, the abysses that Wells creates demonstrate something akin to 
Derrida’s philosophy of the multifaceted void in flux. Derrida’s theory of a 
mutable abyss suggests that there is no definite distinction between man and 
animal: “This abyssal rupture doesn’t describe two edges, a unilinear and 
indivisible line having two edges, Man and Animal in general.” (31) Moreau’s 
varied Beast People reflect the complexity of humanities origins, and therefore 
the complexity of the abyssal contents. Because there is no definite trait that 
defines man from animal, Wells introduces a concept of humanity that becomes 
important throughout much of his literature, both fiction and nonfiction. Wells 
demonstrates that humanity is not a constant, an aspect that will be further 
considered later in this chapter. The abyss is constantly changing, and we cannot 
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pinpoint anything that directly and cleanly divides animal from man, a point that 
Glendening also notes in his consideration of Wells: 
Indetermiacy, for instance, governs the novel’s treatment of the 
relationship between humans and animals, another area of 
uncertainty relavent to evolution. Evolutionary theory complicates 
the distinction between the two; because humans evolved from 
animals and bear innumerable traces of this incestry, there can be no 
absolute or essential gap between them-a point that Darwin makes 
repeatedly in The Descent of Man(1871) and The Expression of the 
Emotions in Man and Animal(1872). (2002) 
The difference cannot be found in the human voice, as Moreau is able to imbue 
the animals with speech. The animals do not lack morality as Dostoevsky would 
argue, as they have created their own sense of morality through The Law and 
their own spiritualism with a focus on Moreau. Furthermore Prendick’s St 
Bernard creature gives his life trying to protect him from the Hyena-Swine that 
the animal feared, demonstrating a capacity for selflessness: “My St Bernard 
creature lay on the ground dead, and near his body crouched the Hyena-Swine, 
gripping the quivering flesh with misshapen claws, gnawing at it and snarling 
with delight.”(125) The belief in a human soul is unacknowledged in these 
novellas, so it can hardly be recognised and reason is demonstrated to be such a 
weak and fragile commodity that it is linked as much to madness as it is to 
humanity. Therefore Wells’s created abyss is horrifying because there is very 
little that separates animal from man, an assertion that can be verified by the fact 
that Prendick, whilst on the island becomes more bestial himself: ‘’In this way I 
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became one among the Beast People in the Island of Doctor Moreau.” (118) 
Predick transforms into a human animal just as the Beast Folk are transformed 
into animal humans, and for a certain amount of time the two live together in a 
form of society. The ape-man irritates Prendick by a likening the two due to the 
shape of their hands: “The ape Man bored me however. He assumed, on the 
strength of his five digits, that he was my equal, and was forever jabbering at me, 
jabbering the most arrant nonsense.” (122) Yet although the apes arrogance 
annoys Prendick, there is an element of truth in the Ape Man’s notion; the two 
are more inherently linked than he admits. Furthermore the animal creatures’ 
society functions as a microcosm of human society, with its hierarchies, 
criminals, and complexities.  
The abyss is used by Wells to demonstrate the philosophical difficulty in dividing 
human from animal. In the abyssal space animal and human are interchangeable, 
and society is warped. The boundaries are blurred, creating liminal creatures 
used to mirror a Wellsian form of warped humanity. The abyss is transient, 
demonstrated by the fact that the protagonist is able to leave, and is used to allow 
the human characters’ space to explore their own animality which is not easily 
defined. Furthermore, another aspect of Derrida’s philosophy which would have 
resonated with Wells is the seemingly extreme divide that occurs in the present: 
 The multiple and heterogeneous border of this abyssal rupture has a 
history. The multiple and heterogeneous border of this abyssal 
rupture has a history. Both macroscopic and microscopic and far from 
being closed, that history is now passing through the most unusual 
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phase in which we now find ourselves, and for which we have no 
scale. (31) 
 Derrida argues that the abyssal limits are complex and in flux, yet according to 
Wells’s interpretation of Darwinian theory, currently we are more divided from 
animals than we have ever been before. As the abyss is changeable, however, 
there is no guarantee that this separation will last.  
Speaking Beasts; Giving the Animal a Voice 
In Derrida’s The Animal That Therefore I Am he argues that philosophers have 
always considered the animal and the human in binary opposition because 
animals lack a voice. They are unable to describe their suffering: “Can they 
suffer?... The answer is well known: no, and precisely because these automatons 
are incapable of responding” (81) Derrida revisits a question asked by Bentham 
and answered by Descartes. Animals become automatons because they cannot 
protest against their pain. Gillian Beer further considers the anthropocentric 
aspect of language, arguing that: “Language is anthropomorphic by its nature and 
anthropocentric in its assumptions. Only somewhat later in the century did it 
begin to frequently be argued that this anthropocentrism in itself might subvert 
the truth telling powers of language and must conscientiously be resisted.” (45) 
Beer argues that whereas many assumptions about the superiority of man were 
hinged on language, it may have in fact obscured certain truths. She suggests that 
with our use of language we forcibly separate ourselves from animals, assuming 
that because they cannot describe their pain they do not feel it. She further 
argues: “If the material world is not anthropocentric but language is so, the mind 
cannot be held truly to encompass and analyse the properties of the world that 
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lie about it.” (45) Thus, rather than revealing truths about the world, language is 
responsible for an anthropocentric deceit. We are able to convince ourselves that 
we are the centre of the world. In The Island of Doctor Moreau Wells does not 
deprive the animal of a voice, allowing a theoretical examination of the moral 
implications of this separation. He also demonstrates that though an animal may 
not have language, they are able to communicate their pain, particularly 
demonstrated through the tortured puma. 
Wells focuses specifically on the voice, which is drawn attention to frequently by 
Prendick. His first experience of the Island is on the ship after being rescued by 
Montgomery, and some of the first sounds he hears are the mingling of human 
and animal sounds; “Then the noise overhead began again, a snarling growl and 
the voice of a human being together.” (11) The sensory addition of the human 
and animal voice being heard together is a precursor for the themes in the novel, 
and the blending of sounds represents the blurred boundary between the human 
and animal, whilst also drawing a distinction between the two noises. 
Furthermore when Prendick encounters the figures in white on the beach he is 
especially focused on their strange voices: “…the deformed and white-swathed 
man on the beach…I wondered what language they spoke. They had all seemed 
remarkably taciturn, and when they did speak, endowed with very uncanny 
voices.” (33) The Unheimlich is one of the most important features of the novel. 
The creatures that Moreau creates on the Island are the embodiment of this 
uncanny sensation that Wells creates: “The three creatures engaged in this 
mysterious rite were human in shape, and yet human beings with the strangest 
air about them of some familiar animal” (42) The voices are therefore exemplary 
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of this uncanniness. The animals speak like humans, but there is a strange 
difference, one that is not definite but still obvious. Prendick cannot decipher 
exactly what makes the voices unusual, but there is a definitely noted difference 
nonetheless. 
Perhaps one of the most important moments in which voice becomes meaningful 
is when considering the pain of the puma. The puma’s cries caused by Moreau’s 
experiments are the driving force behind Prendick’s primary exploration of the 
island; “And presently, with a positive effect of relief, came the pitiful moaning of 
the puma, the sound that had originally driven me to explore this mysterious 
island.” (47) Despite not having any particular qualms with vivisection, the 
sound of the animal’s pain troubles Prendick so much that its drives him out in a 
weakened state. However, the matter changes dramatically when the puma’s 
animal voice becomes a human voice: “There was no mistake this time in the 
quality of the dim broken sounds, no doubt at all of their source; for it was 
groaning, broken by sobs and gasps of anguish. It was no brute this time. It was 
a human being in torment.” (50) Although the creature does not speak, there is a 
definite human quality to the voice, again left unspecified. The instigation of 
human pain and animal pain are immediately for Prendick separate issues. 
Though he may have been troubled by the puma’s pain he did not consider it 
immoral. When the voice became human however, the sounds of pain 
transformed into an alarm, driving Prendick to escape. The sounds of human 
pain represent a threat to Prendick. Whilst it was still the sound of animal pain, 
Prendick could remove himself from it. However, when the noises became 
human the subject of Moreau’s experiments transformed into a creature that 
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Prendick could identify with. The pain inflicted upon this other creature he can 
therefore imagine being inflicted upon himself. Yet the voice is never 
transformed into coherent words.  
Laura Otis argues that the animal voice becomes particularly relevant to the 
question of the division between animal and man considering Prendick’s 
assumption of the Beast People’s humanity: “Prendick presumes that they are or 
were human because they can speak, and that Moreau’s operations have stripped 
people of their humanity.” (500) Otis’s assesment is clarified when Prendick 
comes into contact with the Beast People, who speak to him: ‘‘You,’ he said, ‘in 
the boat.’ He was a man then- at least, as much of a man as Montgomery’s 
attendant-for he could talk.” (55) The Beast People do not all speak well, and 
some better than others: “The speaker’s words came thick and sloppy, and 
though I could hear them distinctly I could not distinguish what he said.” (42) 
Later, following the escape from the laboratory after hearing the Puma’s human 
cries he comes into contact with an ape like creature, whose being he questions. 
From the ability to speak Prendick identifies the simian creature as a human 
rather than an animal, although the form of humanity is measures in doses, as he 
is “as much of a man as Montgomery’s attendant”. Wells demonstrates that a 
creature can be imbued with varying levels of humanity. The ability to speak 
classifies the animal as human in a limited manner.  
The simian creature, however, chooses a different method of distinguishing men 
from beasts, through the number of fingers they are in possession of: “One, Two, 
Three, Four, Five-eh?” (55) This is particularly significant, as it demonstrates the 
subjectivity of human signifiers. The Ape-Man believes himself higher than the 
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other Beast People and closer to humanity because of the features he shares with 
the human members of the Island. Prendick emphasises that this is a ridiculous 
measure of humanity: “He assumed, on the strength of his five digits, that he was 
my equal, and was for ever jabbering at me, jabbering the most arrogant 
nonsense.” (122) Yet if it is arbitrary to find humanity in the digits on our hands, 
it could be equally arbitrary to consider verbal communication as a signifier of 
humanity. Perhaps this is proven by the Beast Peoples’ command of human 
language.  However, Wells’s focus on the Ape-Man’s hand demonstrates a 
fundamental use of logic, an application of causation, and with this ability the 
creature demonstrates a fundamental element of humanity. Similarly, the simian 
creature is able to manipulate and create with language: “One thing about him 
entertained me a little: he had a fantastic trick of coining new words.” (122) For 
example, the Ape-Man used the term “Big Thinks” to explain abstract thoughts. 
The ape man is, perhaps, a pastiche on what could have been considered 
“primitive” society. He is still very brutish, and with this come an annoying 
arrogance, but also his ability to extrapolate information. The Ape-Man’s use of 
language, therefore, is particularly meaningful when considering Wells’s 
application of the animal voice within the narrative.  
With the Beast People’s grasp of human language comes another very human 
attribute-discourse. With this, they created a law, and from the law they form a 
religion: “He must learn the Law.” (58) This law is a list of rules and boundaries 
that they have been told by Moreau to adhere to if they are to define themselves 
as men: “Not to go on all-Fours; that is the Law. Are we not Men?” (59) By 
including this “Law” within the Beast People’s society, Wells alludes to “The Law 
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of the Jungle” that Rudyard Kipling includes in The Jungle Books (1894)181. The 
Beast People are required to repeat these rules, which also include not sucking 
up Drink, not eating flesh or fish, not to claw bark and not to chase other men. To 
ensure the repetition of this law is maintained there is a Sayer of the Law, who 
acts like a priest. The method of upholding values by repetition suggests 
indoctrination which develops into a universal truth. By including these Laws 
Wells critiques Kipling’s concept of a proselytized humanity. Bozzetto identifies 
how Wells does this within his argument focusing on the tragi-farcical elements 
of the novel:  
What we have here, as various commentators have remarked, is 
Wells's ironic revision of the man-cub Mowgli learning the Law in 
Kipling's first Jungle Book. The connection, however, goes further 
than literary parody. Kipling, after all was not simply the marvellous 
storyteller; he also "sung the hymn of the dominant bourgeoisie, the 
war march of the white man round the world, the triumphant paean 
of commercialism and imperialism. (40-41) 
As Bozzetto argues, Wells did not adhere to Kipling’s views on white supremacy; 
using comedy to highlight the absurd nature of these created Laws, Wells deeply 
criticises Kipling. Therefore, when Bozzetto discusses the “tragi-farcical” 
elements of the novella, he emphasises a deeper moral tone to Wells’s writing. 
Furthermore, considering concepts of eugenics that Wells struggled with 
throughout his career, the use of the Law highlights an inherent problem with 
the assumption that one man’s comprehensions are better than another’s. It is 
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morally corrupt to assume superiority over another form of humanity, and 
concepts of eugenics make this concept of moral superiority especially 
dangerous. Thus, through imposing discourse on the Beast People, Wells is able 
to critique hierarchical concepts of humanity that make eugenics problematic. 
Similarly, using the Law Wells critiques the dictatorial elements of religion. Using 
the Law Wells ridicules religion by creating an absurd image of animals 
pretending to be humans controlled and driven by the arbitrary rules given to 
them. Wells also uses the Law, however, to convey pessimistic suggestions of the 
societal purpose of religion. The Law also demonstrates that whilst speech is 
perhaps wrongly considered a signifier of humanity, it is a powerful tool which 
can direct humanity’s development, adhering to his beliefs in the power of 
education. The second part of the Law includes a threat of Moreau’s laboratory, 
written like Hell: “His is the House of Pain.” (59) Moreau, who created the Law 
originally, is portrayed as a malevolent God, perhaps based on readings of the 
Old Testament. Wells demonstrates how language is used to create systems of 
control and, therefore, society. Yet this vision of society and this use of words are 
a lie. As Beer argues, it is possible that language is used to create divisive lies 
rather than universal truths. Lies are therefore, perhaps, more of a human quality 
than the use of language itself.  
The animals’ grasp of language proves to only be temporary, undoubtedly due to 
the persistence of the “stubborn beast flesh” that Moreau laments. Otis argues 
that the reversion by the Beast-People allows Wells a unique insight into the 
intermediary stages of human language:  
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Prendick's observations of the intermediate stages of language 
subvert the notion of it as a unique capacity. Between animal grunts 
and human eloquence lies a continuous spectrum, and articulate 
speech can be simulated, learned, and lost. By representing language 
coalescing and dissolving, Pygmalion and Doctor Moreau disqualify 
language as a well-defined boundary separating people from animals. 
The beast folk's failure to retain speech suggests the limits of 
plasticity: language can be acquired, but it will slip away unless 
integrated into a receptive structure. (500)  
She further argues that the Beast People can resemble the lower echelons of 
society through their inability to conquer English language, and demonstrates a 
social element to Wells’s use of animal language within the novel. She draws 
attention to this using George Bernard Shaw’s Pygmalion(1913)182. As both 
authors were socialists, this engages with perceptions of the poor and lower 
classes as humanity closer to animality.  
Wells uses the animal voice to demonstrate the tenuousness of the separation 
between man and animal. A man may list certain qualities that a human has 
which an animal lack, but through his thought experiment, Wells demonstrates 
that voice could purely be a matter of bodily limitations and education, both 
elements that can be manipulated through science as Moreau does. Wells thus 
shows that the human voice is a weak argument for humanity’s separation from 
animal. However, he also demonstrates the power of language; an argument Otis 
proffers when she says: “With a certain irony… Wells pinpoint language as the 
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most essential skill for success in social adaptation” (499). The Beast People are 
caricatures of humanity, and Wells’s adherence to Darwinian theory makes this 
possible. Like humans in society, a number of individual characters appear. 
Prendick’s Dog Man is a creature who is almost sympathetic; the Ape-Man is 
obnoxious and annoying, whilst the leopard man and Hyena-Swine are 
antagonistic. Wells imbues the animals with speech as an experiment to 
hypothetically explore the effect of giving animals voices. And despite the voice 
being a tenuous explanation of humanity, the animals demonstrate an uncanny 
mirror of humanity in the temporary society they create on Moreau’s island.  
Mutable humanity; The Abyss in Flux 
According to Gillian Beer, the introduction of evolutionary theory transformed 
humanity from a fixed state of existence to something transformative: 
“Evolutionary theory suggested that fixed laws no longer implied a fixed 
universe of matter. Instead, everything was subject to irreversible change. Whole 
species had vanished and even evidence of their existence had crumbled away.” 
(37) The most obvious example of this in literature is Wells’s The Time Machine, 
in which all traces of humanity are eventually wiped out as the Time Traveller 
journeys into the distant future. The concept of mutable humanity was not 
limited to Wells’s literature. Robert Louis Stevenson also demonstrates 
humanity in flux within The Strange Case of Doctor Jekyll and Mr Hyde. Within the 
novel, Stevenson portrays a scientist who endeavours to separate his humanity 
from his more bestial facets. By attempting to create a more Heideggerian abyss 
between himself and the animal, he instead entered a state of flux in which he 
would transform from the human to the animalesque with decreasing control. 
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The effect of the experiment is opposed to the desires of the scientist, who 
endeavours to increase the gap between animal and man. Instead, the transient 
nature of humanity is highlighted. Doctor Moreau’s tactic is very different. 
Instead of separating humanity from animality, he uses animals to demonstrate 
the ability to further a species. Nevertheless, the effect is the same. Moreau, like 
Hyde, demonstrates the mutable nature of human nature, which can be 
manipulated and fluctuate but never fully controlled. 
Within The Island of Doctor Moreau the definition between human and man is 
purposefully blurred to demonstrate this mutability, as Otis argues in her 
comparison of the novel with Pygmalion(1916): “In Wells’s novella people such 
as the alcoholic Montgomery behave like animals, and some of the beast folk have 
sympathetic qualities.”(490) Otis writes on the subject of talking animals and 
social experiments, and further argues that “The difference between people and 
animals, Wells’s story implies, is one of degree, not kind”.(490) As Otis contends, 
Wells held a firm belief that qualities in humanity were not definite, but found in 
higher quantities than they are in animals. They are qualities, therefore that 
fluctuate and change, demonstrated by the imbuement of human qualities on the 
Beast People. This is an aspect of humanity that Wells demonstrates within much 
of his fiction, as Pearson also notes: 
The transitional being is found in all of Wells's early novels. Griffin, in 
The Invisible Man, propels himself into his own modernity through 
the discovery of invisibility, which transforms him into a superhuman 
figure holding an advantage over his species. This mutation, however, 
proves the perverse feature of Darwinism and natural selection: its 
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wastage, and the threat of mutation leading only to extinction. (64-
65) 
Pearson, in his consideration of primitive, transitional man, observes a 
demonstration of unsuccessful, unsustainable mutations. Similarly when the 
Time Traveller is given a glimpse of the far reaching future he sees what would 
happen to human evolution if we accelerated it. Correspondingly, in The Island 
of Doctor Moreau, Moreau attempts to accelerate the evolution of animals, 
assuming that they will evolve the same way as humans. However this is proven 
also to be unsustainable, as once Moreau dies, the animals revert back to their 
original states. 
The transient element of humanity Wells presents can represent a movement 
away from animality as well as a return to it. Ringel, in her argument focusing on 
the animal/human hybrid, considers the mad scientist a figure of fear: “Most of 
all, we fear the ruthless Mad Scientist, whose single-minded pursuit of 
knowledge and pure reason has carried him so far away from the rest of 
humanity that he has lost "the human touch.”(74) For Ringel, the real 
monstrosity within The Island of Doctor Moreau is Moreau himself, who has lost 
touch with his humanity. He believes that humanity must overcome bodily 
impulses like pain, so as to further himself from animal. Although Moreau is not 
monstrous in appearance, the emphasis of the whiteness of his hair can be 
associated with patriarchal domination. The presence of a full head of snow 
white hair on a man can be associated with God-like power, for example 
traditionally linked with wizards from Merlin to Gandalf and Dumbledore.  This 
symbolism is particularly present in Suzanne Collins’s The Hunger Games (2008) 
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in the character of President Snow, the corrupt patriarch who asserts God-like 
control by imposing The Hunger Games on Pandem; similarly Moreau imposes 
his Law on the Beast People.183 The name “Snow” makes direct reference to the 
symbolic qualities of his white hair representing purity and corruption as a 
united dichotomy. Similarly Moreau seeks purity within humanity by separating 
man from his corporeal reactions, yet his actions are inherently corrupt. 
Moreau’s first name is never mentioned, he is always referred to by his last name 
united with his title; this has a dehumanizing quality, imbuing the character more 
clinical associations. Moreau is therefore elevated from his humanity through 
representation. Ann Stiles writes specifically on the focus in the late nineteenth 
century on the mad scientist. A possible throwback to the concerns of Mary 
Shelley divulged in Frankenstein, these scientists are depicted as reaching 
towards God, whilst furthering themselves from their corporeal animality. Stiles 
demonstrates that Wells’s early novels are specifically a demonstration of the 
danger of this cerebral being: “Wells's nightmarish vision of the massively over 
evolved brain unites these three works, as the ruthlessly intellectual biologist 
Moreau morphs into the amoral, top-heavy Martians and lunar inhabitants.” 
(319) Stiles furthers her focus on the mad scientist by demonstrating a 
development from the monomaniacal Moreau to the amoral aliens of War of the 
World (1897)184. Echoing some of Dostoevsky’s considerations of morality, Wells 
portrays the human who considers himself further from animals than the 
remainder of mankind. This Promethean being is revealed as being more 
monstrous than common man, as despite being intellectually advanced he lacks 
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empathy.  Patrick A. McCarthy also notices this element of Wells’ stories, citing 
the “moral ambivalence and degeneration of the self-appointed superman”(39) 
as a theme that Conrad also used to create the character Kurtz in Heart of 
Darkness (1898). McCarthy’s reference draws on Niezschean element of Wells’s 
work. The character of the Promethean scientist pervades both novellas; by 
relying on the ability to transcend the body both Kurtz and Moreau become 
charges of beings with which they feel no empathy, demonstrated by Moreau’s 
disregard of pain: “So long as visible or audio pain turns you sick, so long as your 
own pain drives you, so long as pain underlies your propositions about sin, so 
long, I tell you, you are an animal, thinking a little less obscurely what an animal 
feels.”(73) It is this lack of empathy that allows them the ability to transcend the 
human and the animal; they believe their extreme rationalism an improvement 
on humanity, yet their actions lack morality. Therefore their excess of rationality 
allows them to become more animal. However, whereas Shelley invites us to 
some extent to empathise with her protagonist by giving him the narrative voice, 
Well’s allows the reader no compassion for Moreau. He is written through the 
eyes of Prendick, who shares no emotional attachment with him, and because of 
this Moreau becomes a caricature, an allegory used as a warning against 
excessive materialism, despite Wells’s affinity with Darwinism. 
Examples of this manically intelligent scientist in history include Francis Galton, 
and Cesare Lombroso. Similarly, Stiles notices the active use of the mad scientist 
within The Island of Doctor Moreau: “French psychiatrist Jacques Moreau's 
Morbid Psychology (1859) became the most influential early treatise on genius 
and insanity. Moreau, who is today best known for his experiments with 
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marijuana, almost certainly served as the model for Wells's villainous biologist 
of the same name.” (324) According to Stiles the use of the name “Moreau” is an 
definitive nod towards concepts of genius, madness, and a form of evolution that 
is unsustainable. Wells uses Moreau to argue that a movement away from the 
animal which is too rapid and too artificial is unsustainable and immoral. 
Furthermore, Moreau takes rationality to a new level where it defies itself and 
resembles madness, as the captain of Prendick’s rescue ship suggests: “What the 
devil…want beasts for on an island like that? Then that man of 
yours…Understood he was a man. He’s a lunatic. And he hadn’t no business aft.” 
(16) Although Moreau establishes himself as a God to the creatures of the island, 
the drunken captain, despite his vices, sees Moreau more as a devil and a 
madman. It is madness that causes feelings of supremacy and monomania, 
creating what Prendick describes as a religion: “A horrible fancy come into my 
head that Moreau, after animalizing these men, had infected their dwarfed brains 
with a kind of deification of himself.” (59) Here, the self-appointed God of the 
Island is belittled and questioned, and by breaking ties with Montgomery the 
captain succeeds in excluding the residents of the Island entirely from the real 
world.  
When Prendick remembers stories of a “Moreau”, he recollects that the doctor 
was expelled from human society due to atrocities committed in his lab: “It was 
not the first time that conscience has turned against the methods of research. 
The doctor was simply howled out of the country.” (34) The Doctor was 
responsible for experiments that were referred to as “The Moreau Horrors” (34), 
which Prendick does not elaborate on, but clearly exemplify the scientists 
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disregard for moral feeling when endeavouring to further scientific exploits.  E.E. 
Snyder argues that “Moreau's definition of humanity is a creature that is not 
driven by pain, for that takes only rational action; his definition of sanity 
similarly requires action to be purposeful and directed, taken in the name of 
progress.” (213) Moreau’s vision of humanity is an example of the overt 
rationalism associated with the scientist. The opinion that man can supersede 
his bodily urges demonstrates a disregard for the lessons that evolution teaches 
us, whilst simultaneously exploiting its principles. Yet Moreau, through his own 
death, proves this theory wrong. Rationalism, like every aspect of humanity 
within the novel, can be lost, either through madness or death. Moreau suffered 
both fates. 
Within The Island of Doctor Moreau, the eponymous character demonstrates how 
humanity can be artificially bestowed and created. Humanity is literally 
manmade, and Moreau is able to bestow various gifts of humanity upon animals, 
including the ability to speak and to stand upright: “They may once have been 
animals. But never before did I see an animal trying to think.” (69) Although he 
does this using horrifically cruel methods of vivisection, he is so successful that 
to begin with Prendick assumes that the creature he meets are human, albeit 
disfigured, strange humans: “He was, I could see, a misshapen man, short, broad, 
and clumsy, with a crooked back, a hairy neck, and a head sunk between his 
shoulders.” (13) M’Ling is Prendick’s first experience of the beast people, and 
although he assumes the creature is a man, he is struck by an uncanniness: “The 
thing came to me as a stark inhumanity. That black figure, with its eyes of fire, 
struck down through all my adult thoughts and feelings, and for a moment the 
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forgotten horrors of childhood came back to my mind.” (20) It is this marked 
uncanniness that infects the entirety of the novel, a fact highlighted by Wells’s 
use of an almost exact description of the Unheimlich:  
I perceived clearly for the first time what it was that had offended me, 
what had given me the two inconsistent and confliction impressions 
of utter strangeness and yet of the strangest familiarity. The three 
creatures engaged in this mysterious rite were human in shape, and 
yet human beings with the strangest air about them of some familiar 
animal. (42) 
Nevertheless, when Prendick begins to fathom the meaning behind Moreau’s 
experiments, he assumes he was changing men into more animalistic beings 
rather than the other way round: ‘’They were men-men like yourselves, whom 
you have enslaved, and whom you still fear” (66) However Moreau uses what he 
describes as a “humanizing process” (67) to transform his creatures. Yet it is not 
only bodily changes that Moreau has to instigate to create men from animals. He 
notes instead that much of the necessary work is in the education of the animals: 
“Very much indeed of what we call moral education is such an artificial 
modification and and perversion of instinct; pugnacity is trained into courageous 
self-sacrifice, and supressed sexuality into religious emotion.” (73) This perhaps 
suggests that much of humanity is found in aspects of society that are taught, or 
indoctrinated. Furthermore it suggests that by creating law and religion, 
humanity can be created. Yet with the application of these aspects of society 
Wells creates a ludicrous scene in which the animals are ridiculous for 
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worshipping a man who they consider to be God. The deification of Moreau 
suggests that humanity is an almost farcical application of certain arbitrary lies.  
Moreau describes animality as the drive of bodily inpulses, suggesting that 
humanity rises above this: “So long as visible or audible pain turns you sick, so 
long as your own pains drive you, so long as pain underlies your propositions 
about sin, so long, I tell you, you are an animal, thinking a little less obscurely 
what an animal feels.” (73) Moreau’s belief that the body is responsible for 
animality, however, proves the mutability of humanity, as “they revert. As soon 
as my hand is taken from them the beast begins to creep back, begins to assert 
itself again…” (78) The body is a changing, transitory object that cannot be 
conquered by Moreau’s endeavours. Nevertheless, he promises to: “… burn out 
the animal…” (78), as if humanity is something infinite that can be imposed upon 
the right body. Moreau attempts to argue that after he has created the creatures, 
they are unquestionably human: “These creatures of mine seemed strange and 
uncanny to you as soon as you began to observe them, but to me, just after I make 
them, they seem to be indisputable human beings.” (78) Moreau denies the 
argument that Wells asserts within his writing, that the nature of humanity is 
disputable in itself, and imposing it upon animals merely exemplifies this. 
Furthermore, Moreau is wrong in believing that humanity can conquer the body, 
proven when he dies himself. Despite his belief that humanity is something that 
can be applied with the proper moderations to the body, it is his own animal 
mortality that kills him; the very reason that the body remains the master of the 
human soul. In fact, the humanity of Moreau and Montgomery proves too 
unreliable to be trusted: “Montgomery and Moreau were too peculiar and 
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individual to keep my general impressions of humanity well defined.” (84) 
Prendick begins to see flaws in the concept of humanity, and it begins to become 
a blurred concept within itself. 
It is also evident that whilst humanity can be synthesised, it can also be lost; a 
creature considered “human” can revert back to animality, be it one of Moreau’s 
created creatures, or they human characters of the Island. Prendick reverts to an 
animal state when he panics about his own safety on the Island. Otis argues that 
Montgomery had always been a liminal figure between animal and human: 
“Montgomery, who, as an alcoholic, is himself half beast…” (498) Yet when 
Moreau dies, who represents the only figment of human society on the island,  
Montgomery completely reverts to animality when he gets drunk with Moreau’s 
beasts, causing Prendick to dismiss him saying: “You’ve made a beast of yourself. 
To the beasts you may go.” (107) At this moment Montgomery has actively 
relinquished his links to the human world, and instead allows drink to drive him 
towards the animals: “We’re on the edge of things. I’m bound to cut my throat 
tomorrow. I’m going to have a damn good bank holiday tonight.” (107) 
Furthermore, the most profound reversion is perhaps the reversion made when 
Montogomery dies, and Prendick is left alone with the beasts. “In this way I 
became one among the Beast People.” (118) In his time on the island Prendick 
remains with the beasts, talks with them and develops a social relationship with 
them. When the Beast People begin to revert back to their own original 
animalities, Prendick experiences an almost sentimental sadness when faced 
with losing his companions: “The little pink sloth thing became shy and left me, 
to crawl back to its natural life once more among the tree branches.” (123-124) 
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When Prendick’s St Bernard is killed he senses the danger for himself. This drove 
Prendick’s last senses of humanity to find a way off the Island. Yet although he 
was successful, the effect of the island was lasting. Before his encounter with the 
Hyena-Swine, he is changed from a man into a more animal-like creature: “I, too, 
must have undergone strange changes. My clothes hung about me as yellow rags, 
through whose rents glowed the tanned skin. My hair grew long, and became 
matter together. I am told that even now my eyes have a strange brightness, a 
swift alertness of movement.” (124) During his time on the Island Prendick’s own 
humanity proved mutable. He is consequently permanently transformed into an 
abyssal resident: “I was almost as queer to men as I had been to the Beast People. 
I may have caught something of the natural wildness of my companions.” (130) 
Furthermore, this aspect of his transformation allowed himself to see humans as 
they are, merely animals bestowed with fleeting humanity: “I could not persuade 
myself that the men and women I met were not also another, still passably 
human, Beast People, animals half wrought into the outward image of human 
souls; and that they would presently begin to revert, to show first this bestial 
mark and then that.” (130) Wells perhaps draws attention here to the tenuous 
separation humanity makes between themselves and the animal other. The 
vision he leaves the reader with is a weakly transformed creature who, as Darwin 
says in The Descent of Man: “still bears in his bodily frame the indelible stamp of 
his lowly origin” (398). Wells shows how with our newly developed humanity 
comes the threat of the subsequent loss: “I felt as though the animal was surging 
up through them; that presently the degradation of the Islanders will be played 
over again on a larger scale.” (130) On reaching humanity finally, Prendick 
discovers that he finds himself with another form of Beast People, who are more 
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convincingly human yet still portrayed as animals masquerading as a higher 
form of being. 
Turning back the clock: Devolution and the Regression of Humanity 
Following the previous section in which I discussed how Wells portrays the 
transient nature of humanity, we examined how in the last part of the novel the 
Beast People became gradually more animal and regress, a process that Prendick 
mirrors to some extent. The permanent movement of the Beast People from 
human to animal demonstrates that in the grand time scale of the Earth humanity 
is merely an anomaly that will not persevere as other species adapt. Beer 
summarizes how inconsequential humanity can be considered when discussing 
the place of humanity in the story of the Earth: “Lyell, and later Darwin, 
demonstrated in their major narratives of geological and natural history that it 
was possible to have plot without man-both plot previous to man and plot even 
now regardless of him.” (17)  Beer uses the concept of plots to describe a move 
away from anthropocentrism. The movement away from anthropocentrism 
caused by evolutionary theory is evident in The Time Machine. In the novella the 
Time Traveller finds himself surprised when he travels past humanity and 
further past life itself, achieving a glimpse of man’s insignificance in the process. 
Furthermore, Wells also demonstrates how humanity may change and 
transform, perhaps slipping back into more prehistoric forms. Martin Danahay 
explores how Wells uses misreading of evolution to demonstrate the concept of 
directed evolution:  
The Island of Dr. Moreau plays with two divergent readings of 
evolution, one as ‘progress’, what Wells derisively termed ‘excelsior 
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biology’ in ‘Zoological Retrogression’, and the other drawing on the 
widespread fears of human degeneration in the 1890s. Prendick 
initially fears that Moreau is performing a forced degeneration, 
sending humans ‘down’ the evolutionary scale. 
According to E.E. Snyder “The Island of Doctor Moreau demolishes the idea of 
evolutionary progressivism or directionalism, a response to Darwin that was 
common in the mid to late nineteenth century.”(214) Many misreadings of 
Darwinism took a Lamarckian direction by assuming that as part of the course of 
evolution, humanity would become a greater version of itself. However as 
Darwin argues, natural selection is randomised and non-directional, resulting 
from a series of chance mutations that could progress in any direction, not 
necessarily one that champions humanity. Pearson, who discusses Wells’s 
sociological focus, argues that he took a Darwinian outlook as to the future of 
humanity:  
Wells always rejected the Spenserian promotion of progress for the 
more Darwinan cocktail of chance, coincidence, and 
contingency…Wells bases his system of evolution on Darwin's trinity 
of chance, waste, and pain, the workings of nature being seen as 
without design, 'careless of the type', and inducing suffering in those 
creatures unfit or unable in the struggle for survival (58-59)  
Contrasting with Spenser’s ideas of evolution there is a nihilistic quality to 
Darwinism; his theories suggest that, unlike Erasmus Darwin’s thesis on the 
steady progression of humanity, the future of man is left to chance and the ability 
to survive. The Darwinian concept of chance caused the Victorian fear of the 
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possibility of “de-evolution”; the idea that when natural selection progresses the 
human race may retire into a more primitive form of being. How humanity 
adapts to this is without morality of reason, therefore we cannot expect to be 
moving towards a superior state of being, just a different one. Wells presents this 
sentiment in particular in The Time Machine, which communicates a disturbing 
glimpse into the distance future. 
Primarily the Time Traveller claims that he expected a progression in human 
society; “When I had started with the Time Machine, I had started with the 
absurd assumption that the men of the Future would certainly be infinitely ahead 
of ourselves in all their appliances.” (54) Wells bestows upon the Time Traveller 
a Spenserian assumption that evolution moves in a forward direction, and 
species can only progress. In The Island of Doctor Moreau Montgomery tells 
M’Ling “Your place is forward” (13), and though he is speaking of his place on the 
ship, the sentence is poignant, as it represents a widely held yet mistaken view 
of evolution. Moreau and Montgomery’s goals with the Beast People are 
influenced by the idea that they are driving evolution forward, and it is this vision 
of evolution that the Time Traveller shares. The great scientists of Wells’s novels 
are dedicated to humanity’s progression forward, a concept that verifies their 
own assumptions of intellectual superiority over the rest of the human race. The 
Time Traveller finds instead that he is a common ancestor to two species who 
are both flawed and animalistic, both more base than modern day humans, yet 
also mirroring us. When he first arrives in the future, the Time Traveller 
encounters the ineffectual Eloi who initially resemble a perfect progression but 
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are also reliant and weak, a critical exploration of the concept that Darwin and 
Wallace proffer, suggesting that as our minds grow our bodies need not develop: 
Mr Wallace, in an admirable paper before referred to, argues that 
man, after he had partially acquired those intellectual and moral 
faculties which distinguish him from the lower animals, would have 
been but little liable to bodily modifications through natural selection 
or any other means. For man is enabled through his mental faculties 
‘to keep with an unchanged body in harmony with a changing 
universe. (152) 
The Time Traveller is curious because the Eloi’s language is less complex than 
human languages, as he believed that the progression of humanity would 
necessitate the progression of human speech: “Either I missed some subtle point, 
or their language was excessively simple-almost exclusively composed of 
concrete substantives and verbs. There seemed to be few, if any, abstract terms, 
or little use of figurative language.” (39) Wells’s focus on language and speech is 
used to demonstrates de-evolution of the mind as well as the body, and a loss of 
creative vocabulary signifies a move towards animality. The Eloi body is a 
weaker, as predicted, but the mind is also feebler. The Time Traveller attempts 
to explain the emergence of the Eloi using principles of progressive evolution, 
suggesting that society developed extensively so that great minds or physicality 
was not needed: “I thought of the physical slightness of the people, their lack of 
intelligence and those big abundant ruins, and it strengthened my belief in a 
perfect conquest of nature…Very simple was my explanation, and plausible 
enough-as most wrong theories are!”(32-33) By assuming that humanity moves 
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in an upwards trajectory, the Time Traveller wrongly hypothesises that he is 
safe. His assumption is demonstrated to be false, a mistake that may have cost 
him his life. The Eloi who at first resemble dependent children, are later revealed 
to be livestock.  
The Morlock, due to the hardship they had to adapt to, are the antithesis of the 
Eloi. They are violent, and because they consume their distant relatives the Eloi, 
there is a cannibalistic element to them: “The Morlocks at any rate were 
carnivorous! Even at the time, I remember wondering what large animal could 
have survived to furnish the red joint I saw.” (58) Yet despite their animalistic 
tendencies, the Morlocks demonstrate more intelligence than the Eloi, who they 
control. The Time Traveller surmises that the must be partially cared for by the 
Morlocks, as if they are being farmed: “And the Morlocks made their garments, I 
inferred…” (58). The Morlocks also moved the time machine to stop the Time 
Traveller from escaping. These acts demonstrate reason; a nefarious intelligence 
that is not directly observed, but is evidential, making the Morlocks seem 
uncannily human as well as animalistic. According to the Darwinian law ‘survival 
of the fittest’, this makes the Morlocks the master race: 
What if cruelty had grown into a common passion? What if in this 
interval the race had lost its manliness, and had developed something 
inhuman, unsympathetic, and overwhelming u powerful? I might 
seem some old-world savage animal, only the more dreadful and 
disgusting for our common likeness- a foul creature to be 
incontinently slain. (22) 
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Within Wells’s futuristic dystopia he envisions the Eloi and the Morlocks as a 
degeneration of humanity. The two species that depend on each other are 
generated from a mutual progenitor. This could allude to Darwin’s observation 
of slave and master ants in On the Origin of Species: “The latter does not build its 
own nest, does not determine its own migrations, does not collect food for itself 
or its young, and cannot even feed itself: it is absolutely dependent on its 
numerous slaves.” (223) The ants that Darwin discusses have somehow adapted 
so that one becomes the servant of the other, an allusion to the more brutal 
aspects of present day humanity that links us to our animal selves. Ironically, the 
Time Traveller’s final hypothesis on the development of the two species 
demonstrates a role reversal. The Time Traveller blames a rigid social hierarchy 
for the development of the two species: “The Upperworld people might once 
have been the favoured aristocracy, and the Morlocks their mechanical servants; 
but that had long since passed away. The two species that had resulted from the 
evolution of man were sliding down towards, or had already arrived at, an 
altogether new relationship.” (58) Wells demonstrates an irony in evolutionary 
mechanisms; due to the rule “survival of the fittest” the Morlocks, who are 
originally the down trodden are forced to develop into the amoral creatures they 
become, whereas the Elois’ more comfortable existence meant that the species 
did not need to adapt to survive. Therefore, it is possible to consider the 
Morlocks, more adapted to survival and therefore the more developed humanity, 
and the Eloi to be the regression. The Eloi are therefore the regressive species. 
By creating these juxtaposed species Wells demonstrates that humanity is not 
driven by some reasoning power towards perfection. Furthermore, by depicting 
these two species, which on the one hand could represent the evolution of the 
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human race and on the other represent the regression, Wells proffers a future in 
which no matter whether humanity transcends or descends it is bound to move 
closer to animality, therefore bridging the gap that it momentarily created.  
Furthermore throughout his adventure the Time Traveller begins to realize that 
he is now the missing link. As the ancestor of these creatures, he becomes the 
link between them and other previous animals through evolution. Comparatively 
these creatures, especially the Morlocks, seem to be abyssal residents, but in the 
future he is the missing link which connects the two species. Therefore the 
abyssal resident can be read in two opposing ways; the Morlocks in comparison 
with the Time Traveller could be abyssal, as they represent a development of the 
primal urges of humanity. However, the Time Traveller could be abyssal himself 
as he finds himself between the childlike Eloi, and the carnal Morlocks. His primal 
instincts become clear when he talks to the Eloi, especially when he attempts to 
find his time machine. He also demonstrates a carnivorous nature when he 
returns from the future craving meat… “Save me some of that mutton. I’m 
starving for a bit of meat.” (14) Richard Pearsons draws on this theory, 
describing how the Time Traveller recognises himself more in the Morlock than 
in the Eloi:  
By splitting primitivism and civilization between the Morlocks and 
the Eloi, Wells plays a game with the reader. The Time Traveller 
associates himself with the Eloi, he calls them 'human' or near human 
and feels sympathy for them. He even strikes up his friendship with 
the androgynous Weena, and sees her as the hope of humanity 
symbolized in her white flowers. But it is with the Morlocks that the 
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Time Traveller really has the most association. His repulsion at them, 
his retreat to Weena are only a denial of what the text makes clear: 
the Time Traveller contains the primitive, just like the Morlock. He is 
the labourer, loving machines, the eater of meat, and the violent 
destroyer of what threatens him. (74) 
According to Pearson “The Victorian being of futurity, metamorphosing between 
the Eloi and the Morlock, provided a symbol for the modern age of the 
fundamentally divided and self-destructive psyche of the new man.” (64) 
Pearson’s assessment demonstrates how Wells uses these two species as a 
pastiche to critique the values of the new Victorian man.  
This division between the amoral and the ineffectual, the mind and the body 
represents a divide between the two aspects of humanity. Similarly, in The Island 
of Doctor Moreau, the Islanders are split into two separate species; the cerebral 
humans, and the almost comical Beast People. Once again, Wells’s protagonist is 
found in between these two extremes. Having been stranded and traumatised, 
Prendick literally regresses throughout his experience: “Hunger and a shortage 
of blood-corpuscles take all the manhood from a man.” (24) It is, however, this 
regression that allows Prendick to survive on the Island. As opposed to Moreau’s 
cerebral belief in the human ability to overcome pain, Prendick uses his more 
animal instincts, and this leads to his survival.  
Conclusion 
Throughout this argument, I have noted that Wells, as a fervent Darwinist sees 
the human as a form of animal; there is no distinct, obvious difference between 
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human and animal, demonstrated clearly as Otis argues when Prendick, on 
entering the Beast People’s village, attempts to identify humanising 
characteristics:  “As Prendick learns more slowly than the reader who Moreau's 
beast folk are, he assesses them with all the criteria he can think of to distinguish 
humans from beasts. They talk, build houses, have erect posture, even try to 
think. But one by one, these potential boundaries collapse.” (490) Otis’s 
argument shows that there is not one attribute that a man can point to and 
declare it the difference between human and animal. Similarly, Snyder argues 
that the horror of the novella is sourced in the uncanny similarity between the 
humans and the Beast Folk: “The central concern of the book is that the Beast 
Men cannot be distinguished from other men, and that in our bodies and beliefs, 
we are all monsters.” (215) The abyss, similar to Derrida’s abyss, is fluctuating, 
changeable and multifaceted. Yet with the feeling of uncanniness that he imbues 
through his writing Wells demonstrates that though the distinction is not 
definable, it is definitely there. There is an abyss in existence, it is just not an 
absolute. 
Wells was not merely a Darwinian, but also a political reformist and a socialist. 
He was not an individualist, as many of Darwin’s followers were during the era, 
and he demonstrated a strong intersectional moral empathy for women, the 
lower classes and certain ethnicities comparitavely considering the attitude of 
the time. Pearson writes: 
Thus, human advancement, in Wells's view, is not solely the province 
of biological evolution, and is not to be seen as a complacent 
progression towards ever higher civilization. Indeed, the interaction 
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of cultural change and biological change is complex; but for Wells the 
component of culture is the more significant of the two. (65) 
Wells was a Darwinian evolutionist, and Darwin’s theory of evolution was, for 
him, a matter of fact. Yet he believed in the power of social reform, and 
considered education the primary method to develop the human race. He 
believed that the future of man could potentially be terrible if not checked by 
pacifism, socialism and equality. Pearson argues that “For Wells there is a 
residual savage state in the individual (and in society) that is only held in check 
by moral conscience.” (70) According to Wells, a man must not be the insipid Eloi, 
or the vicious Morlock. Instead, we must retain our human ability to learn and 
develop. For example, despite Moreau’s actions being comparatively inhumane, 
the beginnings of society seen within the Beast Peoples’ community demonstrate 
the need for the higher, more human qualities of language, education and 
community to be retained, in order to maintain humanity’s more sympathetic 
characteristics.  
However, Pearson suggests that for Wells, humanity needs to understand its 
primitivism in order to survive: “Modernity for Wells is the recognition of the 
primitive fundamental nature of man, and the feeble artificial character of his 
civilization. Man's folly, like Almayer's, is to believe that his civilization will save 
him. Wells's modern man must understand his primitivism, or perish.” (74) To 
Wells, our humanity is in the understanding of our animal origins. Ideas which 
consider humanity as somehow higher than other animals will only allow 
humanity to degenerate into complicity. The assumption that our natures are 
inherently different leads to an inactivity, that allows the development of species 
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like the Eloi. To separate ourselves from our animal selves, we must primarily 
accept them.  
In many ways, Wells’s philosophy on human nature can be seen as very 
pessimistic. He rejects concepts of meaning in the individual life, as Peter Kemp 
argues: “Individual life-even human life, he emphasises-is just an experiment, a 
slight modification which may, along with other slight modifications, alter a little 
the future development of the species to which it is utterly subordinate.” (2) 
Wells rejects the concept of individual agency within the progression of life, 
which explains partially his portrayal of the megalomaniac scientist. However, 
he does hold hope for humanity as a race, acting within society for positive 
change. Page suggests that Wells’s separation of humanity from animality is 
imbedded in the subjective self: “Despite the implications of Darwinism— that 
humankind may be just another biological mechanism in a cold, uncaring 
universe— Wells maintained that humans had a subjective self that had its own 
innate urge to develop.” (150) Wells, despite his pessimistic dystopias and 
microcosms, is still hopeful that human nature can overcome the more negative, 
primitive aspects of humanity. And that is perhaps, the element he shares the 
most with such a contrasting author like Dostoevsky. Although Wells’s moral 
sense is not sourced from religion, he still believes that man can overcome the 
more negative aspects of his primal instincts through educational and societal 
means. Despite a wealth of scientific evidence that proves otherwise, Wells 
demonstrates a necessity to elevate man about animal. 
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Conclusion 
Within my thesis I have examined various approaches to the abyss separating 
man from animal; differing concepts of the difference between man and animal, 
and the contents of the mysterious abyss that perhaps contains the secrets to 
man’s superiority over animal, if there is any at all. Throughout I examined the 
various creatures of the abyss, all monstrous in varying different ways, from 
Raskolnikov the superfluous man to Moreau’s Beast People; from Moby-Dick to 
Frankenstein’s creature. The examination of these beings has allowed me to 
consider the aspects which separate human from animal. By considering the 
work of these prolific novilists, I have demonstrated how philosophically 
important literature is. I shall now conclude by discussing the various potential 
elements of humanity which these novelist discuss, and whether they can be 
considered adequate limits of the abyss. I then finally reflect on the work of John 
Gray, whose philosophies categorically disregard a difference between animal 
and man. 
Darwin argues human intellect is the reason why man maintains his place above 
animals in the world. In Darwin’s opinion, it is humanities intellectual ability that 
separates us from animal, as he observes in The Descent of Man: “Of the high 
importance of the intellectual faculties there can be no doubt, for man mainly 
owes to them his predominant position in the world.” (153) However, despite 
recognising intellect as a special feature of humanity, not one of the four authors 
discussed acknowledge it as the meaning behind the division of animal and man. 
Shelley demonstrates that reason only elevates man to remind him of his bodily 
self through the medium of scientific experiment. Despite Frankenstein’s godlike 
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intellect he is unable to recreate the essence of man. Despite being abjected from 
humanity, the Creature is fully capable of rational thought. Rationality is one part 
of humanity that the Creature shares with humanity, yet it is still not human. The 
Creature is rationally and bodily human, yet without the essential essence. In 
Melville’s Moby-Dick, he imbues the whale with reason and Captain Ahab with 
madness. By doing this, he reflects on human rationality as a weak addition to 
humanity. The animal gains rationality as easily as Ahab loses his leg. Reason is 
a mere appendage to the human condition, not a defining feature. By 
representing rationality in this way he portrays intellect as a weak addition to 
humanity, easily conquered by the animalistic Will. Dostoevsky demonstrates 
through Raskolnikov that excessive intellectual application without a moral 
balance can, in fact lead to a regression towards animality in the form of criminal 
activity. For Dostoevsky, humanity is distracted from its purer essence by 
intellect. Rationality is therefore a hindrance for humanity, which is perhaps 
antithetical to Darwin’s opinions. Finally, Wells demonstrates that rationality 
can be bestowed and removed. It is mutable and does not overturn the bodily 
self. According to Wells, it is science and intellect that helps us explain 
humanity’s animality, as Doctor Moreau demonstrates on his island. That is the 
real horror that remains with Prendick after his escape. These authors therefore 
acknowledged rationality as one of the many limits of the abyss yet not 
important enough to divide humanity cleanly from their animal predecessors. 
Furthermore, they used their work to demonstrate this misconception about 
rationality. Every author I have studied is linked by the use of characters to 
disprove the idea that intellect and rationality are the defining feature of 
humanity. Therefore, I can surmise that though intellect is most certainly a 
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unique feature of human nature, in the opinions of these writers, it is not a 
satisfactory explanation as to our particular separation from the rest of the 
animal kingdom. 
On the matter of religion, however, the authors are divergent in opinion. A 
primary interpretation of Mary Shelley’s novella suggests an inability for 
humanity to extend its reach to the God’s, condemning the protagonist to a life of 
suffering caused by his ambitions. By attempting to recreate God’s work, Shelley 
demonstrates that humanity can therefore lose its privileged position. It is 
important to Shelley that man accepts his place as below that of God. Therefore, 
in accordance to the difference between human and animal, Shelley 
demonstrates humanity as perfect in its creation because of the divinity of the 
Creator. Humanity is created by a perfect creator, making it a perfect creation in 
itself; exemplary of Descartes ontological argument. However, a human being 
perfect in creation cannot sufficiently recreate perfection. Therefore, through the 
creation of the creature, Frankenstein demonstrates a rigid hierarchy pertaining 
to the place of man; above animals but below God. Nevertheless, despite Shelley’s 
assertion, underlying this is an inherent uncertainty on the fundamental 
principles of humanity. These insecurities hinted at by Shelley are exemplified 
by Melville in Moby-Dick, who demonstrates both fear of God, and a fear of the 
absence of God in his seminal novel. Dostoevsky however asserts the importance 
of religion as a defining factor which does not refute science, but undermines it 
when considering the definition of man. To Dostoevsky, the very meaning of 
humanity is discovered within spirituality. The closer man is to God, the more 
elevated he becomes. For Dostoevsky, the answer to the abyss lies firmly within 
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spirituality. Controversially, for Wells the figure of God is symbolically portrayed 
by the monomaniacal Doctor Moreau, who believes himself great, but his morally 
dubious experiments achieve strange and repulsive results, perhaps mirroring 
the creation of humanity itself. For Wells, religion is merely a farce, acted by 
Moreau’s Beast People to keep them in order. Completely contrasting with 
Dostoevsky’s assessment, Wells considers religion a mere method to control the 
humanoid beast.  
It seems, from the various different interpretations of the abyss throughout the 
thesis, that despite the differences of the authors, there is one aspect of the 
novels that stands out above any other. Each writer, in their own ways, preserves 
the importance of human morality. Shelley, from a religious perspective 
questions the ethical implications of scientific experimentation, and suggests 
that it is far more important for a human to maintain their bonds with the people 
they love rather that to attempt to exceed the human condition. Melville asserts 
the nobility of his characterised “savages”, for whom it does not matter that they 
are Christian, but that they are instead inherently good. Dostoevsky affirms that 
human morality is found through Christian spirituality, and is therefore what 
separates man from animal. And finally, Wells, despite a love and fascination 
with Darwinism, also believes in necessity of moral fortitude within humanity. 
Darwin himself agrees that retaining a strong moral stance is of primary 
importance, writing in The Descent of Man:  
I fully subscribe to the judgement of those writers who maintain that 
of all the differences between man and the lower animals, the moral 
sense or conscience is by far the most important… It is the most noble 
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of all the attributes of man, leading him without a moment’s 
hesitation to risk his life for that of a fellow creature; or after due 
deliberation, impelled simply by the deep feeling of right or duty, to 
sacrifice it in some great cause. Immanuel Kant exclaims, ‘Duty! 
Wondrous thought that workest neither by fond insinuation, flattery, 
nor by any threat, but merely by holding up thy naked law in the soul, 
and so extorting for thyself always reverence, if not always 
obedience; before whom all appetites are dumb, however secretly 
they rebel, whence thy original? (120) 
By directly referring to Kant, Darwin in some ways agrees with Dostoevsky’s 
particular assertion about morality, albeit without the zealous religious angle. It 
seems that writers and scientists alike strove to cling the concept that humanity 
was defined by morality. That we are inherently a “good” species, with an ethical 
sense absent in animals. However, I would argue that this humanist approach so 
important within the Victorian psyche no longer provides a compelling 
explanation for the abyss. Today the average person is constantly exposed to 
information about the numerous and various atrocities caused day to day by 
humans to other humans. Can we now truly maintain this faith in the goodness 
of human nature? I personally could not. 
Since the nineteenth century there has been a wide variety of new literary 
interpretations which engage with man’s relationship with animality. In Franz 
Kafka’s Metamorphoses (1915) the protagonist Gregor transforms into an insect 
with no identifiable cause, a demonstration of the absurdity of human life.185 In 
                                                          
185 Franz Kafka, Metamorphoses and Other Stories, London: Penguin, 2008 
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“The Lurking Fear”(1922) H.P. Lovecraft demonstrates a potential regression 
into animality of the higher classes, similar to that in Wells’s The Time Traveller, 
yet in Lovecraft’s story, it is the higher classes that resemble the Morlocks, savage 
and cannibalistic.186 In later texts, humanity’s relationship with animality is 
celebrated more than it is condemned, for example in Yann Martel’s  Life of Pi 
(2001) the young protagonist it shipwrecked on a boat with a tiger, insinuating 
that the tiger represents a dichotomous aspect of Pi’s nature that he must learn 
to accept to guarantee his survival.187 It is perhaps possible that a change has 
occurred since the nineteenth century, with an emergent pessimism caused by 
our realisation of how flawed our moral laws are, further transformed by 
acceptance of our animal selves. The animal that we attempted to further 
ourselves from, is perhaps now accepted more as a part of ourselves. It is 
possible that we are learning that attempts to distinguish ourselves from the 
animal are inherently flawed, because we are animals in our nature.  
There is one predominant key feature found in every novel I have discussed 
within this thesis.  In each book, the writer includes a vision of the fall of man. 
Furthermore, the fallen man is represented using is a Promethean narrative 
chronicling the folly of overreaching. Each novel contains its own version of 
Daedelus. The modern Prometheus, in this manner, is found in Shelley’s 
Frankenstein, Melville’s Ahab, Dostoevsky’s Raskolnikov, and Wells’s Moreau. 
Shelley’s Frankenstein represents the Promethean character in his pursuit of the 
scientist. Like the Titan, Frankenstein tries to bestow humanity with more 
                                                          
186 H.P. Lovecraft, The Lurking Fear: Collected Short Stories Volume Four, Ware: Wordsworth 
Editions, 2013 
187 Yann Martel, Life of Pi, London: Cannongate, 2012 
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control over its own destiny. Like Prometheus, he is severely punished. In Moby-
Dick, Captain Ahab represents the Promethean character because of his defiance; 
his dogged intent to gain revenge. By hunting Moby Dick, Ahab is presented by 
Melville as challenging God himself. The death of almost the entire crew is his 
punishment for overstepping his limits. In Crime and Punishment, the protagonist 
Raskolnikov attempts to overreach by committing murder. By doing this, he 
attempted to demonstrate that certain men can extend beyond the limitations of 
morality to act to promote the greater good.  By acknowledging his mistake, 
Raskolnikov suffers less that he perhaps would have if he had not confessed. 
Finally, Doctor Moreau is banished from England because of his attempts to 
create humanity. Like Frankenstein, he suffers for his arrogance. Yet after the 
first creation, Frankenstein understands his mistake at least in part, and refuses 
to create more human life. Moreau, however, does not learn from his 
banishment, and continues to pervert the natural order with science from his 
island. His death is his punishment for overreaching, demonstrating how mortal 
he actually is. The use of the Promethean character suggests less of a concern in 
separating man from animal, and more of a concern for man overreaching. 
Therefore, it is possible that these authors are more unsettled by the prospect of 
the trajectory of science, and less concerned about separating man from animal. 
In this manner, perhaps the abyss, or lack therefore was not such a terrifying 
prospect. Perhaps, instead, they feared the progress of man, the extension of that 
space separation man from animal, rather than the space itself. 
John Gray uses the Promethean myth to demonstrate a major failing of 
humanism; the dogmatic belief in the ability for humanity to progress: 
Tabitha Kan 285 
 
“Knowledge does not make us free. It leaves us as we have always been, prey to 
every kind of folly. The same truth is found in Greek myth. The punishment of 
Prometheus, chained to a rock for stealing fire from the gods, was not unjust.” 
(xiv) To Gray, the Promethean myth demonstrates that by reaching further than 
our limited abilities, we have doomed ourselves to an eternity of suffering. The 
myth was coined years before it had been written down by Hesiod, but it would 
seem that the concept was prophetic. Science may have changed the world for 
the better in many ways, but it has also helped facilitate our own self destruction 
through new and varied manners of warfare. The atom bomb was created with 
one purpose alone; to eradicate life. That we have conceived the very means to 
our own annihilation through the pursuit for progress, seems to vindicate Gray 
in many respects. 
Furthermore, Gray argues against the very concept of “humanity”. Gray instead 
declares that ““Humanity” does not exist. There are only humans, driven by 
conflicting needs and illusions, and subject to every kind of infirmity of will and 
judgement.” (12) This viewpoint entirely undermines the concept of the abyss. 
According to Gray, the abyss is merely an illusion created by humanity to forge a 
separation; he considers the abyss briefly by swiftly dismissing it: “The humanist 
sense of a gulf between ourselves and other animals is an aberration.” (17)  Gray 
suggests that the whole principle of “humanity” is an illusion; he insinuates that 
there is no such collective. For such a regarded pessimist, Gray is exceedingly 
popular. His supporters and collaborations include J.G. Ballard, Will Self, and 
Andrew Marr. Within the present day literary scene, he explains what might 
perhaps be the most popular viewpoint held by academics, exercised by current 
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authors. For example, Ballard’s High Rise (1975)188 is exactly the type of novel 
that explores the themes discussed by Gray. The descent of the residents into 
madness observed by a scientific professional is almost a modern reimagining 
Wells’s novels. Yet unlike Prendick, who manages to escape Moreau’s island, 
Laing is never able to leave. This change demonstrates how attitudes towards 
such questions have transformed, becoming more pessimistic, yet also more 
accepting of our animalistic selves, hailing potentially a movement away from 
humanism and towards a form of nihilism that essentially undermines human 
nature. 
In his “Foreword” to Straw Dogs (2003), Gray clarifies his attack on humanism.  
“Humanists like to think they have a rational view of the world; but their core 
belief in progress is a superstition, further from the truth about the human 
animal than any of the world’s religions.” (xi) According to Gray, Humanism is, at 
its core, a paradoxical belief, attempting to marry science and faith with opposing 
principles. This can be observed perhaps through Wells’s particular approach to 
the question. Unlike the other authors discussed he is able to dispose of the 
concept of a creator. However, he seems unable to entirely let go of the belief that 
man is in charge of his own destiny. Through his non-fiction works he 
demonstrates that although he does not believe that humanity will continue to 
progress in the biological sense, he puts faith in education and socialist reform 
instead. Where religious belief once prevailed, humanism becomes a seemingly 
more rational option. It is this “new religion”, however, that Gray criticises for its 
inconsistencies and its optimism.  
                                                          
188 J.G. Ballard, High Rise, London: Fourth Estate 2014 
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Within his criticism of humanism, Gray could be seen to be criticising ideas held 
by Wells, and his belief in human agency:  
Darwin has shown that we are animals; but-as humanists never tire 
of preaching-how we live is ‘up to us’. Unlike any other animal, we are 
told, we are free to live as we choose. Yet the idea of free will does not 
come from science. Its origins are in religion-not just any religion, but 
the Christian faith against which humanists rail so obsessively. (xi-
xii) 
In arguing so passionately against humanism, Gray undermines the hope 
Wells holds for the human race. As Wells is potentially the most pessimistic 
author that I have studied, it is enlightening to consider how the other 
authors would have reacted to Gray’s philosophy. Dostoevsky, in 
particular, would have found the theory upsetting; the writer who puts his 
faith in humanity in his belief in moral good. Preferring Schopenhauer over 
Kant, Gray rejects the concept of moral human nature. Gray does, however, 
call upon Dostoevsky to exemplify a contradictory statement. According to 
Gray, elements of Nietzsche’s final madness resemble a dream sequence in 
Crime and Punishment, in which Raskolnikov throws his arms around a 
whipped horse. Gray argues that this scene demonstrates an underlying 
guilt, a crisis of conscience felt by humanity; whilst on the surface we 
attempt to explain our superiority, underneath we acknowledge our 
mistreatment of other species. Dostoevsky would not approve of Grays 
pessimism, yet Gray does find some truths within Dostoevsky’s work. 
Melville would perhaps have considered Gray’s emphasis on the illusion of 
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free will with interest, but would eventually rejected it, preferring the more 
optimistic stance, that allowed Billy Budd to control his bodily impulses at 
the moment of death.  
According to Gray, the belief that humans are different from other animals is 
unnatural. It is in this concept, that perhaps we find the most likely difference 
between our need for separation during the nineteenth century, and our need 
for separation now. During the nineteenth century, after Darwinism had been 
accepted by such radically progressive thinkers such as Wells, it was still difficult 
to imagine that no difference between humanity and animals exists. Given space 
during the twentieth century to let this concept sink in, general attitudes towards 
animals have changed. In the last few hundred years’ progress has ironically 
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